Share count
1.9Bpeak FY2025
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CPNG, Coupang Inc.
Coupang is one of South Korea's largest online retailers. It sells goods it buys and stocks itself, and it also rents its site to outside sellers who pay to reach its shoppers. What sets it apart is that it owns the delivery — its own warehouses, trucks, and drivers carry orders to the door, often the same or next day. The money comes from the markup on its own goods, the fees from third-party sellers, and a paid membership, spread across a dense home market.
We serve millions of customers in over 190 countries and territories around the world.
We have organized our operations into two segments: Product Commerce and Developing Offerings.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$34.5B
+14.1% YoY · 24% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $35.1B 5-yr avg $25.6B
Revenue $8.5B +7.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −2.8% yr-ago 1.9%
Net income ($266M) yr-ago $114M
Net margin −3.1% yr-ago 1.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Products (76%), Third-party merchant services (21%) and Other revenue (3%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- This runs on the same logic as the big Western marketplaces: own the pipes from warehouse to doorstep, then drive enough orders through them that the fixed cost of all that concrete and freight spreads thin. The lever is volume against a heavy, self-built delivery network in one country — fill the trucks and the warehouses and the cost per package falls, and fast, sure delivery pulls in the next order. It tilts franchise if the network and habit make a shopper's default choice hard to dislodge, commodity if rivals match the speed and compete on price alone. The bad case: the build runs ahead of the orders, a deep-pocketed competitor matches the service, and the spending never earns its return. Margins, returns on capital, and cash flow sit in the record below.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Products is 76% of revenue, with Third-party merchant services the other meaningful line at 21%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Products76%$26.3B
- Third-party merchant services21%$7.1B
- Other revenue3%$1.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $6.3B | $12.0B | $18.4B | $20.6B | $24.4B | $30.3B | $34.5B | $35.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 16% | 17% | 16% | 23% | 25% | 29% | 29% | 29% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 27% | 21% | 24% | 23% | 23% | 28% | 28% | 29% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($642M) | ($516M) | ($1.5B) | ($112M) | $473M | $436M | $473M | $77M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −10.2% | −4.3% | −8.1% | −0.5% | 1.9% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 0.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($697M) | ($463M) | ($1.5B) | ($92M) | $1.4B | $154M | $208M | ($165M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| ($312M) | $302M | ($411M) | $565M | $2.7B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $71M | $128M | $201M | $231M | $275M | $433M | $517M | $538M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $293M | $606M | $682M | $164M | $691M | $866M | $573M | $754M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $218M | $485M | $674M | $824M | $896M | $879M | $1.3B | $1.3B | CapexCapex |
| 3.5% | 4.0% | 3.7% | 4.0% | 3.7% | 2.9% | 3.6% | 3.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($383M) | $174M | ($612M) | $334M | $2.4B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −6.1% | 1.5% | −3.3% | 1.6% | 9.7% | 4.8% | 3.6% | 3.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($530M) | ($183M) | ($1.1B) | ($259M) | $1.8B | $1.0B | $522M | $295M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −8.4% | −1.5% | −5.9% | −1.3% | 7.2% | 3.3% | 1.5% | 0.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $178M | $243M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | -71% | -4% | 33% | 4% | 4% | -4% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −71% | −4% | 33% | 4% | 4% | −4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $1.4B | $1.3B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $5.2B | $5.9B | $6.3B | $6.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $12M | $90M | $64M | $314M | $407M | $363M | $351M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.0B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $5.1B | $5.6B | $6.3B | $6.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($1.7B) | ($1.9B) | ($1.9B) | ($3.1B) | ($3.0B) | ($3.7B) | ($3.6B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $2.8B | $5.6B | $5.8B | $7.9B | $9.0B | $9.7B | $9.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $3.7B | $4.7B | $5.1B | $6.9B | $7.7B | $9.4B | $9.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.8× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $4M | $10M | — | — | — | — | $10M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $5.1B | $8.6B | $9.5B | $13.3B | $15.3B | $17.8B | $17.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $590M | $625M | $667M | $732M | $1.1B | $648M | $618M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($662M) | ($2.9B) | ($2.8B) | ($4.5B) | ($4.8B) | ($5.7B) | ($5.7B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -6.6× | -4.8× | -33.2× | -4.1× | 9.9× | 3.1× | 5.5× | 1.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($3.5B) | ($4.1B) | $2.2B | $2.4B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.6B | $3.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.3% | 1.4% | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 19.5M | 29.0M | 1.42B | 1.76B | 1.80B | 1.83B | 1.85B | 1.82B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $322.32 | $412.50 | $12.93 | $11.66 | $13.52 | $16.58 | $18.62 | $19.25 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-35.81 | $-15.96 | $-1.08 | $-0.05 | $0.75 | $0.08 | $0.11 | $-0.09 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-19.67 | $6.00 | $-0.43 | $0.19 | $1.32 | $0.80 | $0.68 | $0.58 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-27.21 | $-6.31 | $-0.76 | $-0.15 | $0.97 | $0.55 | $0.28 | $0.16 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $11.19 | $16.70 | $0.47 | $0.47 | $0.50 | $0.48 | $0.67 | $0.72 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-181.52 | $-140.25 | $1.53 | $1.37 | $2.27 | $2.25 | $2.49 | $2.15 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.49 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×49.08 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −37.8%/yr | −46.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −35.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −37.4%/yr | −47.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Gross margin
29%low FY2021
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$1.3Bowner earningsvs.$208Mnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2020FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.3B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $517M it takes just to hold its position. It put $734M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $522M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $208M | $154M | $1.4B | ($92M) | ($1.5B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$517M | +$433M | +$275M | +$231M | +$201M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$475M | +$433M | +$326M | +$262M | +$249M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$573M | +$866M | +$691M | +$164M | +$682M |
| Cash from operations | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.7B | $565M | ($411M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$517M | −$433M | −$275M | −$231M | −$201M |
| Owner earnings | $1.3B | $1.5B | $2.4B | $334M | ($612M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$734M | −$446M | −$621M | −$593M | −$473M |
| Free cash flow | $522M | $1.0B | $1.8B | ($259M) | ($1.1B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | 5% | 10% | 2% | -3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $517M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $734M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $475M), owner earnings is nearer $781M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We previously identified and disclosed a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting related to our Farfetch acquisition.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $473M ÷ interest expense $86M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $6.3B − debt $988M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $5.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 4 + DIO 34 − DPO 94 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Not meaningful hereInvested capital ($707M) = debt $988M + equity $4.6B − cashIndustry peers: median 23%
What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $1.3B = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $517M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median 2%)Industry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 7 years. It chose to put $734M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $522M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $475M of SBC) leaves $781M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.8B ÷ net income $208M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $243M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.3B
What this means
Of $1.3B Owner Earnings, $243M (19%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $243M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($475M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.42×ExpandingCapex $1.3B ÷ depreciation $517M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $34.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.04×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $988M vs $334M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.31/share (latest year $0.11), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.53/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −8% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −8% early to 2% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2019 · −10.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“We continually upgrade existing technologies and business applications to keep pace with evolving technologies, our competitors, and consumer preferences, and we may be required to implement new technologies, such as those related to AI, or business applications in the future.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$9.4B
- Cash & short-term investments$6.3B
- Receivables$351M
- Inventory$2.0B
- Other current assets$674M
Current liabilities$9.6B
- Accounts payable$6.0B
- Other current liabilities$3.7B
Current ratio0.97×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.76×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.65×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($260M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.7B$3.1B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.0B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$183Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Due in the next 12 months$580Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$1.1Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$580Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$2.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$6.3B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$1.3B
Together, against $580M due next year13.0×
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $7.6B against the $580M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 13 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$721Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$3.7Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$3.0Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$988M
Lease obligations (present value)$3.0B
Total fixed claims on the business$4.0B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.0B, of which the leases are 75%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $6.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$5.2B · 81%
- Buybacks$421M · 7%
- Retained (debt / cash)$807M · 13%
- Returned to owners$421M
9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $421M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $4.9B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$27.61
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 9M shares were bought for $243M, about $27.61 each.
- Net change in share count9276.8%
The diluted count rose from 19M to 1825M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $1.6M | $684.3M | ($612M) |
| 2022 | $1.9M | −$49.7M | $334M |
| 2023 | $1.7M | $2.6M | $2.4B |
| 2024 | $2.1M | $2.4M | $1.5B |
| 2025 | $3.2M | $3.2M | $1.3B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio95:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$475M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 100% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, E-Commerce & Marketplaces
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CPNGCoupang Inc. | $34.5B | 23% | -0.5% | — | 2% |
| CDWCDW Corp. | $22.4B | 17% | 6.6% | 17% | 5% |
| DKSDick's Sporting Goods | $17.2B | 32% | 7.1% | 28% | 6% |
| CHWYChewy Inc. | $12.6B | 27% | -0.8% | — | 2% |
| WWayfair | $12.5B | 28% | -5.4% | — | 1% |
| ULTAUlta Beauty Inc. | $12.4B | 38% | 13.4% | 48% | 10% |
| NSITInsight Enterprises | $8.2B | 15% | 3.4% | 13% | 2% |
| PTRNPattern Group Inc. Series A | $2.5B | 44% | 3.9% | — | 3% |
| Group median | — | 27% | 3.6% | — | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Coupang Inc. has delivered.
Coupang Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Coupang Inc. earns about $560M on its 1.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
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The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−45%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+56%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $295M on 1825M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $5.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.3B) runs well above depreciation ($538M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Coupang Inc. (CPNG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CPNG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CPK its page in the Manual CPRI →
Industry order: ← CHWY the E-Commerce & Marketplaces chapter DDL →