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CELH, Celsius Holdings Inc.

Beverages consumer brand

We develop, process, market, sell, manufacture and distribute a portfolio of differentiated products with innovative formulas meant to positively impact the lives of our consumers.

Our products are positioned as premium lifestyle beverages designed to support active, wellness-oriented, modern energy drink consumers.

Our portfolio primarily consists of energy drinks offered under the CELSIUS , Alani Nu and Rockstar brands, with CELSIUS and Alani Nu also offering a range of additional wellness products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CELH · Celsius Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.5B

+85.5% YoY · 81% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.0B 5-yr avg $1.2B

Gross margin 50% 5-yr avg 46%

Operating margin 7.7% 5-yr avg 2.4%

ROIC 14% 5-yr avg 3%

Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 5%

Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 20% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −1.3%) on a 43% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$36M	$53M	$75M	$131M	$314M	$654M	$1.3B	$1.4B	$2.5B	$3.0B	RevenueRevenue
43%	40%	42%	47%	41%	41%	48%	50%	50%	50%	Gross marginGross mgn
19%	20%	15%	14%	42%	66%	28%	39%	32%	31%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($8M)	($11M)	($1M)	$8M	($4M)	($158M)	$266M	$156M	$141M	$228M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−22.3%	−20.2%	−1.9%	6.1%	−1.3%	−24.1%	20.2%	11.5%	5.6%	7.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($8M)	($11M)	$10M	$9M	$4M	($187M)	$227M	$145M	$108M	$174M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	1%	—	—	22%	26%	14%	14%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
($8M)	($12M)	$1M	$3M	($97M)	$108M	$141M	$263M	$359M	$330M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$20K	$72K	$67K	$127K	$1M	$2M	$3M	$7M	$29M	$36M	DepreciationDeprec.
($2M)	($5M)	($14M)	($12M)	($138M)	$273M	($110M)	$91M	$194M	$89M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$50K	$110K	$78K	$574K	$3M	$8M	$17M	$23M	$36M	$37M	CapexCapex
0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.4%	1.0%	1.3%	1.3%	1.7%	1.4%	1.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($8M)	($12M)	$956K	$3M	($98M)	$106M	$138M	$256M	$323M	$293M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−23.3%	−22.3%	1.3%	2.5%	−31.1%	16.3%	10.5%	18.9%	12.9%	9.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($8M)	($12M)	$956K	$3M	($100M)	$100M	$124M	$240M	$323M	$293M	Free cash flowFCF
−23.4%	−22.3%	1.3%	2.2%	−31.7%	15.3%	9.4%	17.7%	12.9%	9.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$75M	—	$1.4B	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$2M	$6M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-216%	-99%	-2%	13%	-2%	—	—	—	8%	14%	ROICROIC
-48%	-95%	16%	8%	2%	-467%	86%	36%	9%	14%	Return on equityROE
−48%	−95%	16%	8%	2%	−467%	86%	36%	9%	14%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$14M	$8M	$23M	$43M	$16M	$614M	$756M	$890M	$399M	$549M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$6M	$13M	$8M	$15M	$39M	$63M	$184M	$270M	$755M	$832M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$5M	$11M	$15M	$18M	$191M	$173M	$229M	$131M	$338M	$364M	InventoryInvent.
$3M	$6M	$10M	$12M	$36M	$36M	$43M	$41M	$138M	$198M	Accounts payablePayables
$9M	$19M	$13M	$22M	$194M	$200M	$370M	$360M	$955M	$998M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$27M	$35M	$52M	$93M	$262M	$918M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.8B	$1.9B	Current assetsCur. assets
$6M	$15M	$27M	$26M	$93M	$161M	$277M	$366M	$1.1B	$1.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.2×	2.3×	1.9×	3.5×	2.8×	5.7×	4.4×	3.6×	1.7×	1.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	$10M	$10M	$15M	$14M	$14M	$72M	$918M	$920M	GoodwillGoodwill
$27M	$35M	$90M	$131M	$314M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$5.1B	$5.2B	Total assetsAssets
—	$4M	$9M	—	—	—	—	$0	$677M	$676M	Total debtDebt
—	($3M)	($14M)	—	—	—	—	($890M)	$278M	$127M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$17M	$12M	$63M	$104M	$217M	$40M	$264M	$400M	$1.2B	$1.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
6.2%	8.2%	6.4%	4.8%	11.6%	3.2%	1.6%	1.4%	1.1%	1.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
44.4M	50.1M	64.2M	74.4M	233M	227M	237M	237M	255M	260M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.81	$1.05	$1.17	$1.76	$1.35	$2.88	$5.56	$5.71	$9.87	$11.43	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.19	$-0.22	$0.16	$0.11	$0.02	$-0.83	$0.96	$0.61	$0.42	$0.67	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.19	$-0.23	$0.01	$0.04	$-0.42	$0.47	$0.58	$1.08	$1.27	$1.13	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.19	$-0.23	$0.01	$0.04	$-0.43	$0.44	$0.52	$1.01	$1.27	$1.13	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.01	$0.01	$0.04	$0.07	$0.10	$0.14	$0.14	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.39	$0.24	$0.99	$1.40	$0.93	$0.18	$1.11	$1.68	$4.63	$4.81	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.13 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+36.6%/yr	+41.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+96.0%/yr
EPS	—	+29.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+83.2%/yr	+78.9%/yr
Book value / share	+36.4%/yr	+27.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

255Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

8%low FY2017

Gross margin

50%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.9×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$323Mowner earningsvs.$108Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $108M of profit into $323M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$108M

Owner earnings$323M · 13% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$108M	$145M	$227M	($187M)	$4M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$29M	+$7M	+$3M	+$2M	+$1M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$28M	+$20M	+$21M	+$21M	+$36M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$194M	+$91M	−$110M	+$273M	−$138M
Cash from operations	$359M	$263M	$141M	$108M	($97M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$36M	−$7M	−$3M	−$2M	−$1M
Owner earnings	$323M	$256M	$138M	$106M	($98M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$16M	−$14M	−$6M	−$2M
Free cash flow	$323M	$240M	$124M	$100M	($100M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	13%	19%	10%	16%	-31%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $28M), owner earnings is nearer $295M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.9×

Adequate

Operating income $141M ÷ interest expense $49M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $278M · 2.0× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $399M − debt $677M

What this means
Netting $399M of cash and short-term investments against $677M of debt leaves $278M owed, about 2.0× a year's operating profit (4.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 168d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 110 + DIO 99 − DPO 40 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -2%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -216%–13%; 8% latest = NOPAT $122M ÷ invested capital $1.5B

Industry peers: median 28%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 13%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $323M = operating cash $359M − maintenance capex $36M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median 2%)

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves $295M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.33×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $359M ÷ net income $108M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 2%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $6M ÷ Owner Earnings $323M

What this means
Of $323M Owner Earnings, $6M (2%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $6M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($28M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.22×

Expanding

Capex $36M ÷ depreciation $29M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.68×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $677M vs $732M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.63/share (latest year $0.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −15% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −15% early to 12% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2022 · −24.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We use AI and automated technologies in certain operational, analytical and forecasting processes and overreliance on, or errors in these systems, could impair decision-making, disrupt operations or introduce unintended vulnerabilities.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B

Cash & short-term investments$549M
Receivables$832M
Inventory$364M
Other current assets$119M

Current liabilities$1.1B

Debt due within a year$7M
Accounts payable$198M
Other current liabilities$846M

Current ratio1.77×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.43×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.52×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$813Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$7M due · $549M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+137.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.4× → 1.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$225Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($283M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$694M$18M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$422Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $760M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$89M · 12%
Buybacks$8M · 1%
Retained (debt / cash)$662M · 87%

Returned to owners$8M
1% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $8M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $535M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $8M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count484.8%
The diluted count rose from 44M to 260M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained85%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($288M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $245M, so each retained $1 added about 0.85 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.0B20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity78%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$75Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $89M of capital spent building

$9M written down across 2 years (2018, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	John Fieldly	$12.2M	$33.4M	($98M)
2022	John Fieldly	$3.6M	$6.1M	$106M
2023	John Fieldly	$3.3M	$11.8M	$138M
2024	John Fieldly	$5.9M	$1.0M	$256M
2025	John Fieldly	$9.6M	$14.8M	$323M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio117:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$28M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 20% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Celsius Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?484.8%
Diluted shares grew 484.8% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $8M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Beverages

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MNSTMonster Beverage Corp.	$8.3B	58%	32.9%	28%	24%
COKECoca-Cola Consolidated	$7.2B	35%	7.9%	32%	6%
BF-BBrown-Forman	$3.9B	61%	32.4%	22%	20%
CELHCelsius Holdings Inc.	$2.5B	43%	-1.3%	-2%	2%
BRBRBellRing Brands Inc. Common Stock	$2.3B	33%	16.0%	37%	11%
SAMBoston Beer	$2.0B	48%	9.5%	16%	10%
WESTWestrock Coffee Company	$1.2B	18%	-3.1%	-7%	-6%
FIZZNational Beverage	$1.2B	37%	18.9%	75%	14%
Group median	—	40%	12.8%	25%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Celsius Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Celsius Holdings Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Celsius Holdings Inc. earns about $63M on its 2.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($63M) Net of stock comp (−$31M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+188%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+48%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $293M on 256M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $127M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CELH against another business →

The owners of CELH: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Celsius Holdings Inc. (CELH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CELH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CEG its page in the Manual CENT →

Industry order: ← CCEP the Beverages chapter COCO →