Owner Scorecard


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TMUS, T-Mobile US Inc.

Telecom Operators capital-intensive

T-Mobile sells wireless phone and data service — and home broadband — to consumers and businesses across the United States, mostly on monthly plans, and the bulk of its base is postpaid subscribers. The money is recurring: people pay each month to stay connected. Behind that service sits a nationwide cellular network built on spectrum licenses, which makes this a capital-heavy business.

And Strategy Un-carrier Strategy As America's supercharged Un-carrier, we have disrupted the telecommunications industry by actively engaging with and listening to our customers and focusing on eliminating their pain points.

We ended annual service contracts, overages, unpredictable international roaming fees and data buckets, among other things.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TMUS · T-Mobile US Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$88.3B
+8.5% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $90.5B 5-yr avg $81.6B
Operating margin 19.9% 5-yr avg 15.6%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 20% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Wireless service sits close to a commodity: the national carriers sell minutes and gigabytes that look much alike, so the test is whether network quality and brand let T-Mobile hold its price and keep customers from defecting to a cheaper rival — churn is the scoreboard. The second test is cost, because this is a scale game, and the carrier that spreads the fixed cost of spectrum and network over the most subscribers earns the most per dollar of plant. Set against both is the treadmill: it must keep buying spectrum and pouring money into the network just to stand still, and it carries debt under covenants, so a price war or a heavier capital bill could eat the owner's cash. The record below holds the margins, returns and leverage.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$37.5B$40.6B$43.3B$45.0B$68.4B$80.1B$79.6B$78.6B$81.4B$88.3B$90.5BRevenueRevenue
71%71%87%Gross marginGross mgn
30%30%30%31%28%25%27%27%26%27%26%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$4.0B$4.9B$5.3B$5.7B$6.6B$6.9B$6.5B$14.3B$18.0B$18.3B$18.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
10.8%12.0%12.3%12.7%9.7%8.6%8.2%18.2%22.1%20.7%19.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.5B$4.5B$2.9B$3.5B$3.1B$3.0B$2.6B$8.3B$11.3B$11.0B$10.5BNet incomeNet inc.
37%26%25%20%10%18%24%23%23%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$2.8B$3.8B$3.9B$6.8B$8.6B$13.9B$16.8B$18.6B$22.3B$27.9B$28.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$6.2B$6.0B$6.5B$6.6B$14.2B$16.4B$13.7B$12.8B$12.9B$13.5B$14.1BDepreciationDeprec.
($5.2B)($7.0B)($5.9B)($3.8B)($9.3B)($6.0B)($55M)($3.2B)($2.6B)$2.6B$2.8BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4.7B$5.2B$5.5B$6.4B$11.0B$12.3B$14.0B$9.8B$8.8B$10.0B$10.1BCapexCapex
12.5%12.9%12.8%14.2%16.1%15.4%17.6%12.5%10.9%11.3%11.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($1.9B)($1.4B)($1.6B)$433M($2.4B)$1.6B$2.8B$8.8B$13.5B$18.0B$18.2BOwner earningsOwner earn.
−5.1%−3.5%−3.8%1.0%−3.5%2.0%3.5%11.1%16.5%20.4%20.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($1.9B)($1.4B)($1.6B)$433M($2.4B)$1.6B$2.8B$8.8B$13.5B$18.0B$18.2BFree cash flowFCF
−5.1%−3.5%−3.8%1.0%−3.5%2.0%3.5%11.1%16.5%20.4%20.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$338M$31M$5.0B$1.9B$52M$0$373M$3.5B$2.8BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$55M$55M$0$0$0$0$747M$3.3B$4.1B$4.2BDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$427M$1.1B$0$19.5B$0$3.0B$13.1B$11.2B$10.0BBuybacksBuybacks
6%10%8%8%4%5%4%8%11%10%10%ROICROIC
8%20%12%12%5%4%4%13%18%19%19%Return on equityROE
8%20%12%12%4%4%12%13%12%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5.5B$1.2B$1.2B$1.5B$10.4B$6.6B$4.5B$5.1B$5.4B$5.6B$3.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.9B$1.9B$1.8B$1.9B$4.3B$4.2B$4.4B$4.7B$4.3B$4.9B$4.9BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.1B$1.6B$1.1B$964M$2.5B$2.6B$1.9B$1.7B$1.6B$2.4B$2.3BInventoryInvent.
$5.2B$6.2B$5.5B$4.3B$5.6B$6.5B$7.2B$5.6B$4.2B$5.2B$4.6BAccounts payablePayables
($2.2B)($2.7B)($2.6B)($1.5B)$1.2B$262M($884M)$797M$1.6B$2.1B$2.6BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$14.2B$8.9B$8.3B$9.3B$23.9B$20.9B$19.1B$19.0B$18.4B$24.5B$22.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$9.0B$11.5B$10.3B$12.5B$21.7B$23.5B$24.7B$20.9B$20.2B$24.5B$20.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×0.8×0.8×0.7×1.1×0.9×0.8×0.9×0.9×1.0×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.7B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9B$11.1B$12.2B$12.2B$12.2B$13.0B$13.7B$13.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$65.9B$70.6B$72.5B$86.9B$200.2B$206.6B$211.3B$207.7B$208.0B$219.2B$214.7BTotal assetsAssets
$27.8B$28.3B$27.5B$25.0B$66.4B$70.5B$72.0B$71.4B$74.2B$81.1B$86.3BTotal debtDebt
$22.3B$27.1B$26.3B$23.4B$56.0B$63.8B$67.5B$66.3B$68.8B$75.5B$82.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.9×4.4×6.4×24.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$18.2B$22.6B$24.7B$28.8B$65.3B$69.1B$69.7B$64.7B$61.7B$59.2B$55.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.8%1.0%1.1%1.0%0.7%0.7%0.8%0.8%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
833M872M858M863M1.15B1.25B1.26B1.20B1.17B1.13B1.10BShares out (diluted)Shares
$45.00$46.58$50.46$52.12$59.23$63.85$63.38$65.45$69.38$78.08$82.15Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.75$5.20$3.36$4.02$2.65$2.41$2.06$6.93$9.66$9.72$9.57EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.31$-1.61$-1.91$0.50$-2.07$1.27$2.24$7.30$11.47$15.91$16.51Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.31$-1.61$-1.91$0.50$-2.07$1.27$2.24$7.30$11.47$15.91$16.51Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.07$0.06$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.62$2.81$3.64$3.85Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.64$6.01$6.46$7.40$9.56$9.82$11.13$8.17$7.53$8.80$9.19Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$21.89$25.88$28.80$33.34$56.59$55.07$55.49$53.92$52.63$52.34$50.70Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.3%/yr+5.7%/yr
EPS+21.0%/yr+29.6%/yr
Dividends / share+56.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.1%/yr−1.6%/yr
Book value / share+10.2%/yr−1.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.1Bpeak FY2022
ROIC
10%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.2×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$18.0Bowner earningsvs.$11.0Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $11.0B of profit into $18.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$11.0B
Owner earnings$18.0B · 20% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$11.0B$11.3B$8.3B$2.6B$3.0B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$13.5B+$12.9B+$12.8B+$13.7B+$16.4B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$829M+$649M+$667M+$595M+$540M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$2.6B−$2.6B−$3.2B−$55M−$6.0B
Cash from operations$27.9B$22.3B$18.6B$16.8B$13.9B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$10.0B−$8.8B−$9.8B−$14.0B−$12.3B
Owner earnings$18.0B$13.5B$8.8B$2.8B$1.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue20%17%11%4%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $829M), owner earnings is nearer $17.2B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $18.3B ÷ interest expense $835M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $80.7B · 4.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $5.6B − debt $86.3B
    What this means

    Netting $5.6B of cash and short-term investments against $86.3B of debt leaves $80.7B owed, about 4.4× a year's operating profit (4.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $17M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $80.7B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 20 + DIO 76 − DPO 164 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–11%; 10% latest = NOPAT $14.1B ÷ invested capital $139.9B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High, recently turned positive
    latest $18.0B = operating cash $27.9B − maintenance capex $10.0B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $829M of SBC) leaves $17.2B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $27.9B ÷ net income $11.0B

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $14.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $18.0B
    What this means

    Of $18.0B Owner Earnings, $14.1B (78%) went back to shareholders, $4.1B dividends, $10.0B buybacks. Net of $829M stock comp, the real buyback was about $9.1B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.74×
    Harvesting
    Capex $10.0B ÷ depreciation $13.5B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $88.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.00×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $86.3B vs ($39M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +245%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $9.44/share (latest year $10.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $54.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 20% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 20% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 11%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2022 · 8.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +3.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$22.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$3.5B
  • Receivables$4.9B
  • Inventory$2.3B
  • Other current assets$11.4B
Current liabilities$20.3B
  • Debt due within a year$5.2B
  • Accounts payable$4.6B
  • Other current liabilities$10.6B
Current ratio1.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.97×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.8Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5.2B due · $3.5B cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$38.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$11.8BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$115.8B$29.5B of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1.5Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $125.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$87.8B · 70%
  • Dividends$8.3B · 7%
  • Buybacks$58.3B · 46%
  • Returned to owners$66.6B

    177% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $8.3B as dividends and $58.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$28.9B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $28.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $27.8B to $86.3B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$63.07

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 24M shares were bought for $1.5B, about $63.07 each.

  • Net change in share count32.3%

    The diluted count rose from 833M to 1102M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$3.64/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 65% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021G. Michael Sievert$22.6M−$15.1M$1.6B
2022G. Michael Sievert$29.1M$86.6M$2.8B
2023G. Michael Sievert$37.5M$55.0M$8.8B
2024G. Michael Sievert$30.0M$70.2M$13.5B
2025G. Michael Sievert$50.4M$63.4M$18.0B
2025Srinivasan Gopalan$35.4M$29.8M$18.0B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio499:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$829M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why T-Mobile US Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?32.3%

    Diluted shares grew 32.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $58.3B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$27.8B → $86.3B

    Debt rose from $27.8B to $86.3B while owner earnings went from about ($1.7B) to $13.4B: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Telecom Operators

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
VZVerizon Communications$138.2B84%22.0%11%6%
TAT&T Inc.$125.6B52%15.4%6%15%
CCZComcast Holdings ZONES$123.7B19.0%9%14%
TMUST-Mobile US Inc.$88.3B87%12.1%8%1%
CHTRCharter Communications, Inc.$54.8B18.9%7%10%
WBDWarner Bros. Discovery, Inc.$37.3B63%13.4%5%20%
PARAParamount Global$29.2B17.8%13%6%
PSKYParamount Skydance Corporation$29.2B-18.0%-19%2%
Group median73%16.6%8%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what T-Mobile US Inc. has delivered.

T-Mobile US Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, T-Mobile US Inc. earns about $1.3B on its 1.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+63%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+83%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $18.2B on 1082M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $82.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "T-Mobile US Inc. (TMUS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TMUS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TMP its page in the Manual TNC →

Industry order: ← TLK the Telecom Operators chapter TSAT →