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W, Wayfair

E-Commerce & Marketplaces retail UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Our CastleGate facilities enable suppliers to forward-position their inventory in our warehouses, allowing us to offer faster delivery.

We are focused on bringing our customers an experience that is at the forefront of shopping for the home online.

Our selections of furniture, d cor, housewares and home improvement products appeal to our customers' different tastes, styles, purchasing goals and budgets when shopping for their homes and businesses.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

W · Wayfair

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$12.5B

+5.1% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $12.7B 5-yr avg $12.4B

Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 29%

Operating margin 1.0% 5-yr avg −4.5%

Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is U.S. (88%) and International (12%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −5.8% through the cycle on a 28% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −40 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

U.S. is 88% of revenue, with International the other meaningful segment at 12%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

U.S.88%$11.0B
International12%$1.5B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.4B	$4.7B	$6.8B	$9.1B	$14.1B	$13.7B	$12.2B	$12.0B	$11.9B	$12.5B	$12.7B	RevenueRevenue
24%	24%	23%	24%	29%	28%	28%	31%	30%	30%	30%	Gross marginGross mgn
($196M)	($235M)	($473M)	($930M)	$360M	($94M)	($1.4B)	($813M)	($461M)	$17M	$128M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−5.8%	−5.0%	−7.0%	−10.2%	2.5%	−0.7%	−11.3%	−6.8%	−3.9%	0.1%	1.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($194M)	($245M)	($504M)	($985M)	$185M	($131M)	($1.3B)	($738M)	($492M)	($313M)	($305M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$63M	$34M	$85M	($197M)	$1.4B	$410M	($674M)	$349M	$317M	$534M	$578M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$56M	$87M	$124M	$192M	$286M	$322M	$371M	$417M	$387M	$305M	$291M	DepreciationDeprec.
$152M	$123M	$338M	$369M	$670M	($125M)	($227M)	$65M	$27M	$207M	$254M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$97M	$100M	$159M	$272M	$186M	$101M	$186M	$148M	$73M	$70M	$90M	CapexCapex
2.9%	2.1%	2.3%	3.0%	1.3%	0.7%	1.5%	1.2%	0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$7M	($67M)	($39M)	($389M)	$1.2B	$309M	($860M)	$201M	$244M	$464M	$488M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
0.2%	−1.4%	−0.6%	−4.3%	8.7%	2.3%	−7.0%	1.7%	2.1%	3.7%	3.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($34M)	($67M)	($74M)	($469M)	$1.2B	$309M	($860M)	$201M	$244M	$464M	$488M	Free cash flowFCF
−1.0%	−1.4%	−1.1%	−5.1%	8.7%	2.3%	−7.0%	1.7%	2.1%	3.7%	3.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	—	$0	$0	$380M	$300M	$75M	$0	$0	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
											Balance sheet
$349M	$620M	$964M	$987M	$2.6B	$2.4B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.1B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$19M	$38M	$51M	$100M	$110M	$226M	$272M	$140M	$155M	$132M	$158M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$19M	$28M	$46M	$62M	$52M	$69M	$90M	$75M	$76M	$71M	$78M	InventoryInvent.
$379M	$440M	$650M	$908M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B	Accounts payablePayables
($342M)	($374M)	($553M)	($747M)	($995M)	($871M)	($842M)	($1.0B)	($1.0B)	($999M)	($858M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$477M	$817M	$1.3B	$1.4B	$3.0B	$3.0B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$1.6B	Current assetsCur. assets
$557M	$740M	$1.1B	$1.6B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.1B	$2.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×	1.1×	1.1×	0.9×	1.4×	1.4×	0.9×	0.8×	0.8×	0.9×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M	$2M	$2M	$400K	$400K	$400K	$400K	$400K	$400K	$400K	$400K	GoodwillGoodwill
$762M	$1.2B	$1.9B	$3.0B	$4.6B	$4.6B	$3.6B	$3.5B	$3.5B	$3.4B	$2.9B	Total assetsAssets
$0	$333M	$739M	$1.5B	$2.7B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$3.1B	Total debtDebt
($349M)	($287M)	($225M)	$469M	$67M	$653M	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$2.1B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-12.9×	-5.6×	0.1×	0.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$79M	($48M)	($331M)	($944M)	($1.2B)	($1.6B)	($2.5B)	($2.7B)	($2.8B)	($2.8B)	($2.8B)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.5%	1.4%	1.9%	2.5%	2.0%	2.5%	4.2%	5.0%	3.3%	2.7%	2.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
85.0M	87.0M	89.5M	92.0M	99.0M	104M	106M	114M	123M	128M	131M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$39.78	$54.27	$75.77	$99.21	$142.88	$131.81	$115.26	$105.29	$96.35	$97.32	$96.63	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.29	$-2.81	$-5.63	$-10.71	$1.87	$-1.26	$-12.56	$-6.47	$-4.00	$-2.45	$-2.33	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.09	$-0.77	$-0.43	$-4.23	$12.43	$2.97	$-8.11	$1.76	$1.98	$3.63	$3.73	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.40	$-0.77	$-0.83	$-5.10	$12.43	$2.97	$-8.11	$1.76	$1.98	$3.63	$3.73	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.14	$1.15	$1.78	$2.96	$1.88	$0.97	$1.75	$1.30	$0.59	$0.55	$0.69	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.93	$-0.56	$-3.70	$-10.26	$-12.04	$-15.57	$-24.06	$-23.75	$-22.40	$-21.73	$-21.69	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+10.5%/yr	−7.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+51.7%/yr	−21.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	−7.8%/yr	−21.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

128Mpeak FY2025

Gross margin

30%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.7×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$464Mowner earningsvs.($313M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $313M loss into $464M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($313M)	($492M)	($738M)	($1.3B)	($131M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$305M	+$387M	+$417M	+$371M	+$322M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$335M	+$395M	+$605M	+$513M	+$344M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$207M	+$27M	+$65M	−$227M	−$125M
Cash from operations	$534M	$317M	$349M	($674M)	$410M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$70M	−$73M	−$148M	−$186M	−$101M
Owner earnings	$464M	$244M	$201M	($860M)	$309M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	2%	2%	-7%	2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $335M), owner earnings is nearer $129M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.1×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $17M ÷ interest expense $165M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.7B · 101.8× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $1.5B + ST investments $66M − debt $3.3B

What this means
Netting $1.5B of cash and short-term investments against $3.3B of debt leaves $1.7B owed, about 101.8× a year's operating profit (192.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -44d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 4 + DIO 3 − DPO 50 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not meaningful here

Invested capital ($986M) = debt $3.3B + equity ($2.8B) − cash

Industry peers: median 23%

What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $464M = operating cash $534M − maintenance capex $70M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 0%)

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $335M of SBC) leaves $129M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $534M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($313M) · cash from operations $534M

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $464M

What this means
Of $464M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.23×

Harvesting

Capex $70M ÷ depreciation $305M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.94×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.3B vs ($128M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.93/share (latest year $-2.39), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-21.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −6% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to −4% lately, median −6% — pricing power intact or improving.
Worst year 2022 · −11.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +4.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We use artificial intelligence in our business, and challenges with properly managing its use could result in reputational harm, competitive harm, and legal liability, and adversely affect our results of operations.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B

Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
Receivables$158M
Inventory$78M
Other current assets$270M

Current liabilities$2.1B

Debt due within a year$39M
Accounts payable$1.1B
Other current liabilities$922M

Current ratio0.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.73×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.52×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($487M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$39M due · $1.1B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($2.9B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($4.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$3.9B$894M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.3B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$255Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$226M

'27$241M

'28$190M

'29$142M

'30$115M

later$477M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$226Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.0Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$3.3B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.0B

Total fixed claims on the business$4.3B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.3B, of which the leases are 24%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.4B · 60%
Buybacks$755M · 32%
Retained (debt / cash)$190M · 8%

Returned to owners$755M
69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $755M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.1B and cash and short-term investments rose $713M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $755M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count54.2%
The diluted count rose from 85M to 131M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid no dividend over the span; it returns cash through buybacks or retains it.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Shah	$227k	$227k	$309M
2022	Shah	$751k	$751k	($860M)
2023	Shah	$225k	$225k	$201M
2024	Shah	$283k	$283k	$244M
2025	Shah	$280.8M	$324.0M	$464M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$335M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 1971% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Wayfair is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?54.2%
Diluted shares grew 54.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $755M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $3.1B
Debt rose from $0 to $3.1B while owner earnings went from about ($33M) to $303M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?1% → 2% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $38M to $236M while revenue grew 274%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (1% of revenue then, 2% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $93M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, E-Commerce & Marketplaces

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CPNGCoupang Inc.	$34.5B	23%	-0.5%	—	2%
CDWCDW Corp.	$22.4B	17%	6.6%	17%	5%
DKSDick's Sporting Goods	$17.2B	32%	7.1%	28%	6%
CHWYChewy Inc.	$12.6B	27%	-0.8%	—	2%
WWayfair	$12.5B	28%	-5.4%	—	1%
ULTAUlta Beauty Inc.	$12.4B	38%	13.4%	48%	10%
NSITInsight Enterprises	$8.2B	15%	3.4%	13%	2%
PTRNPattern Group Inc. Series A	$2.5B	44%	3.9%	—	3%
Group median	—	27%	3.6%	—	3%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Wayfair has delivered.

Wayfair’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Wayfair earns about $118M on its 0.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($118M) Net of stock comp (−$338M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($508M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+52%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $488M on 131M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $2.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($90M) runs well above depreciation ($291M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $508M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh W against another business →

The owners of W: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Wayfair (W), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/W, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VZ its page in the Manual WAB →

Industry order: ← VIPS the E-Commerce & Marketplaces chapter