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CCC, CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc.

Software asset-light Distress / turnaroundCyclical

CCC is a leading Software-as-a-Service and AI platform provider for the multi-trillion-dollar insurance economy powering operations for insurers, repairers, automakers, part suppliers, and more.

CCC cloud technology connects more than 35,000 businesses digitizing mission-critical workflows, commerce, and customer experiences.

A trusted leader in AI, customer experience, network and workflow management, CCC delivers technology that turns crucial moments into intelligent experiences, with the goal of shaping a world where life just works.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CCC · CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.1B

+11.9% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $868M

Gross margin 73% 5-yr avg 73%

Operating margin 8.9% 5-yr avg 0.0%

ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 0%

Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 22%

Free cash flow margin 24% 5-yr avg 21%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 73% and operating margin about 6.6% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −27% to 12% — on a steadier 73% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 17% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 22% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
								Income statement
$616M	$633M	$688M	$782M	$866M	$945M	$1.1B	$1.1B	RevenueRevenue
63%	67%	72%	73%	73%	76%	73%	73%	Gross marginGross mgn
13%	14%	36%	21%	22%	23%	20%	20%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
19%	17%	24%	20%	20%	21%	22%	22%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($166M)	$77M	($145M)	$52M	($24M)	$80M	$94M	$94M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−27.0%	12.2%	−21.0%	6.6%	−2.8%	8.5%	8.9%	8.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($210M)	($17M)	($249M)	$38M	($90M)	$31M	$2M	$2M	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
$66M	$104M	$127M	$200M	$250M	$284M	$315M	$315M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$18M	$18M	$25M	$28M	$37M	$43M	$59M	$59M	DepreciationDeprec.
$251M	$92M	$90M	$24M	$159M	$39M	$80M	$80M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$20M	$30M	$38M	$48M	$55M	$53M	$61M	$61M	CapexCapex
3.3%	4.8%	5.6%	6.1%	6.4%	5.6%	5.8%	5.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$46M	$86M	$103M	$172M	$213M	$231M	$255M	$255M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
7.4%	13.6%	14.9%	22.0%	24.6%	24.4%	24.1%	24.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$46M	$74M	$89M	$152M	$195M	$231M	$255M	$255M	Free cash flowFCF
7.4%	11.7%	12.9%	19.4%	22.5%	24.4%	24.1%	24.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$0	$0	$32M	$0	$0	$410M	$410M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$269M	$0	$0	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$148K	$0	$0	$0	$328M	$0	$601M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-10%	—	-5%	2%	-1%	2%	2%	2%	ROICROIC
-15%	-1%	-13%	2%	-5%	2%	0%	0%	Return on equityROE
—	−1%	−28%	2%	−5%	—	—	0%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$93M	$162M	$183M	$324M	$196M	$399M	$111M	$111M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$59M	$74M	$79M	$98M	$102M	$107M	$137M	$137M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$13M	$13M	$28M	$16M	$18M	$31M	$31M	Accounts payablePayables
$59M	$61M	$66M	$71M	$86M	$88M	$106M	$106M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$282M	$323M	$479M	$350M	$565M	$335M	$335M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$126M	$137M	$152M	$153M	$155M	$234M	$234M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	2.2×	2.4×	3.2×	2.3×	3.6×	1.4×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$2.0B	$2.0B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$3.6B	Total assetsAssets
—	$1.3B	$789M	$782M	$776M	$769M	$1.3B	$1.3B	Total debtDebt
—	$1.2B	$606M	$458M	$580M	$370M	$1.2B	$1.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.9×	1.0×	-2.5×	1.3×	-0.4×	1.2×	1.3×	1.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%	1.8%	38.1%	14.0%	16.7%	18.1%	16.6%	16.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
503M	504M	544M	643M	618M	642M	660M	660M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.22	$1.26	$1.27	$1.22	$1.40	$1.47	$1.60	$1.60	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.42	$-0.03	$-0.46	$0.06	$-0.15	$0.05	$0.00	$0.00	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.09	$0.17	$0.19	$0.27	$0.34	$0.36	$0.39	$0.39	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.09	$0.15	$0.16	$0.24	$0.32	$0.36	$0.39	$0.39	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	$0.00	$0.50	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.04	$0.06	$0.07	$0.07	$0.09	$0.08	$0.09	$0.09	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.74	$2.72	$3.44	$3.18	$2.88	$3.11	$2.71	$2.71	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+4.6%/yr	+5.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+27.2%/yr	+17.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+14.7%/yr	+9.1%/yr
Book value / share	−0.2%/yr	−0.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

660Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

2%low FY2019

Gross margin

73%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.6×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$255Mowner earningsvs.$2Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $2M of profit into $255M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$2M

Owner earnings$255M · 24% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2M	$31M	($90M)	$38M	($249M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$59M	+$43M	+$37M	+$28M	+$25M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$175M	+$171M	+$145M	+$109M	+$262M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$80M	+$39M	+$159M	+$24M	+$90M
Cash from operations	$315M	$284M	$250M	$200M	$127M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$61M	−$53M	−$37M	−$28M	−$25M
Owner earnings	$255M	$231M	$213M	$172M	$103M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	−$18M	−$20M	−$14M
Free cash flow	$255M	$231M	$195M	$152M	$89M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	24%	24%	25%	22%	15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $175M), owner earnings is nearer $79M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.3×

Thin

Operating income $94M ÷ interest expense $71M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 12.4× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $111M − debt $1.3B

What this means
Netting $111M of cash and short-term investments against $1.3B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 12.4× a year's operating profit (13.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 7d

Tight

DSO 47 + DIO 0 − DPO 40 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -1%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -10%–2%; 2% latest = NOPAT $47M ÷ invested capital $3.0B

Industry peers: median -4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 22%

High through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range 7%–25%; latest $255M = operating cash $315M − maintenance capex $61M

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 22% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $175M of SBC) leaves $79M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 186.90×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $315M ÷ net income $2M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 236%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $601M ÷ Owner Earnings $255M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $255M of Owner Earnings, $601M (236%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $601M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $175M stock comp, the real buyback was about $425M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.04×

Maintaining

Capex $61M ÷ depreciation $59M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.43×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.3B vs $101M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.03/share (latest year $0.00), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −12% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −12% early to 5% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +24%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 24% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · −27.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +4.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Furthermore, any factor adversely affecting sales of our SaaS or AI solutions, including application release cycles, delays or failures in new functionality, market acceptance, product competition, performance and reliability, reputation, price competition and economic and market conditions, could have a material adver…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$335M

Cash & short-term investments$111M
Receivables$137M
Other current assets$87M

Current liabilities$234M

Debt due within a year$13M
Accounts payable$31M
Other current liabilities$190M

Current ratio1.43×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.43×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.47×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$101Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$13M due · $111M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 1.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($1.2B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.3B$59M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$74Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$306M · 23%
Dividends$269M · 20%
Buybacks$929M · 69%

Returned to owners$1.2B
108% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $269M as dividends and $929M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$157M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $157M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$67.37
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $328M, about $67.37 each.
Net change in share count31.0%
The diluted count rose from 503M to 660M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.0B83% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$443Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $306M of capital spent building

$103M written down across 2 years (2019, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 23% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Githesh Ramamurthy	$137.1M	$191.9M	$103M
2022	Githesh Ramamurthy	$849k	−$48.6M	$172M
2023	Githesh Ramamurthy	$54.5M	$71.0M	$213M
2024	Githesh Ramamurthy	$946k	$4.4M	$231M
2025	Githesh Ramamurthy	$988k	−$6.4M	$255M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$175M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 17% of revenue, equal to 187% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?31.0%
Diluted shares grew 31.0% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $929M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?10% → 13% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $59M to $137M while revenue grew 72%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (10% of revenue then, 13% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MANHManhattan Associates	$1.1B	55%	23.3%	214%	25%
SAILSailPoint Inc.	$1.1B	64%	-28.7%	-4%	-13%
CCCCCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc.	$1.1B	73%	6.6%	0%	22%
FIGFigma Inc.	$1.1B	88%	-117.1%	-92%	23%
DUOLDuolingo Inc.	$1.0B	73%	-6.2%	44%	21%
ALRMAlarm.com	$1.0B	63%	8.7%	16%	13%
SSentinelOne	$1.0B	66%	-95.4%	-20%	-47%
TENBTenable	$999M	81%	-9.1%	-10%	15%
Group median	—	69%	-7.7%	-2%	18%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc. earns about $232M on its 22.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($232M) Net of stock comp (−$175M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+15%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+26%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $255M on 607M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-02-17; net debt $1.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 660M, 9% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CCC against another business →

The owners of CCC: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CCC Intelligent Solutions Holdings Inc. (CCC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CCC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CCBG its page in the Manual CCCC →

Industry order: ← CACI the Software chapter CCCS →