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PARA, Paramount Global

Media & Broadcasting capital-intensive Cyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-K

PARA · Paramount Global

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024

$29.2B

−1.5% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $28.8B 5-yr avg $28.6B

Operating margin 4.9% 5-yr avg 5.3%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 16% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −18% and 22% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 13%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2015’15	2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	TTMTTMJun 2025
											Income statement
$12.7B	$13.2B	$26.5B	$26.4B	$27.0B	$25.3B	$28.6B	$30.2B	$29.7B	$29.2B	$28.8B	RevenueRevenue
15%	16%	19%	19%	20%	21%	22%	23%	24%	23%	22%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$2.7B	$2.9B	$5.3B	$5.1B	$4.1B	$4.1B	$6.3B	$2.3B	($451M)	($5.3B)	$1.4B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
21.0%	22.0%	20.1%	19.2%	15.4%	16.4%	22.0%	7.8%	−1.5%	−18.0%	4.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.4B	$1.3B	$2.3B	$3.5B	$3.3B	$2.4B	$4.5B	$1.1B	($608M)	($6.2B)	($14M)	Net incomeNet inc.
32%	33%	26%	14%	-1%	18%	12%	17%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.4B	$1.7B	$2.4B	$3.5B	$1.2B	$2.3B	$953M	$219M	$475M	$752M	$772M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$235M	$225M	$443M	$427M	$438M	$430M	$390M	$378M	$418M	$392M	$366M	DepreciationDeprec.
($411M)	$34M	($557M)	($605M)	($2.8B)	($832M)	($4.2B)	($1.4B)	$488M	$6.3B	$197M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$171M	$196M	$356M	$345M	$345M	$324M	$354M	$358M	$328M	$263M	$265M	CapexCapex
1.3%	1.5%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.2%	1.2%	1.1%	0.9%	0.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.2B	$1.5B	$2.1B	$3.1B	$885M	$2.0B	$599M	($139M)	$147M	$489M	$507M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
9.7%	11.3%	7.9%	11.8%	3.3%	7.8%	2.1%	−0.5%	0.5%	1.7%	1.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.2B	$1.5B	$2.1B	$3.1B	$885M	$2.0B	$599M	($139M)	$147M	$489M	$507M	Free cash flowFCF
9.7%	11.3%	7.9%	11.8%	3.3%	7.8%	2.1%	−0.5%	0.5%	1.7%	1.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$12M	$92M	$289M	$118M	$399M	$147M	$54M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$300M	$288M	$616M	$599M	$595M	$600M	$617M	$631M	$389M	$139M	$141M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$2.8B	$3.0B	$1.1B	$586M	$57M	$58M	$0	$0	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
13%	16%	33%	15%	13%	11%	16%	5%	-1%	-15%	—	ROICROIC
25%	34%	117%	33%	25%	16%	20%	5%	-3%	-38%	-0%	Return on equityROE
20%	26%	86%	27%	21%	12%	18%	2%	−4%	−39%	−1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$317M	$598M	$285M	$856M	$632M	$3.0B	$6.3B	$2.9B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.7B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$3.4B	$3.3B	$3.7B	$7.2B	$6.8B	$7.0B	$7.0B	$7.4B	$7.1B	$6.9B	$6.3B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$1.8B	$1.5B	—	—	—	$1.5B	InventoryInvent.
$159M	$148M	$231M	$502M	$632M	$571M	$800M	$1.4B	$1.1B	$953M	$822M	Accounts payablePayables
$4.5B	$4.6B	$5.3B	$9.5B	$9.0B	$8.2B	$7.7B	$6.0B	$6.0B	$6.0B	$7.0B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$5.7B	$6.1B	$6.3B	$11.9B	$11.9B	$13.8B	$16.7B	$13.7B	$12.7B	$12.5B	$12.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$3.6B	$3.7B	$4.0B	$8.3B	$9.0B	$8.3B	$9.5B	$11.2B	$9.7B	$9.6B	$8.7B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×	1.6×	1.6×	1.4×	1.3×	1.7×	1.8×	1.2×	1.3×	1.3×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.8B	$4.9B	$16.6B	$16.1B	$16.5B	$16.6B	$16.6B	$16.5B	$16.5B	$10.5B	$10.5B	GoodwillGoodwill
$23.8B	$24.2B	$20.8B	$44.5B	$49.6B	$52.7B	$58.6B	$58.4B	$53.5B	$46.2B	$44.9B	Total assetsAssets
$8.4B	$9.4B	$10.2B	$19.4B	$18.7B	$19.7B	$17.7B	$15.8B	$14.6B	$14.5B	$18.0B	Total debtDebt
$8.1B	$8.8B	$9.9B	$18.5B	$18.1B	$16.7B	$11.4B	$13.0B	$12.1B	$11.8B	$15.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
6.8×	7.1×	4.9×	4.9×	4.3×	4.0×	6.4×	2.5×	-0.5×	-6.1×	1.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.6B	$3.7B	$2.0B	$10.4B	$13.2B	$15.4B	$22.4B	$23.0B	$22.5B	$16.3B	$16.7B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%	1.3%	0.9%	0.7%	1.1%	1.1%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%	0.8%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$484M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$27M	$83M	$6.0B	$142M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
489M	448M	647M	621M	617M	618M	655M	650M	652M	664M	679M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$25.91	$29.39	$41.01	$42.55	$43.76	$40.91	$43.64	$46.39	$45.48	$44.00	$42.35	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.89	$2.81	$3.59	$5.56	$5.36	$3.92	$6.94	$1.70	$-0.93	$-9.32	$-0.02	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.50	$3.32	$3.22	$5.02	$1.43	$3.19	$0.91	$-0.21	$0.23	$0.74	$0.75	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.50	$3.32	$3.22	$5.02	$1.43	$3.19	$0.91	$-0.21	$0.23	$0.74	$0.75	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.61	$0.64	$0.95	$0.96	$0.96	$0.97	$0.94	$0.97	$0.60	$0.21	$0.21	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.35	$0.44	$0.55	$0.56	$0.56	$0.52	$0.54	$0.55	$0.50	$0.40	$0.39	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.38	$8.23	$3.06	$16.83	$21.41	$24.87	$34.20	$35.44	$34.55	$24.58	$24.60	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.1%/yr	+0.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−12.7%/yr	−12.5%/yr
Dividends / share	−11.3%/yr	−26.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+1.4%/yr	−6.7%/yr
Book value / share	+8.9%/yr	+2.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

664Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

−15%low FY2024

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

24.2×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$489Mowner earningsvs.($6.2B)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2015FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2024cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned a $6.2B loss into $489M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020
Reported net income	($6.2B)	($608M)	$1.1B	$4.5B	$2.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$392M	+$418M	+$378M	+$390M	+$430M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$245M	+$177M	+$172M	+$192M	+$274M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$6.3B	+$488M	−$1.4B	−$4.2B	−$832M
Cash from operations	$752M	$475M	$219M	$953M	$2.3B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$263M	−$328M	−$358M	−$354M	−$324M
Owner earnings	$489M	$147M	($139M)	$599M	$2.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	0%	0%	2%	8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $245M), owner earnings is nearer $244M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -6.1×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($5.3B) ÷ interest expense $860M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $15.2B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $2.7B − debt $17.9B

What this means
Netting $2.7B of cash and short-term investments against $17.9B of debt leaves $15.2B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 13%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -15%–33%; -13% latest = NOPAT ($4.2B) ÷ invested capital $31.6B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -0%–12%; latest $489M = operating cash $752M − maintenance capex $263M

Industry peers: median 20%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $245M of SBC) leaves $244M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $752M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($6.2B) · cash from operations $752M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 28%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $139M ÷ Owner Earnings $489M

What this means
Of $489M Owner Earnings, $139M (28%) went back to shareholders, $139M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.67×

Harvesting

Capex $263M ÷ depreciation $392M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $29.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.30×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $17.9B vs $2.9B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −214%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.82/share (latest year $-9.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 21% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 21% early to −4% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −17%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth −15%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 15% a year over the record.
Worst year 2024 · −18.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$12.1B

Cash & short-term investments$2.7B
Receivables$6.3B
Inventory$1.5B
Other current assets$1.6B

Current liabilities$8.7B

Debt due within a year$240M
Accounts payable$822M
Other current liabilities$7.7B

Current ratio1.39×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.22×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.31×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$3.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$240M due · $2.7B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2025 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$4.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$19.2B$1.3B of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$753Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2024

Over the record, the business generated $14.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$3.0B · 20%
Dividends$4.8B · 32%
Buybacks$7.6B · 51%

Returned to owners$12.4B
104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4.8B as dividends and $7.6B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$531M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $531M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $8.4B to $18.0B.
Average price paid for buybacks$55.96
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 136M shares were bought for $7.6B, about $55.96 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $44.62 (2020) to $68.58 (2017); its heaviest year, 2016, paid $55.19 ($3.0B).
Net change in share count38.9%
The diluted count rose from 489M to 679M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.21/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 11% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$12.9B28% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity64%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $3.0B of capital spent building

$6.6B written down across 4 years (2015, 2022, 2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2020	$39.0M	$34.1M	$2.0B
2021	$20.0M	$12.9M	$599M
2022	$32.0M	$14.6M	($139M)
2023	$31.3M	$22.3M	$147M
2024	$87.0M	$86.0M	$489M
2024	$19.5M	$17.6M	$489M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$245M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Paramount Global is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.6% vs 9.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 9.6% early in the record and 0.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?38.9%
Diluted shares grew 38.9% over 2015–2024, even as the company spent $7.6B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$8.4B → $18.0B
Debt rose from $8.4B to $18.0B while owner earnings went from about $1.6B to $166M — about 5.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 109 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Media & Broadcasting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
WBDWarner Bros. Discovery, Inc.	$37.3B	63%	13.4%	5%	20%
PARAParamount Global	$29.2B	—	17.8%	13%	6%
PSKYParamount Skydance Corporation	$29.2B	—	-18.0%	-19%	2%
FOXFox Corporation	$16.3B	—	20.9%	13%	15%
SIRISiriusXM Holdings Inc.	$8.6B	100%	21.2%	17%	20%
VSNTVersant Media Group, Inc.	$6.7B	—	26.1%	13%	31%
NXSTNexstar Media Group Inc.	$4.9B	—	24.3%	9%	22%
FWONALiberty Media Corporation	$4.5B	73%	13.6%	4%	18%
Group median	—	—	19.3%	11%	19%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Paramount Global has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Paramount Global earns about $1.6B on its 5.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($1.6B) Net of stock comp (−$223M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24−29%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’24−15%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $507M on 673M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $15.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PARA against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Paramount Global (PARA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PARA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PAR its page in the Manual PARR →

Industry order: ← OPTU the Media & Broadcasting chapter PSKY →