Share count
2.5Bpeak FY2025
← All companies ← WAY Manual WBI → ← VSNT Media & Broadcasting
WBD, Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc.
Warner Bros. Discovery is a media company that makes movies and television shows and delivers them to viewers. It earns money in a few ways: fees that cable and satellite carriers pay to carry its networks, subscriptions and advertising from its streaming service, and the licensing and theatrical sale of the content its studios produce. The largest share comes from distribution — being paid to deliver channels and streams — with the rest from selling the content itself.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$37.3B
−5.1% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $37.2B 5-yr avg $32.8B
Gross margin 89%
Revenue $8.9B −1.0% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −27.8% yr-ago −0.4%
Net income ($2.9B) yr-ago ($449M)
Net margin −32.7% yr-ago −5.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Distribution (52%) and Content (26%), with 3 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The whole business turns on one question: is the library a franchise people will pay up for, or one more option in a crowded field where the next hit must be bought afresh. The test is pricing power — whether the studios and networks command terms across both the carriage fees of the cable bundle and the subscriptions and advertising of streaming, or merely meet the going market price. Watch, too, whether the company can fund the content it needs while servicing the debt it carries; the filing's own flags point to a crowded market of advertising inventory and a standing dependence on out-bidding rivals for popular content and the talent who make it. The bad case is a costly content slate, thin pricing power, and leverage that leaves little room when returns sit low — the record below carries the margins, the returns, and the debt.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Distribution at 52%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Distribution52%$19.3B
- Content26%$9.6B
- Advertising20%$7.3B
- Other3%$1.1B
- Other3%$1.1B
By geographyUnited States67%International33%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $6.5B | $6.9B | $10.6B | $11.1B | $10.7B | $12.2B | $33.8B | $41.3B | $39.3B | $37.3B | $37.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 63% | 61% | 63% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 89% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 26% | 26% | 25% | 25% | 26% | 33% | 29% | 23% | 24% | 25% | 26% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $2.1B | $713M | $1.9B | $3.0B | $2.5B | $2.0B | ($7.4B) | ($1.5B) | ($10.0B) | $738M | ($1.7B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 31.7% | 10.4% | 18.3% | 27.0% | 23.6% | 16.5% | −21.8% | −3.7% | −25.5% | 2.0% | −4.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $1.2B | ($337M) | $594M | $2.1B | $1.2B | $1.0B | ($7.4B) | ($3.1B) | ($11.3B) | $727M | ($1.7B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 28% | — | 36% | 4% | 23% | 19% | — | — | — | 55% | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.6B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $4.3B | $7.5B | $5.4B | $4.3B | $3.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $322M | $330M | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $7.2B | $8.0B | $7.0B | $5.7B | $5.4B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($205M) | $1.6B | $504M | ($159M) | $51M | $32M | $4.1B | $2.1B | $9.1B | ($2.9B) | ($867M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $88M | $135M | $147M | $289M | $402M | $373M | $987M | $1.3B | $948M | $1.2B | $1.2B | CapexCapex |
| 1.4% | 2.0% | 1.4% | 2.6% | 3.8% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 3.2% | 2.4% | 3.3% | 3.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1.3B | $1.5B | $2.4B | $3.1B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $3.3B | $6.2B | $4.4B | $3.1B | $2.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 19.9% | 21.7% | 23.0% | 27.9% | 21.9% | 19.9% | 9.8% | 14.9% | 11.3% | 8.3% | 6.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $1.3B | $1.5B | $2.4B | $3.1B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $3.3B | $6.2B | $4.4B | $3.1B | $2.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 19.9% | 21.7% | 23.0% | 27.9% | 21.9% | 19.9% | 9.8% | 14.9% | 11.3% | 8.3% | 6.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $60M | $8.6B | $73M | $39M | $2M | $0 | $50M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $1.4B | $603M | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 12% | — | 5% | 12% | 8% | 7% | -6% | -1% | -11% | 1% | -2% | ROICROIC |
| 23% | -7% | 7% | 21% | 12% | 9% | -16% | -7% | -33% | 2% | -5% | Return on equityROE |
| 23% | −7% | 7% | 21% | 12% | 9% | −16% | −7% | −33% | 2% | −5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $300M | $7.3B | $986M | $1.6B | $2.1B | $3.9B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $5.3B | $4.6B | $3.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $6.4B | $6.0B | $4.9B | $5.3B | $5.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $241M | $277M | $325M | $463M | $397M | $412M | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $1.3B | $1.6B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $4.9B | $4.8B | $3.9B | $4.2B | $4.0B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.5B | $10.0B | $4.2B | $5.2B | $6.1B | $7.3B | $14.0B | $14.2B | $14.1B | $13.2B | $11.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.6B | $1.9B | $4.0B | $3.2B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $15.0B | $15.3B | $15.8B | $12.5B | $16.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.6× | 5.3× | 1.1× | 1.6× | 2.0× | 2.1× | 0.9× | 0.9× | 0.9× | 1.1× | 0.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $8.0B | $7.1B | $13.0B | $13.1B | $13.1B | $12.9B | $34.4B | $35.0B | $25.7B | $25.9B | $25.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $15.7B | $22.6B | $32.5B | $33.7B | $34.1B | $34.4B | $134.0B | $122.8B | $104.6B | $100.1B | $97.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $7.9B | $14.8B | $18.6B | $16.0B | $15.7B | $15.1B | $49.4B | $45.4B | $42.3B | $32.7B | $34.0B | Total debtDebt |
| $7.6B | $7.5B | $17.6B | $14.5B | $13.6B | $11.2B | $45.6B | $41.7B | $36.9B | $28.1B | $30.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 5.8× | 1.5× | 2.7× | 4.4× | 3.9× | 3.2× | -4.1× | -0.7× | -5.0× | 0.4× | -0.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $5.2B | $4.6B | $8.4B | $9.9B | $10.5B | $11.6B | $47.1B | $45.2B | $34.0B | $35.9B | $32.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.1% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 1.3% | 1.0% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.2% | 1.4% | 2.1% | 2.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | $1.3B | — | $155M | $121M | — | — | — | $9.1B | — | $9.1B | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| — | — | — | — | 672M | 664M | 1.94B | 2.44B | 2.45B | 2.53B | 2.49B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | — | — | — | $15.88 | $18.36 | $17.43 | $16.96 | $16.05 | $14.74 | $14.93 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | — | — | $1.81 | $1.52 | $-3.80 | $-1.28 | $-4.62 | $0.29 | $-0.70 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | — | — | $3.48 | $3.65 | $1.71 | $2.53 | $1.81 | $1.22 | $0.93 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | — | — | $3.48 | $3.65 | $1.71 | $2.53 | $1.81 | $1.22 | $0.93 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | — | $0.60 | $0.56 | $0.51 | $0.54 | $0.39 | $0.49 | $0.50 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | — | — | — | $15.57 | $17.47 | $24.28 | $18.57 | $13.89 | $14.20 | $13.07 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.92 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −1.5%/yr (5-yr) | −1.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −18.9%/yr (5-yr) | −18.9%/yr |
| EPS | −30.8%/yr (5-yr) | −30.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −4.0%/yr (5-yr) | −4.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | −1.8%/yr (5-yr) | −1.8%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Distribution-2.2%
“Distribution revenue decreased 2% in 2025, primarily attributable to an 9% decline in Networks domestic linear subscribers and the impact of the previously disclosed domestic wholesale deal renewal that occurred in the second quarter of 2025, partially offset by a 13% increase in streaming subscribers as a result of continued growth and global expansion of HBO Max and a 3% increase in domestic contractual affiliate rates.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Content-6.3%
“Content revenue decreased 7% in 2025, primarily attributable to sublicensing of Olympic sports rights in Europe, which had a favorable impact of $576 million on content revenue in 2024, lower initial telecast revenue due to fewer deliveries, and a decrease in games revenue due to lower carryover and fewer releases in 2025, partially offset by an increase in theatrical product revenue due to higher film rental revenue.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Advertising-9.7%
“Advertising revenue decreased 11% in 2025, primarily attributable to audience declines in domestic linear networks of 25%, partially offset by an increase in domestic HBO Max ad-lite subscribers.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
1%low FY2024
Gross margin
63%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
9.1×peak FY2022
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$3.1Bowner earningsvs.$727Mnet incomelow FY2016
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $727M of profit into $3.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $727M | ($11.3B) | ($3.1B) | ($7.4B) | $1.0B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$5.7B | +$7.0B | +$8.0B | +$7.2B | +$1.6B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$769M | +$557M | +$500M | +$412M | +$178M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$2.9B | +$9.1B | +$2.1B | +$4.1B | +$32M |
| Cash from operations | $4.3B | $5.4B | $7.5B | $4.3B | $2.8B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1.2B | −$948M | −$1.3B | −$987M | −$373M |
| Owner earnings | $3.1B | $4.4B | $6.2B | $3.3B | $2.4B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 11% | 15% | 10% | 20% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $769M), owner earnings is nearer $2.3B.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $738M ÷ interest expense $2.1B
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $28.1B · 38.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $4.6B − debt $32.7B
What this means
Netting $4.6B of cash and short-term investments against $32.7B of debt leaves $28.1B owed, about 38.1× a year's operating profit (44.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 52 + DIO 0 − DPO 101 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -11%–12%; 1% latest = NOPAT $369M ÷ invested capital $64.1BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 8%–28%; latest $3.1B = operating cash $4.3B − maintenance capex $1.2BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 20% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $769M of SBC) leaves $2.3B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $4.3B ÷ net income $727M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $3.1B
What this means
Of $3.1B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.22×HarvestingCapex $1.2B ÷ depreciation $5.7B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $37.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.06×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $32.7B vs $706M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −1045%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.82/share (latest year $0.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 20% → −9% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 20% early to −9% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −7%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −25.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Technology such as AI may be used in ways that increase access to publicly available free or relatively inexpensive content that could reduce demand for our content, products and streaming services.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$11.7B
- Cash & short-term investments$3.3B
- Receivables$5.0B
- Inventory$149M
- Other current assets$3.3B
Current liabilities$16.1B
- Debt due within a year$1.5B
- Accounts payable$1.1B
- Other current liabilities$13.5B
Current ratio0.73×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.72×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($4.4B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.5B due · $3.3B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($20.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($52.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$37.5B$3.5B of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2.0Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Due in the next 12 months$5.7Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$10.1Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$5.7Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$19.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$3.3B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.1B
Together, against $5.7B due next year1.1×
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $6.4B against the $5.7B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.1 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $36.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$5.9B · 16%
- Buybacks$2.0B · 5%
- Retained (debt / cash)$28.1B · 78%
- Returned to owners$2.0B
7% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.0B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $26.0B and cash and short-term investments rose $3.0B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count270.8%
The diluted count rose from 672M to 2492M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$53.7B54% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity72%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$12.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $5.9B of capital spent building
$10.8B written down across 4 years (2017, 2019, 2020, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 87% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Zaslav | $246.6M | $100.8M | $2.4B |
| 2022 | Mr. Zaslav | $39.3M | −$40.9M | $3.3B |
| 2023 | Mr. Zaslav | $49.7M | $64.7M | $6.2B |
| 2024 | Mr. Zaslav | $51.9M | $63.6M | $4.4B |
| 2025 | Mr. Zaslav | $165.0M | $636.1M | $3.1B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$769M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 104% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?11.5% vs 21.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 21.5% early in the record and 11.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?270.8%
Diluted shares grew 270.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $2.0B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$7.9B → $34.0B
Debt rose from $7.9B to $34.0B while owner earnings went from about $1.7B to $4.6B — about 4.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 7.4 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Media & Broadcasting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCZComcast Holdings ZONES | $123.7B | — | 19.0% | 9% | 14% |
| CHTRCharter Communications, Inc. | $54.8B | — | 18.9% | 7% | 10% |
| WBDWarner Bros. Discovery, Inc. | $37.3B | 63% | 13.4% | 5% | 20% |
| PARAParamount Global | $29.2B | — | 17.8% | 13% | 6% |
| PSKYParamount Skydance Corporation | $29.2B | — | -18.0% | -19% | 2% |
| FOXFox Corporation | $16.3B | — | 20.9% | 13% | 15% |
| OPTUOptimum Communications Inc. | $8.6B | 67% | 18.6% | 5% | 10% |
| ROKURoku Inc. | $4.7B | 44% | -4.6% | -15% | 5% |
| Group median | — | 63% | 18.2% | 6% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. earns about $7.4B on its 19.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $2.3B on 2507M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $30.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Warner Bros. Discovery, Inc. (WBD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WBD, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← WAY its page in the Manual WBI →
Industry order: ← VSNT the Media & Broadcasting chapter