Owner Scorecard


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CHRD, Chord Energy

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Chord Energy Corporation is an independent exploration and production company engaged in the acquisition, exploration, development and production of crude oil, NGL and natural gas primarily in the Williston Basin with limited non-operated interests in the Marcellus Shale.

As of December 31, 2025, we had 1,302,921 net leasehold acres in the Williston Basin, approximately all of which is held by production.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CHRD · Chord Energy
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.9B
−7.1% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.3B 5-yr avg $3.9B
Gross margin 74% 5-yr avg 78%
Operating margin 3.6% 5-yr avg 30.5%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 31%
Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 28%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 80% and operating margin about 5.1% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −19% and 51% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 22% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 2 of 7 years). By owner earnings: roughly 24% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162017’172018’182019’192021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$790M$705M$1.3B$2.3B$1.9B$1.6B$3.6B$3.9B$5.3B$4.9B$5.3BRevenueRevenue
80%73%80%74%Gross marginGross mgn
11%13%7%5%7%5%6%3%4%3%2%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($114M)($131M)$144M$119M($90M)$809M$1.6B$1.3B$1.1B$197M$193MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−14.5%−18.6%11.1%5.1%−4.7%51.2%43.4%32.7%20.9%4.0%3.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($40M)($243M)$124M($35M)($128M)$320M$1.9B$1.0B$849M$44M($67M)Net incomeNet inc.
-0%-3%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$360M$228M$508M$996M$893M$914M$1.9B$1.8B$2.1B$2.0B$1.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$485M$476M$531M$636M$787M$158M$370M$599M$1.1B$1.5B$1.5BDepreciationDeprec.
($111M)($29M)($173M)$366M$200M$421M($363M)$151M$118M$500M$427MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$29M$782M$62M$1.1B$869M$213M$531M$906M$1.2B$1.3B$1.4BCapexCapex
3.6%110.9%4.8%49.5%45.0%13.5%14.6%23.2%22.5%27.6%26.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$331M($248M)$446M$360M$24M$756M$1.6B$1.2B$918M$693M$501MOwner earningsOwner earn.
41.9%−35.2%34.5%15.5%1.2%47.8%42.6%31.3%17.5%14.2%9.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$331M($554M)$446M($153M)$24M$701M$1.4B$914M$918M$693M$501MFree cash flowFCF
41.9%−78.5%34.5%−6.6%1.2%44.4%38.2%23.5%17.5%14.2%9.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$782M$62M$582M$21M$590M$148M$362M$655M$576M$563MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$112M$655M$500M$530M$318M$305MDividends paidDiv. paid
$100M$152M$239M$444M$365MBuybacksBuybacks
-2%-2%-1%35%19%9%1%ROICROIC
-2%-8%4%-1%-4%31%40%20%10%1%-1%Return on equityROE
−4%20%26%10%4%−3%−5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$10M$11M$17M$22M$20M$172M$593M$318M$37M$190M$226MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$197M$204M$371M$388M$371M$377M$782M$943M$1.3B$1.1B$1.4BReceivablesReceiv.
$11M$11M$19M$33M$35M$29M$54M$73M$94M$116M$100MInventoryInvent.
$10M$5M$13M$20M$18M$2M$29M$34M$69M$42M$91MAccounts payablePayables
$198M$210M$377M$401M$388M$404M$807M$981M$1.3B$1.2B$1.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$365M$239M$416M$554M$437M$1.6B$1.5B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5B$1.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$371M$381M$631M$612M$603M$1.2B$1.4B$1.2B$1.7B$1.5B$1.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×0.6×0.7×0.9×0.7×1.3×1.1×1.2×0.9×1.1×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$0$531M$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$5.6B$6.2B$6.6B$7.6B$7.5B$3.0B$6.6B$6.9B$13.0B$13.1B$13.2BTotal assetsAssets
$2.3B$2.3B$2.1B$2.7B$2.7B$393M$394M$396M$843M$1.5B$1.5BTotal debtDebt
$2.3B$2.3B$2.1B$2.7B$2.7B$220M($199M)$78M$806M$1.3B$1.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.8×-0.9×1.0×0.7×-0.6×26.3×54.0×44.5×19.5×2.5×2.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.3B$2.9B$3.4B$3.7B$3.6B$1.0B$4.7B$5.1B$8.7B$8.1B$8.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
3.2%3.4%2.1%1.3%1.7%1.0%1.7%1.2%0.4%0.5%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
13.0M12.2M15.9M20.5M21.0M20.6M32.3M43.4M52.7M57.9M56.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$60.66$57.57$81.58$113.27$91.94$76.52$113.08$89.79$99.55$84.30$93.84Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.09$-19.85$7.81$-1.72$-6.11$15.48$57.55$23.59$16.09$0.77$-1.18EPS (diluted)EPS
$25.43$-20.29$28.12$17.57$1.13$36.61$48.20$28.14$17.41$11.97$8.82Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$25.43$-45.22$28.12$-7.44$1.13$33.97$43.18$21.06$17.41$11.97$8.82Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$5.42$20.30$11.53$10.05$5.49$5.38Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.21$63.84$3.90$56.05$41.39$10.31$16.47$20.87$22.35$23.30$24.49Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$178.16$238.80$212.87$182.19$173.15$50.02$145.11$116.98$164.98$139.67$141.73Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2016 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×1/15 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1.56 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
10-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.3%/yr+2.5%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share−7.3%/yr−24.4%/yr (4-yr)
EPS−52.8%/yr (4-yr)
Dividends / share+0.3%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+26.5%/yr+22.6%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share−2.4%/yr+29.3%/yr (4-yr)

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Net income-94.8%
    “Net Income We had net income of $44.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, which decreased 95% as compared to $848.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, primarily due to decreased realized oil prices and a non-cash goodwill impairment charge during the year ended December 31, 2025.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2015–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
58Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
1%low FY2016
Gross margin
80%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.9×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$693Mowner earningsvs.$44Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2015FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $44M of profit into $693M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$44M
Owner earnings$693M · 14% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$44M$849M$1.0B$1.9B$320M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1.5B+$1.1B+$599M+$370M+$158M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$26M+$23M+$46M+$61M+$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$500M+$118M+$151M−$363M+$421M
Cash from operations$2.0B$2.1B$1.8B$1.9B$914M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$1.3B−$1.2B−$599M−$370M−$158M
Owner earnings$693M$918M$1.2B$1.6B$756M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$307M−$162M−$55M
Free cash flow$693M$918M$914M$1.4B$701M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue14%17%31%43%48%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $26M), owner earnings is nearer $667M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $197M ÷ interest expense $80M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 6.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $190M − debt $1.5B
    What this means

    Netting $190M of cash and short-term investments against $1.5B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 6.5× a year's operating profit (7.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 84 + DIO 43 − DPO 16 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    7-yr median, range -2%–35%; 1% latest = NOPAT $99M ÷ invested capital $9.4B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -35%–48%; latest $693M = operating cash $2.0B − maintenance capex $1.3B
    Industry peers: median 23%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves $667M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.0B ÷ net income $44M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $683M ÷ Owner Earnings $693M
    What this means

    Of $693M Owner Earnings, $683M (99%) went back to shareholders, $318M dividends, $365M buybacks. Net of $26M stock comp, the real buyback was about $339M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.92×
    Maintaining
    Capex $1.3B ÷ depreciation $1.5B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.06×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.5B vs $87M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $11.35/share (latest year $0.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $143.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −7% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −7% early to 19% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 23%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +35%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 35% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −18.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“We face risks associated with disruptive technologies, innovation and competition, including artificial intelligence. 8 Table of Content s PART I Item 1.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$226M
  • Receivables$1.4B
  • Inventory$100M
  • Other current assets$35M
Current liabilities$1.7B
  • Debt due within a year$60M
  • Accounts payable$91M
  • Other current liabilities$1.5B
Current ratio1.02×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.96×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.13×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$41Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$60M due · $226M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+37.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$8.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.6B$21M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2025

Over the record, the business generated $11.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$7.1B · 60%
  • Dividends$2.1B · 18%
  • Buybacks$1.3B · 11%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.3B · 11%
  • Returned to owners$3.4B

    56% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.1B as dividends and $1.3B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$125.18

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $1.3B, about $125.18 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $104.50 (2025) to $156.04 (2023); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $142.66 ($444M).

  • Net change in share count336.1%

    The diluted count rose from 13M to 57M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$5.49/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$667K0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $7.1B of capital spent building

$539M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$26M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Chord Energy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?336.1%

    Diluted shares grew 336.1% over 2015–2025, even as the company spent $1.3B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OVVOvintiv$8.7B17.7%12%17%
EQTEQT Corporation$8.6B63%-3.8%-1%18%
CTRACoterra Energy Inc.$7.3B34.8%9%33%
ARAntero Resources$5.3B1.1%0%23%
CIVICivitas Resources$5.2B29.6%9%60%
PRPermian Resources$5.1B31.8%7%50%
CHRDChord Energy$4.9B80%8.1%1%24%
CRGYCrescent Energy$3.6B13.6%2%23%
Group median15.6%4%24%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Chord Energy has delivered.

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Through the cycle, Chord Energy earns about $1.2B on its 24.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−9%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+76%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $501M on 56M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $1.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Chord Energy (CHRD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CHRD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CHMG its page in the Manual CHRN →

Industry order: ← BSM the Oil & Gas Producers chapter CIVI →