Owner Scorecard


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OVV, Ovintiv

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Cyclical

An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
OVV · Ovintiv
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$8.7B
−3.1% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.9B 5-yr avg $10.6B
Operating margin 5.3% 5-yr avg 19.8%
ROIC 3% 5-yr avg 16%
Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 19%
Free cash flow margin 19% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 18% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −98% and 31% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 26% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.9B$5.5B$7.0B$5.5B$10.5B$14.3B$10.7B$8.9B$8.7B$8.9BRevenueRevenue
7%3%7%7%4%3%4%4%4%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$1.1B$1.7B$598M($5.4B)$1.5B$3.9B$2.9B$1.6B$1.1B$466MOperating incomeOp. inc.
27.4%31.0%8.5%−98.0%14.5%27.0%26.9%17.7%13.1%5.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$827M$1.1B$234M($6.1B)$1.4B$3.6B$2.1B$1.1B$1.2B$771MNet incomeNet inc.
42%8%26%-2%17%17%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.1B$2.3B$2.9B$1.9B$3.1B$3.9B$4.2B$3.7B$3.7B$3.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$833M$1.3B$2.0B$1.8B$1.2B$1.1B$1.8B$2.3B$2.2B$2.2BDepreciationDeprec.
($610M)($41M)$672M$6.2B$523M($884M)$257M$306M$231M$869MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$1.8B$2.0B$2.6B$1.7B$1.5B$1.8B$2.7B$2.3B$2.1B$2.1BCapexCapex
46.1%36.2%37.4%31.5%14.5%12.8%25.7%25.8%24.8%24.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$217M$1.0B$906M$159M$1.9B$2.8B$2.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.6%18.8%12.9%2.9%18.5%19.3%22.0%15.9%17.4%19.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($746M)$325M$295M$159M$1.6B$2.0B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7BFree cash flowFCF
−19.2%6.0%4.2%2.9%15.4%14.3%13.3%15.9%17.4%19.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0$0$0$0$3.2B$0$0$1.2BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$57M$56M$102M$97M$122M$239M$307M$316M$308M$315MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$250M$1.3B$0$111M$719M$426M$597M$307MBuybacksBuybacks
15%3%-40%16%34%15%8%7%3%ROICROIC
12%14%2%-159%28%47%20%11%11%7%Return on equityROE
11%14%1%−161%26%44%17%8%8%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$719M$1.1B$190M$10M$195M$5M$3M$42M$280M$26MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$233M$355M$306M$328M$436M$586M$435M$390M$1.9BAccounts payablePayables
$2.7B$1.9B$1.2B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$1.4B$1.5B$1.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.0B$2.4B$2.4B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8B$2.7B$2.8B$3.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×0.8×0.5×0.6×0.6×0.6×0.5×0.5×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.6B$2.6B$2.6B$2.6B$2.6B$2.6B$2.5B$2.6B$2.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$15.3B$21.5B$14.5B$14.1B$15.1B$20.0B$19.3B$20.4B$22.3BTotal assetsAssets
$4.2B$7.0B$6.9B$4.8B$3.6B$5.7B$5.5B$5.2B$6.4BTotal debtDebt
$3.1B$6.8B$6.9B$4.6B$3.6B$5.7B$5.4B$4.9B$6.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.9×4.8×1.6×-14.5×4.5×12.4×8.1×3.8×3.0×1.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$6.7B$7.4B$9.9B$3.8B$5.1B$7.7B$10.4B$10.3B$11.2B$11.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
195M192M261M260M266M258M264M267M260M268MShares out (diluted)Shares
$20.00$28.42$26.85$21.20$39.29$55.20$40.40$33.44$33.36$33.05Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.25$5.57$0.90$-23.47$5.32$14.08$7.90$4.21$4.78$2.87EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.12$5.35$3.47$0.61$7.28$10.65$8.87$5.30$5.80$6.34Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-3.83$1.69$1.13$0.61$6.04$7.88$5.39$5.30$5.80$6.34Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.29$0.29$0.39$0.37$0.46$0.92$1.16$1.18$1.19$1.17Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$9.23$10.29$10.05$6.68$5.70$7.09$10.40$8.61$8.27$7.96Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$34.57$38.79$38.02$14.77$19.05$29.76$39.30$38.64$43.11$43.09Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.6%/yr+9.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+22.9%/yr+56.8%/yr
EPS+1.5%/yr
Dividends / share+19.1%/yr+26.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.4%/yr+4.3%/yr
Book value / share+2.8%/yr+23.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
260Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
7%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.3×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.5Bowner earningsvs.$1.2Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.2B of profit into $1.5B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.2B
Owner earnings$1.5B · 17% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.2B$1.1B$2.1B$3.6B$1.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.2B+$2.3B+$1.8B+$1.1B+$1.2B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$231M+$306M+$257M−$884M+$523M
Cash from operations$3.7B$3.7B$4.2B$3.9B$3.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$2.1B−$2.3B−$1.8B−$1.1B−$1.2B
Owner earnings$1.5B$1.4B$2.3B$2.8B$1.9B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$919M−$718M−$329M
Free cash flow$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$2.0B$1.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue17%16%22%19%19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $1.1B ÷ interest expense $376M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.9B · 4.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $35M + ST investments $245M − debt $5.2B
    What this means

    Netting $280M of cash and short-term investments against $5.2B of debt leaves $4.9B owed, about 4.4× a year's operating profit (4.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -40%–34%; 7% latest = NOPAT $1.1B ÷ invested capital $16.4B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 3%–22%; latest $1.5B = operating cash $3.7B − maintenance capex $2.1B
    Industry peers: median 20%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 9 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $3.7B ÷ net income $1.2B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $615M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.5B
    What this means

    Of $1.5B Owner Earnings, $615M (41%) went back to shareholders, $308M dividends, $307M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.99×
    Maintaining
    Capex $2.1B ÷ depreciation $2.2B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.54×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.2B vs ($1.3B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +109%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.28/share (latest year $4.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $39.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 22% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 22% early to 19% lately, median 18% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −98.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If our proprietary AI fails to operate as anticipated our competitive position may be harmed and our business and reputation may be adversely impacted.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$26M
  • Other current assets$1.8B
Current liabilities$3.2B
  • Debt due within a year$877M
  • Accounts payable$1.9B
  • Other current liabilities$411M
Current ratio0.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratioinventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.4B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$877M due · $26M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$8.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($8.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$7.7B$1.3B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $6.4B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$189M
'27$158M
'28$132M
'29$123M
'30$122M
later$979M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$189Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.7Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.2Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$5.2B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.2B
Total fixed claims on the business$6.4B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $6.4B, of which the leases are 19%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $26.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$18.7B · 70%
  • Dividends$1.6B · 6%
  • Buybacks$3.7B · 14%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.8B · 10%
  • Returned to owners$5.3B

    43% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.6B as dividends and $3.7B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$39.91

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 92M shares were bought for $3.7B, about $39.91 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $31.73 (2019) to $60.98 (2018); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $31.73 ($1.3B).

  • Net change in share count37.8%

    The diluted count rose from 195M to 268M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.19/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 19% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$2.6B13% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity23%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.3Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $18.7B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Brendan McCracken$8.6M$7.7M$1.9B
2021Doug Suttles$12.1M$27.2M$1.9B
2022Brendan McCracken$10.2M$10.7M$2.8B
2023Brendan McCracken$11.8M$7.4M$2.3B
2024Brendan McCracken$13.0M$10.7M$1.4B
2025Brendan McCracken$13.7M$8.9M$1.5B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ovintiv is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.8%

    Diluted shares grew 37.8% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $3.7B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DVNDevon Energy Corporation$16.8B53%20.7%12%20%
EXEExpand Energy Corporation$12.1B-0.9%-0%5%
OVVOvintiv$8.7B17.7%12%17%
EQTEQT Corporation$8.6B63%-3.8%-1%18%
PARRPar Pacific Holdings$7.5B78%2.6%11%1%
CTRACoterra Energy Inc.$7.3B34.8%9%33%
PRPermian Resources$5.1B31.8%7%50%
CHRDChord Energy$4.9B80%8.1%1%24%
Group median12.9%8%19%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ovintiv has delivered.

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Through the cycle, Ovintiv earns about $1.5B on its 17.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 17.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2018+24%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.7B on 281M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $6.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ovintiv (OVV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OVV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← OVID its page in the Manual OWL →

Industry order: ← OBE the Oil & Gas Producers chapter OXY →