Owner Scorecard


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DKS, Dick's Sporting Goods

Dick's Sporting Goods is a leading global sports retailer offering an extensive assortment of authentic, high-quality sports equipment, apparel, footwear and accessories.

Stack, our Executive Chairman, opened his original bait and tackle store in Binghamton, New York.

Stack joined his father's business full-time in 1977 and in 1984 became President and Chief Executive Officer of the then two-store chain.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
DKS · Dick's Sporting Goods
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$17.2B
+28.1% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $19.2B 5-yr avg $13.7B
Gross margin 32% 5-yr avg 35%
Operating margin 6.1% 5-yr avg 11.1%
ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 63%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is DICK'S (82%) and Foot Locker (18%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 32% and operating margin about 6.4% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 4.3% to 17% — on a steadier 32% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 22% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 28%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

DICK'S is 82% of revenue, with Foot Locker the other meaningful segment at 18%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
  • DICK'S82%$14.1B
  • Foot Locker18%$3.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$7.9B$8.6B$8.4B$8.8B$9.6B$12.3B$12.4B$13.0B$13.4B$17.2B$19.2BRevenueRevenue
30%29%29%29%32%38%35%35%36%33%32%Gross marginGross mgn
24%23%24%25%24%22%23%25%25%25%25%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$450M$478M$445M$376M$741M$2.0B$1.5B$1.3B$1.5B$1.1B$1.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.7%5.6%5.3%4.3%7.7%16.5%11.8%9.9%11.0%6.4%6.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$287M$323M$320M$297M$530M$1.5B$1.0B$1.0B$1.2B$849M$905MNet incomeNet inc.
37%35%26%27%25%24%25%21%23%26%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$769M$746M$713M$405M$1.6B$1.6B$922M$1.5B$1.3B$1.5B$1.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$234M$238M$244M$307M$326M$323M$365M$394M$400M$489M$545MDepreciationDeprec.
$214M$149M$107M($244M)$646M($278M)($537M)$30M($325M)$76M$52MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$422M$474M$198M$217M$224M$308M$364M$587M$803M$1.1B$1.2BCapexCapex
5.3%5.5%2.3%2.5%2.3%2.5%2.9%4.5%6.0%6.6%6.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$535M$509M$515M$187M$1.3B$1.3B$558M$1.1B$911M$1.0B$1.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.8%5.9%6.1%2.1%13.9%10.6%4.5%8.7%6.8%6.1%5.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$347M$272M$515M$187M$1.3B$1.3B$558M$940M$509M$400M$403MFree cash flowFCF
4.4%3.2%6.1%2.1%13.9%10.6%4.5%7.2%3.8%2.3%2.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$119M$9M$0$0$0$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$68M$73M$89M$98M$107M$603M$163M$351M$362M$414M$428MDividends paidDiv. paid
$146M$285M$323M$402M$0$1.1B$458M$649M$263M$347MBuybacksBuybacks
16%16%18%15%50%165%53%44%38%13%13%ROICROIC
15%17%17%17%23%72%41%40%36%15%16%Return on equityROE
11%13%12%12%18%44%35%27%25%8%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$165M$101M$114M$69M$1.7B$2.6B$1.9B$1.8B$1.7B$1.4B$998MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$75M$60M$38M$53M$77MReceivablesReceiv.
$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$2.2B$2.0B$2.3B$2.8B$2.8B$3.3B$4.9B$5.4BInventoryInvent.
$756M$843M$890M$1.0B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$2.0B$2.2BAccounts payablePayables
$958M$928M$973M$1.3B$695M$1.0B$1.6B$1.6B$1.9B$2.9B$3.3BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.4B$3.8B$5.1B$5.0B$4.9B$5.4B$7.1B$7.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$2.1B$2.6B$2.7B$2.6B$2.8B$3.1B$4.6B$4.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.4×1.4×1.2×1.5×1.9×1.9×1.8×1.8×1.5×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$245M$250M$250M$246M$246M$246M$246M$246M$246M$864M$813MGoodwillGoodwill
$4.1B$4.2B$4.2B$6.6B$7.8B$9.0B$9.0B$9.3B$10.5B$17.4B$17.8BTotal assetsAssets
$5M$60M$55M$224M$418M$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.9B$1.9BTotal debtDebt
($160M)($41M)($59M)$155M($1.2B)($1.2B)($442M)($318M)($190M)$586M$941MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
76.8×59.3×43.4×22.1×15.2×35.2×15.4×22.1×27.8×17.1×16.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.7B$2.3B$2.1B$2.5B$2.6B$3.2B$5.5B$5.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.5%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
112M108M98.8M89.1M92.6M110M99.3M85.9M82.9M85.1M90.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$70.60$79.85$85.41$98.25$103.46$112.19$124.59$151.11$162.10$202.19$212.43Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.56$3.01$3.24$3.34$5.72$13.87$10.51$12.18$14.05$9.97$10.01EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.77$4.73$5.21$2.10$14.34$11.94$5.62$13.19$10.99$12.32$12.07Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.09$2.53$5.21$2.10$14.34$11.94$5.62$10.94$6.14$4.70$4.45Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.61$0.68$0.90$1.10$1.16$5.50$1.64$4.09$4.36$4.86$4.73Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.76$4.41$2.01$2.44$2.42$2.81$3.67$6.84$9.68$13.36$13.64Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.19$18.05$19.28$19.44$25.25$19.18$25.43$30.46$38.57$65.07$61.99Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.4%/yr+14.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+11.1%/yr−3.0%/yr
EPS+16.3%/yr+11.7%/yr
Dividends / share+26.0%/yr+33.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+15.1%/yr+40.7%/yr
Book value / share+15.9%/yr+20.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
85Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
13%low FY2026
Gross margin
33%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.6×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.0Bowner earningsvs.$849Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $1.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $489M it takes just to hold its position. It put $649M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $400M.

Reported net income$849M
Owner earnings$1.0B · 6% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$849M$1.2B$1.0B$1.0B$1.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$489M+$400M+$394M+$365M+$323M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$124M+$71M+$57M+$51M+$53M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$76M−$325M+$30M−$537M−$278M
Cash from operations$1.5B$1.3B$1.5B$922M$1.6B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$489M−$400M−$394M−$364M−$308M
Owner earnings$1.0B$911M$1.1B$558M$1.3B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$649M−$402M−$193M
Free cash flow$400M$509M$940M$558M$1.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%7%9%5%11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $489M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $649M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $124M), owner earnings is nearer $925M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.1B ÷ interest expense $64M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $586M · 0.5× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $1.4B − debt $1.9B
    What this means

    Netting $1.4B of cash and short-term investments against $1.9B of debt leaves $586M owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit (1.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 1 + DIO 155 − DPO 63 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 13%–165%; 13% latest = NOPAT $815M ÷ invested capital $6.1B
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–14%; latest $1.0B = operating cash $1.5B − maintenance capex $489M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. It chose to put $649M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $400M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $124M of SBC) leaves $925M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.5B ÷ net income $849M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $761M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.0B
    What this means

    Of $1.0B Owner Earnings, $761M (73%) went back to shareholders, $414M dividends, $347M buybacks. Net of $124M stock comp, the real buyback was about $223M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.33×
    Expanding
    Capex $1.1B ÷ depreciation $489M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $17.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.53×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.9B vs $2.5B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +229%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $11.52/share (latest year $9.59), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $62.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 6% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 9% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 35%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 4.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, the retail industry is undergoing continued technological innovation and disruption—including increased use of artificial intelligence ("AI") and machine learning.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$7.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$998M
  • Receivables$77M
  • Inventory$5.4B
  • Other current assets$776M
Current liabilities$4.8B
  • Accounts payable$2.2B
  • Other current liabilities$2.7B
Current ratio1.50×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.38×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.21×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+62.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$5.9B$5.9B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $7.8B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$1.3B
'27$1.2B
'28$963M
'29$788M
'30$643M
later$2.3B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$1.3Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$7.2Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$5.8Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.9B
Lease obligations (present value)$5.8B
Total fixed claims on the business$7.8B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $7.8B, of which the leases are 75%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $11.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$4.7B · 43%
  • Dividends$2.3B · 21%
  • Buybacks$4.0B · 36%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$19M · 0%
  • Returned to owners$6.3B

    79% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.3B as dividends and $4.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.9B and cash and short-term investments rose $833M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$71.88

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 56M shares were bought for $4.0B, about $71.88 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $33.78 (2019) to $219.15 (2026); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $106.10 ($1.1B).

  • Net change in share count−19.4%

    The diluted count fell from 112M to 90M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$4.86/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 26% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained49%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $512M, so each retained $1 added about 0.49 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Lauren R. Hobart$9.6M$32.7M$1.3B
2023Lauren R. Hobart$8.4M$12.6M$558M
2024Lauren R. Hobart$13.6M$23.1M$1.1B
2025Lauren R. Hobart$12.9M$36.1M$911M
2026Lauren R. Hobart$15.1M$9.6M$1.0B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio325:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$124M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Dick's Sporting Goods is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$5M → $1.9B

    Debt rose from $5M to $1.9B while owner earnings went from about $519M to $1.0B — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?22% → 29% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $1.7B to $5.5B while revenue grew 142%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (22% of revenue then, 29% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CPNGCoupang Inc.$34.5B23%-0.5%2%
CDWCDW Corp.$22.4B17%6.6%17%5%
DKSDick's Sporting Goods$17.2B32%7.1%28%6%
CHWYChewy Inc.$12.6B27%-0.8%2%
WWayfair$12.5B28%-5.4%1%
ULTAUlta Beauty Inc.$12.4B38%13.4%48%10%
SIGSignet Jewelers$6.8B38%6.7%15%8%
ASOAcademy Sports and Outdoors$6.1B34%8.8%25%7%
Group median30%6.7%25%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Dick's Sporting Goods has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Dick's Sporting Goods earns about $1.1B on its 6.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $403M on 89M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $941M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.2B) runs well above depreciation ($545M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Dick's Sporting Goods (DKS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DKS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DKNG its page in the Manual DLB →

Industry order: ← DBI the Specialty Retail chapter ELA →