Owner Scorecard


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CRGY, Crescent Energy

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

Revenue is led by Oil (66%) and Natural gas (19%), with 2 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CRGY · Crescent Energy
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.6B
+22.1% YoY · 37% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.8B 5-yr avg $2.7B
Operating margin 10.1% 5-yr avg 20.4%
Owner-earnings margin 38% 5-yr avg 16%
Free cash flow margin 38% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 23% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 14% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −50% and 42% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 19% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Oil is 66% of revenue, with Natural gas the other meaningful line at 19%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Oil66%$2.4B
  • Natural gas19%$674M
  • Natural gas liquids11%$391M
  • Midstream and other4%$143M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.1B$754M$1.5B$3.1B$2.4B$2.9B$3.6B$3.8BRevenueRevenue
0%2%5%3%6%11%13%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$227M($374M)$484M$1.3B$325M$218M$229M$385MOperating incomeOp. inc.
20.9%−49.5%32.8%42.0%13.6%7.5%6.4%10.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$0$0($19M)$97M$68M($115M)$133M($285M)Net incomeNet inc.
27%26%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$486M$411M$233M$1.0B$936M$1.2B$1.7B$1.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$311M$372M$313M$533M$676M$949M$1.2B$1.2BDepreciationDeprec.
$177M$40M($100M)$345M$109M$203M$135M$556MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$0$0$115M$627M$849M$559M$819M$306MCapexCapex
0.0%0.0%7.8%20.5%35.6%19.1%22.9%8.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$486M$411M$118M$386M$260M$664M$861M$1.4BOwner earningsOwner earn.
44.7%54.5%8.0%12.6%10.9%22.7%24.1%37.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$486M$411M$118M$386M$87M$664M$861M$1.4BFree cash flowFCF
44.7%54.5%8.0%12.6%3.6%22.7%24.1%37.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$28M$34M$65M$115M$131MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$18M$0$0$8M$33MBuybacksBuybacks
-3%11%4%-4%3%-6%Return on equityROE
−3%8%2%−6%0%−9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$20M$37M$129M$0$3M$133M$10M$10MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$112M$322M$457M$468MReceivablesReceiv.
$15M$87M$104M$125M$138MAccounts payablePayables
$97M$235M$353M$329MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$220M$480M$517M$616M$788M$1.9B$896MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$121M$616M$894M$750M$827M$1.3B$1.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×0.8×0.6×0.8×1.0×1.5×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$77M$0$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$3.9B$5.2B$6.0B$6.8B$9.2B$12.4B$12.0BTotal assetsAssets
$751M$1.0B$1.2B$1.7B$3.0B$5.5B$5.2BTotal debtDebt
$714M$902M$1.2B$1.7B$2.9B$5.5B$5.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.2×-9.8×9.5×13.4×2.2×1.0×0.8×1.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$695M$862M$1.7B$3.1B$5.2B$4.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
−0.3%−0.1%2.7%1.2%3.5%6.3%6.9%6.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.4×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$861Mowner earningsvs.$133Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $133M of profit into $861M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$133M
Owner earnings$861M · 24% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$133M($115M)$68M$97M($19M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1.2B+$949M+$676M+$533M+$313M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$245M+$186M+$83M+$38M+$40M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$135M+$203M+$109M+$345M−$100M
Cash from operations$1.7B$1.2B$936M$1.0B$233M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$819M−$559M−$676M−$627M−$115M
Owner earnings$861M$664M$260M$386M$118M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$173M
Free cash flow$861M$664M$87M$386M$118M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue24%23%11%13%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $245M), owner earnings is nearer $616M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $229M ÷ interest expense $298M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.5B · 24.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $10M − debt $5.5B
    What this means

    Netting $10M of cash and short-term investments against $5.5B of debt leaves $5.5B owed, about 24.0× a year's operating profit (24.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average
    NOPAT $182M ÷ invested capital $10.7B (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range 8%–54%; latest $861M = operating cash $1.7B − maintenance capex $819M
    Industry peers: median 26%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 23% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $245M of SBC) leaves $616M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.7B ÷ net income $133M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $149M ÷ Owner Earnings $861M
    What this means

    Of $861M Owner Earnings, $149M (17%) went back to shareholders, $115M dividends, $33M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($245M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.70×
    Harvesting
    Capex $819M ÷ depreciation $1.2B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.48×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.5B vs $602M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.09/share (latest year $0.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.64/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 1% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 1% early to 9% lately, median 14% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 2%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −49.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$896M
  • Cash & short-term investments$10M
  • Receivables$468M
  • Other current assets$419M
Current liabilities$1.6B
  • Accounts payable$138M
  • Other current liabilities$1.4B
Current ratio0.57×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratioinventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($672M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+24.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($6.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.2B$2M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$3.0B · 50%
  • Dividends$242M · 4%
  • Buybacks$60M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.7B · 45%
  • Returned to owners$302M

    9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $242M as dividends and $60M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$16.03

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $18M, about $16.03 each.

  • Net change in share count

    No continuous share count across the span.

  • Dividend recordPays

    Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Stock-based compensation$245M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 107% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Crescent Energy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?19.2% vs 35.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 35.7% early in the record and 19.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 7 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 7 years, $1.0B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PRPermian Resources$5.1B31.8%7%50%
CHRDChord Energy$4.9B80%8.1%1%24%
MTDRMatador Resources$3.7B95%37.4%12%35%
CRGYCrescent Energy$3.6B13.6%2%23%
SMSM Energy$3.2B62%19.8%8%47%
RRCRange Resources$3.0B91%5.4%-3%26%
CRCCalifornia Resources$2.9B24%19.7%13%12%
CNXCNX Resources$2.2B-3.2%-0%24%
Group median16.7%4%25%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Crescent Energy has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Crescent Energy earns about $812M on its 22.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+32%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.4B on 330M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $5.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Crescent Energy (CRGY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CRGY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CRDO its page in the Manual CRH →

Industry order: ← CRC the Oil & Gas Producers chapter CRK →