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CHTR, Charter Communications, Inc.
Charter sells broadband internet and related connectivity and entertainment services to homes and businesses across much of the United States, under the Spectrum brand. It owns the wires and the network that run into the home, and customers pay a monthly bill to stay connected. The plant belongs to Charter; the money comes from the recurring subscriptions that ride over it.
Over the Spectrum Fiber Broadband Network and supported by our 100% U.S.-based employees, we offer Seamless Connectivity and Entertainment with Spectrum Internet , Mobile, TV and Voice products.
We offer Spectrum Internet products with speeds up to 1 gigabits per second ("Gbps") across our entire footprint and multi-gigabit speeds in a portion of our footprint.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The question is whether owning the line into the home is a franchise or just a commodity pipe. The network is a large fixed cost that took years and a fortune to build, so the test is whether scale lets Charter spread that cost and hold its price while rivals court the same homes — and bundling several services onto one relationship, which Charter offers as the reason a customer stays, is meant to show up as low churn. Set against this is a plant that never stops asking for capital and a balance sheet carried on debt, so if price slips or subscribers leave, the borrowing is felt first. Watch the margins, the returns on the capital sunk into the network, and the debt load in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $29.0B | $41.6B | $43.6B | $45.8B | $48.1B | $51.7B | $54.0B | $54.6B | $55.1B | $54.8B | $54.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| $2.5B | $4.1B | $5.2B | $6.5B | $8.4B | $10.5B | $12.0B | $12.6B | $13.1B | $12.9B | $12.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.5% | 9.9% | 12.0% | 14.2% | 17.5% | 20.4% | 22.1% | 23.0% | 23.8% | 23.6% | 23.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $3.5B | $9.9B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $3.2B | $4.7B | $5.1B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $5.0B | $4.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 13% | 21% | 16% | 19% | 24% | 26% | 24% | 25% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $8.0B | $12.0B | $11.8B | $11.7B | $14.6B | $16.2B | $14.9B | $14.4B | $14.4B | $16.1B | $16.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $6.9B | $10.6B | $10.3B | $9.9B | $9.7B | $9.3B | $8.9B | $8.7B | $8.7B | $8.7B | $8.7B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($2.6B) | ($8.8B) | ($66M) | ($161M) | $1.3B | $1.8B | $497M | $488M | $23M | $1.7B | $1.8B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $5.3B | $8.7B | $9.1B | $7.2B | $7.4B | $7.6B | $9.4B | $11.1B | $11.3B | $11.7B | $12.1B | CapexCapex |
| 18.4% | 20.9% | 20.9% | 15.7% | 15.4% | 14.8% | 17.4% | 20.4% | 20.5% | 21.3% | 22.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $2.7B | $3.3B | $2.6B | $4.6B | $7.1B | $8.6B | $5.5B | $5.7B | $5.8B | $7.4B | $7.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 9.4% | 7.9% | 6.1% | 9.9% | 14.9% | 16.6% | 10.3% | 10.5% | 10.5% | 13.4% | 13.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $2.7B | $3.3B | $2.6B | $4.6B | $7.1B | $8.6B | $5.5B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $4.4B | $4.0B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 9.4% | 7.9% | 6.1% | 9.9% | 14.9% | 16.6% | 10.3% | 6.1% | 5.7% | 8.1% | 7.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $1.6B | $11.7B | $4.4B | $6.9B | $11.2B | $15.4B | $10.3B | $3.2B | $1.2B | $5.1B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 2% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 7% | 8% | 9% | 9% | 9% | 9% | — | ROICROIC |
| 9% | 25% | 3% | 5% | 14% | 33% | 55% | 41% | 33% | 31% | 30% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 25% | 3% | 5% | 14% | 33% | 55% | 41% | 33% | 31% | 30% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.5B | $621M | $551M | $3.5B | $1.0B | $601M | $645M | $709M | $459M | $477M | $517M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $3.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $454M | $740M | $758M | $786M | $763M | $724M | $952M | $931M | $880M | $1.0B | $1.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $978M | $895M | $975M | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.5B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $3.3B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $6.5B | $3.9B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.2B | $5.1B | $5.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $9.6B | $11.1B | $12.1B | $12.4B | $9.9B | $12.5B | $12.1B | $13.2B | $13.5B | $13.3B | $12.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.3× | 0.2× | 0.2× | 0.5× | 0.4× | 0.3× | 0.3× | 0.3× | 0.3× | 0.4× | 0.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $29.5B | $29.6B | $29.6B | $29.6B | $29.6B | $29.6B | $29.6B | $29.7B | $29.7B | $29.7B | $29.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $149.1B | $146.6B | $146.1B | $148.2B | $144.2B | $142.5B | $144.5B | $147.2B | $150.0B | $154.2B | $154.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $61.7B | $70.2B | $72.8B | $79.1B | $82.8B | $91.6B | $97.6B | $97.8B | $93.9B | $94.8B | $94.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $60.2B | $69.6B | $72.3B | $75.6B | $81.8B | $91.0B | $97.0B | $97.1B | $93.5B | $94.3B | $93.9B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $40.1B | $39.1B | $36.3B | $31.4B | $23.8B | $14.1B | $9.1B | $11.1B | $15.6B | $16.1B | $16.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.3% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 235M | 297M | 236M | 224M | 209M | 193M | 164M | 152M | 145M | 138M | 127M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $123.53 | $140.14 | $185.26 | $204.50 | $229.83 | $267.72 | $328.53 | $359.34 | $378.95 | $397.65 | $430.72 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $15.00 | $33.35 | $5.22 | $7.45 | $15.40 | $24.11 | $30.74 | $29.99 | $34.97 | $36.20 | $38.89 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $11.57 | $11.03 | $11.22 | $20.35 | $34.15 | $44.57 | $33.75 | $37.75 | $39.60 | $53.48 | $58.37 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $11.57 | $11.03 | $11.22 | $20.35 | $34.15 | $44.57 | $33.75 | $21.83 | $21.75 | $32.07 | $31.77 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $22.68 | $29.26 | $38.74 | $32.15 | $35.43 | $39.55 | $57.02 | $73.14 | $77.52 | $84.64 | $95.51 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $170.96 | $131.73 | $154.06 | $140.51 | $113.75 | $72.78 | $55.46 | $72.95 | $107.23 | $116.55 | $129.17 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +13.9%/yr | +11.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +18.5%/yr | +9.4%/yr |
| EPS | +10.3%/yr | +18.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +15.8%/yr | +19.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | −4.2%/yr | +0.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $7.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $8.7B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $4.4B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $5.0B | $5.1B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $4.7B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$8.7B | +$8.7B | +$8.7B | +$8.9B | +$9.3B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$673M | +$651M | +$692M | +$470M | +$430M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.7B | +$23M | +$488M | +$497M | +$1.8B |
| Cash from operations | $16.1B | $14.4B | $14.4B | $14.9B | $16.2B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$8.7B | −$8.7B | −$8.7B | −$9.4B | −$7.6B |
| Owner earnings | $7.4B | $5.8B | $5.7B | $5.5B | $8.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$2.9B | −$2.6B | −$2.4B | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $4.4B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $5.5B | $8.6B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 13% | 10% | 11% | 10% | 17% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $8.7B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $673M), owner earnings is nearer $6.7B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 15.3×ComfortableOperating income $12.9B ÷ interest expense $846M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $94.3B · 7.3× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $477M − debt $94.8B
What this means
Netting $477M of cash and short-term investments against $94.8B of debt leaves $94.3B owed, about 7.3× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–9%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 6%–17%; latest $7.4B = operating cash $16.1B − maintenance capex $8.7BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $4.4B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $673M of SBC) leaves $6.7B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $16.1B ÷ net income $5.0B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $5.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $7.4B
What this means
Of $7.4B Owner Earnings, $5.1B (70%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $5.1B buybacks. Net of $673M stock comp, the real buyback was about $4.5B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.34×ExpandingCapex $11.7B ÷ depreciation $8.7B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $54.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.39×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $94.8B vs ($8.2B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −0%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $38.85/share (latest year $39.74), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $127.93/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 10% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 10% early to 23% lately, median 17% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 8.5% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −5.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Colorado passed the Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act ("CAIA") which will take effect on June 30, 2026.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$517M
- Receivables$3.5B
- Other current assets$933M
- Accounts payable$1.0B
- Other current liabilities$11.3B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $7.9B against the $1.1B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 7.5 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $134.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$88.8B · 66%
- Buybacks$71.0B · 53%
- Returned to owners$71.0B
133% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $71.0B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$25.7B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $25.7B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $61.7B to $94.4B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$429.83
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 165M shares were bought for $71.0B, about $429.83 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $259.07 (2016) to $664.34 (2021), and 2021, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($15.4B).
- Net change in share count−46.0%
The diluted count fell from 235M to 127M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $41.9M | $39.9M | $8.6B |
| 2022 | $39.2M | −$35.7M | $5.5B |
| 2022 | $15.6M | −$7.5M | $5.5B |
| 2023 | $89.1M | $93.6M | $5.7B |
| 2024 | $5.8M | −$24.9M | $5.8B |
| 2025 | $6.5M | −$46.1M | $7.4B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$673M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Charter Communications, Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?5% → 6% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1.4B to $3.5B while revenue grew 88%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (5% of revenue then, 6% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Media & Broadcasting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TAT&T Inc. | $125.6B | 52% | 15.4% | 6% | 15% |
| CCZComcast Holdings ZONES | $123.7B | — | 19.0% | 9% | 14% |
| TMUST-Mobile US Inc. | $88.3B | 87% | 12.1% | 8% | 1% |
| CHTRCharter Communications, Inc. | $54.8B | — | 18.9% | 7% | 10% |
| WBDWarner Bros. Discovery, Inc. | $37.3B | 63% | 13.4% | 5% | 20% |
| PARAParamount Global | $29.2B | — | 17.8% | 13% | 6% |
| PSKYParamount Skydance Corporation | $29.2B | — | -18.0% | -19% | 2% |
| OPTUOptimum Communications Inc. | $8.6B | 67% | 18.6% | 5% | 10% |
| Group median | — | — | 16.6% | 7% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Charter Communications, Inc. has delivered.
Charter Communications, Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Charter Communications, Inc. earns about $5.7B on its 10.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $4.0B on 125M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $93.9B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($12.1B) runs well above depreciation ($8.7B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $7.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CHSCP its page in the Manual CHWY →
Industry order: ← CCZ the Media & Broadcasting chapter CMCSA →