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COCO, The Vita Coco Company Inc.
Vita Coco is available in over 35 countries, with our primary markets in North America, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
We are one of the largest brands globally in the coconut and other plant waters category, and a large supplier of Private Label coconut water.
Our branded portfolio is led by our Vita Coco brand, which is the leader in the coconut water category in the United States, and also includes coconut oil, juice, and milk offerings.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Vita Coco Coconut Water (81%), Private Label (15%) and Other (4%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 34% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.7% to 15% — on a steadier 34% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 47%, above 15% in 6 of 7 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Vita Coco Coconut Water is 81% of revenue, with Private Label the other meaningful line at 15%.
- Vita Coco Coconut Water81%$496M
- Private Label15%$89M
- Other4%$25M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $284M | $311M | $380M | $428M | $494M | $516M | $610M | $659M | RevenueRevenue |
| 33% | 34% | 30% | 24% | 37% | 39% | 37% | 37% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 28% | 24% | 23% | 23% | 25% | 24% | 23% | 23% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $13M | $47M | $25M | $3M | $56M | $74M | $83M | $97M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.7% | 15.1% | 6.5% | 0.7% | 11.4% | 14.3% | 13.5% | 14.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $9M | $33M | $19M | $8M | $47M | $56M | $71M | $83M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 17% | 25% | 22% | 28% | 19% | 21% | 23% | 22% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $22M | $33M | ($16M) | ($11M) | $107M | $43M | $47M | $73M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $660K | $745K | $1M | $1M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $8M | ($3M) | ($41M) | ($28M) | $51M | ($23M) | ($36M) | ($25M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1M | $392K | $557K | $982K | $599K | $974K | $8M | $8M | CapexCapex |
| 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 1.3% | 1.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $21M | $33M | ($17M) | ($12M) | $107M | $42M | $46M | $71M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.3% | 10.6% | −4.4% | −2.8% | 21.6% | 8.2% | 7.6% | 10.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $21M | $33M | ($17M) | ($12M) | $107M | $42M | $39M | $65M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.3% | 10.6% | −4.4% | −2.8% | 21.6% | 8.1% | 6.4% | 9.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $37K | $7M | $50M | $0 | $773K | $12M | $11M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 30% | 64% | 20% | 2% | 65% | 62% | 47% | 50% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 32% | 15% | 6% | 23% | 22% | 22% | 24% | Return on equityROE |
| 13% | 32% | 15% | 6% | 23% | 22% | 22% | 24% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $37M | $72M | $29M | $20M | $133M | $165M | $197M | $202M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $31M | $47M | $43M | $50M | $63M | $82M | $121M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $32M | $75M | $84M | $51M | $84M | $111M | $86M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $16M | $28M | $16M | $22M | $31M | $25M | $25M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $47M | $94M | $112M | $79M | $116M | $168M | $182M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $159M | $173M | $175M | $263M | $341M | $421M | $450M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $56M | $74M | $54M | $83M | $103M | $116M | $123M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.9× | 2.3× | 3.2× | 3.2× | 3.3× | 3.6× | 3.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $8M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $184M | $197M | $198M | $286M | $362M | $461M | $488M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $25M | $76K | $48K | $26K | $13K | $3K | $3K | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($47M) | ($29M) | ($20M) | ($133M) | ($165M) | ($197M) | ($202M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 11.5× | 59.2× | 68.3× | 11.8× | 1822.4× | — | — | — | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $74M | $102M | $123M | $141M | $202M | $259M | $332M | $352M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.9% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.8% | 2.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 57.2M | 58.6M | 54.2M | 56.1M | 58.7M | 59.3M | 60.0M | 60.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.97 | $5.30 | $7.00 | $7.62 | $8.40 | $8.70 | $10.17 | $10.89 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.16 | $0.56 | $0.35 | $0.14 | $0.79 | $0.94 | $1.19 | $1.37 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.36 | $0.56 | $-0.31 | $-0.21 | $1.81 | $0.71 | $0.77 | $1.18 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.36 | $0.56 | $-0.31 | $-0.21 | $1.81 | $0.71 | $0.65 | $1.07 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.14 | $0.13 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.29 | $1.74 | $2.27 | $2.51 | $3.45 | $4.37 | $5.53 | $5.82 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.7%/yr | +13.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +13.3%/yr | +6.5%/yr |
| EPS | +39.0%/yr | +16.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +40.5%/yr | +82.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +27.4%/yr | +26.0%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Vita Coco Coconut Water+26.1%
“Vita Coco Coconut Water net sales increased $81.0 million, or 23.6%, reflecting a combination of increased CE volume growth and benefits from net pricing actions.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $46M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1M it takes just to hold its position. It put $7M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $39M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $71M | $56M | $47M | $8M | $19M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1M | +$745K | +$660K | +$2M | +$2M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$11M | +$9M | +$9M | +$7M | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$36M | −$23M | +$51M | −$28M | −$41M |
| Cash from operations | $47M | $43M | $107M | ($11M) | ($16M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$1M | −$745K | −$599K | −$982K | −$557K |
| Owner earnings | $46M | $42M | $107M | ($12M) | ($17M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$7M | −$229K | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $39M | $42M | $107M | ($12M) | ($17M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 8% | 22% | -3% | -4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $7M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer $35M.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $197M − debt $3K
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $197M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 49 + DIO 105 − DPO 24 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle7-yr median, range 2%–65%; 47% latest = NOPAT $63M ÷ invested capital $135MIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 47% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -4%–22%; latest $46M = operating cash $47M − maintenance capex $1MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 7 years. It chose to put $7M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $39M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $35M.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $47M ÷ net income $71M
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips on it. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $11M ÷ Owner Earnings $46M
What this means
Of $46M Owner Earnings, $11M (24%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $11M buybacks. Net of $11M stock comp, the real buyback was about $426K. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 7.60×ExpandingCapex $8M ÷ depreciation $1M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $610M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.62×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $3K vs $305M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +185%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.01/share (latest year $1.25), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 7
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 9% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words confirm the number: the filing says price increases held their volume, and the margin widened with them — Buffett’s strongest mark of pricing power.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 9% early to 13% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · 0.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.8%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Further, a failure to incorporate new technology, like artificial intelligence ("AI"), machine learning and automation, or adopt new marketing practices may reduce our ability to compete and operate efficiently, or increase risks of data security or result in suboptimal business decisions.…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$202M
- Receivables$121M
- Inventory$86M
- Other current assets$40M
- Accounts payable$25M
- Other current liabilities$98M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $225M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$13M · 6%
- Buybacks$81M · 36%
- Retained (debt / cash)$132M · 58%
- Returned to owners$81M
37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $81M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $165M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $81M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count5.8%
The diluted count rose from 57M to 60M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained33%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($162M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $53M, so each retained $1 added about 0.33 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Roper | $3.3M | $13.7M | $107M |
| 2024 | Mr. Roper | $3.6M | $6.8M | $42M |
| 2025 | Mr. Roper | $4.5M | $7.3M | $46M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$11M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why The Vita Coco Company Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.8%
Diluted shares grew 5.8% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $81M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Beverages
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BF-BBrown-Forman | $3.9B | 61% | 32.4% | 22% | 20% |
| SAMBoston Beer | $2.0B | 48% | 9.5% | 16% | 10% |
| WESTWestrock Coffee Company | $1.2B | 18% | -3.1% | -7% | -6% |
| FIZZNational Beverage | $1.2B | 37% | 18.9% | 75% | 14% |
| VITLVital Farms | $759M | 34% | 6.0% | 19% | 5% |
| TRTootsie Roll Industries | $733M | 36% | 13.6% | 9% | 14% |
| COCOThe Vita Coco Company Inc. | $610M | 34% | 11.4% | 47% | 8% |
| BRCCBRC Inc. | $398M | 38% | -5.0% | -40% | -3% |
| Group median | — | 36% | 10.5% | 17% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what The Vita Coco Company Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, The Vita Coco Company Inc. earns about $46M on its 7.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $65M on 57M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net cash $202M. The if-converted diluted count is 60M, 6% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($8M) runs well above depreciation ($1M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $72M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CNXN its page in the Manual CODI →
Industry order: ← CELH the Beverages chapter COKE →