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RRC, Range Resources

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

RRC · Range Resources

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.0B

+27.3% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.2B 5-yr avg $3.4B

Gross margin 94% 5-yr avg 92%

Operating margin 28.2% 5-yr avg 24.0%

ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 34% 5-yr avg 23%

Free cash flow margin 27% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 19% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 90% and operating margin about 3.1% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −94% and 49% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −205 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.1B	$2.6B	$3.3B	$2.6B	$1.8B	$3.6B	$5.3B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$3.0B	$3.2B	RevenueRevenue
85%	92%	85%	86%	89%	90%	92%	92%	94%	94%	94%	Gross marginGross mgn
17%	9%	6%	7%	9%	5%	3%	6%	7%	6%	6%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($802M)	$82M	($1.7B)	($2.4B)	($925M)	$1.1B	$2.6B	$267M	$180M	$704M	$905M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−72.9%	3.1%	−51.8%	−93.9%	−51.9%	29.4%	48.7%	10.5%	7.7%	23.6%	28.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($521M)	$333M	($1.7B)	($1.7B)	($712M)	$412M	$1.2B	$871M	$266M	$658M	$903M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	—	-2%	16%	21%	-6%	21%	22%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$387M	$816M	$991M	$682M	$269M	$793M	$1.9B	$978M	$945M	$1.2B	$1.5B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$567M	$689M	$658M	$1.6B	$473M	$365M	$353M	$350M	$358M	$370M	$368M	DepreciationDeprec.
$341M	($206M)	$2.1B	$754M	$507M	$17M	$328M	($243M)	$320M	$143M	$129M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$6M	$1M	$687M	$406M	$393M	$457M	$572M	$570M	$581M	$607M	CapexCapex
0.3%	0.2%	0.0%	26.4%	22.8%	11.0%	8.6%	22.5%	24.3%	19.5%	18.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$384M	$811M	$989M	($5M)	($137M)	$399M	$1.5B	$628M	$586M	$801M	$1.1B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
34.9%	31.0%	29.7%	−0.2%	−7.7%	11.2%	28.4%	24.7%	25.0%	26.8%	34.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$384M	$811M	$989M	($5M)	($137M)	$399M	$1.4B	$406M	$374M	$590M	$853M	Free cash flowFCF
34.9%	31.0%	29.7%	−0.2%	−7.7%	11.2%	26.4%	16.0%	15.9%	19.7%	26.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$17M	$20M	$20M	$20M	$0	$0	$39M	$77M	$77M	$86M	$88M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
-7%	1%	-17%	-35%	-15%	—	—	4%	3%	10%	13%	ROICROIC
-10%	6%	-43%	-73%	-43%	20%	41%	23%	7%	15%	20%	Return on equityROE
−10%	5%	−44%	−74%	−43%	20%	40%	21%	5%	13%	18%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$314K	$448K	$545K	$546K	$458K	$214M	$207K	$212M	$304M	$204K	$247K	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$242M	$349M	$491M	$273M	$253M	$472M	$481M	$275M	$302M	$359M	$277M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$27M	$21M	$23M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$26M	InventoryInvent.
$229M	$344M	$227M	$155M	$132M	$178M	$207M	$110M	$133M	$164M	$232M	Accounts payablePayables
$39M	$26M	$286M	$118M	$120M	$293M	$274M	$165M	$169M	$194M	$71M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$282M	$429M	$602M	$428M	$290M	$737M	$540M	$870M	$721M	$444M	$376M	Current assetsCur. assets
$703M	$755M	$755M	$567M	$707M	$1.2B	$1.0B	$583M	$1.3B	$661M	$679M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.4×	0.6×	0.8×	0.8×	0.4×	0.6×	0.5×	1.5×	0.6×	0.7×	0.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.7B	$1.6B	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$11.3B	$11.7B	$9.7B	$6.6B	$6.1B	$6.7B	$6.6B	$7.2B	$7.3B	$7.4B	$7.4B	Total assetsAssets
$4.1B	$4.1B	$3.9B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.2B	$819M	Total debtDebt
$4.1B	$4.1B	$3.9B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$2.7B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$819M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.8×	0.4×	-8.2×	-12.6×	-4.8×	4.6×	15.7×	2.2×	1.5×	6.7×	9.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.4B	$5.8B	$4.1B	$2.3B	$1.6B	$2.1B	$2.9B	$3.8B	$3.9B	$4.3B	$4.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
190M	245M	246M	248M	241M	249M	246M	240M	243M	240M	236M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$5.79	$10.64	$13.54	$10.49	$7.38	$14.36	$21.64	$10.60	$9.67	$12.46	$13.58	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.75	$1.36	$-7.09	$-6.92	$-2.95	$1.65	$4.80	$3.63	$1.10	$2.74	$3.82	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.02	$3.30	$4.02	$-0.02	$-0.57	$1.60	$6.13	$2.62	$2.41	$3.34	$4.62	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.02	$3.30	$4.02	$-0.02	$-0.57	$1.60	$5.72	$1.69	$1.54	$2.46	$3.61	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.09	$0.08	$0.08	$0.08	$0.00	$0.00	$0.16	$0.32	$0.32	$0.36	$0.37	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.02	$0.02	$0.01	$2.77	$1.68	$1.58	$1.85	$2.38	$2.35	$2.43	$2.57	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$28.48	$23.52	$16.49	$9.47	$6.78	$8.37	$11.67	$15.70	$16.22	$18.01	$19.47	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.9%/yr	+11.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+5.7%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+16.9%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+74.6%/yr	+7.6%/yr
Book value / share	−5.0%/yr	+21.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

240Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

10%low FY2019

Gross margin

94%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.5×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$801Mowner earningsvs.$658Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $801M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $370M it takes just to hold its position. It put $211M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $590M.

Reported net income$658M

Owner earnings$801M · 27% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$658M	$266M	$871M	$1.2B	$412M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$370M	+$358M	+$350M	+$353M	+$365M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$143M	+$320M	−$243M	+$328M	+$17M
Cash from operations	$1.2B	$945M	$978M	$1.9B	$793M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$370M	−$358M	−$350M	−$353M	−$393M
Owner earnings	$801M	$586M	$628M	$1.5B	$399M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$211M	−$212M	−$222M	−$103M	—
Free cash flow	$590M	$374M	$406M	$1.4B	$399M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	27%	25%	25%	28%	11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $370M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $211M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 6.7×

Comfortable

Operating income $704M ÷ interest expense $105M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 1.7× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $204K − debt $1.2B

What this means
Netting $204K of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 1.7× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -234d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 44 + DIO 45 − DPO 323 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -7%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -35%–10%; 10% latest = NOPAT $557M ÷ invested capital $5.5B

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 25%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -8%–35%; latest $801M = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $370M

Industry peers: median 24%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 27% of revenue this year, a 25% median across 10 years. It chose to put $211M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $590M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $119M of SBC) leaves $681M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.78×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $658M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 11%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $86M ÷ Owner Earnings $801M

What this means
Of $801M Owner Earnings, $86M (11%) went back to shareholders, $86M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.57×

Expanding

Capex $581M ÷ depreciation $370M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.67×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs ($217M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.54/share (latest year $2.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −41% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −41% early to 14% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +2%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · −93.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +2.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$376M

Cash & short-term investments$247K
Receivables$277M
Inventory$26M
Other current assets$73M

Current liabilities$679M

Accounts payable$232M
Other current liabilities$447M

Current ratio0.55×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.52×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.00×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($303M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+49.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$4.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($2.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$979M$160M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $8.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

Reinvested$3.7B · 41%
Dividends$356M · 4%
Retained (debt / cash)$4.9B · 55%

Returned to owners$356M
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $356M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $3.3B and cash and short-term investments fell $67K.
Net change in share count24.5%
The diluted count rose from 190M to 236M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.36/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 17% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$00% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$7Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $3.7B of capital spent building

$1.6B written down across 1 year (2018): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Ventura	$7.5M	$29.9M	$399M
2022	Mr. Ventura	$7.9M	$20.6M	$1.5B
2023	Mr. Degner	$6.2M	$11.2M	$628M
2023	Mr. Ventura	$593k	$7.1M	$628M
2024	Mr. Degner	$7.5M	$11.9M	$586M
2025	Mr. Degner	$8.4M	$7.9M	$801M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$119M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 17% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Range Resources is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?25.5% vs 31.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 31.9% early in the record and 25.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?24.5%
Diluted shares grew 24.5% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PRPermian Resources	$5.1B	—	31.8%	7%	50%
CHRDChord Energy	$4.9B	80%	8.1%	1%	24%
CRGYCrescent Energy	$3.6B	—	13.6%	2%	23%
SMSM Energy	$3.2B	62%	19.8%	8%	47%
RRCRange Resources	$3.0B	91%	5.4%	-3%	26%
CRCCalifornia Resources	$2.9B	24%	19.7%	13%	12%
MURMurphy Oil	$2.7B	100%	11.6%	3%	46%
CNXCNX Resources	$2.2B	—	-3.2%	-0%	24%
Group median	—	80%	12.6%	3%	25%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Range Resources has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Range Resources earns about $774M on its 25.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($774M) Net of stock comp (−$61M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($1.1B)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−8%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−2%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $853M on 236M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $819M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($607M) runs well above depreciation ($368M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh RRC against another business →

The owners of RRC: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Range Resources (RRC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RRC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RRBI its page in the Manual RRR →

Industry order: ← REPX the Oil & Gas Producers chapter SD →