Owner Scorecard


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MTDR, Matador Resources

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive Cyclical

We are an independent energy company engaged in the exploration, development, production and acquisition of oil and natural gas resources in the United States, with an emphasis on oil and natural gas shale and other unconventional plays.

The successful execution of our business strategies led to increases in our oil and natural gas production and proved oil and natural gas reserves in 2025.

Oil production comprised 58% of our total production (using a conversion ratio of one Bbl of oil per six Mcf of natural gas) for each of the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MTDR · Matador Resources
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.7B
+5.1% YoY · 34% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.6B 5-yr avg $3.0B
Gross margin 94% 5-yr avg 94%
Operating margin 24.6% 5-yr avg 43.1%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 21%
Owner-earnings margin 27% 5-yr avg 39%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg −10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Oil (78%) and Natural Gas (11%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 95% and operating margin about 34% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −67% and 55% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 92% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 35% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Oil is 78% of revenue, with Natural Gas the other meaningful line at 11%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Oil78%$2.8B
  • Natural Gas11%$399M
  • Natural Gas, Sales7%$253M
  • Natural Gas, Midstream5%$165M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$264M$544M$830M$1.0B$851M$1.9B$3.2B$2.8B$3.5B$3.7B$3.6BRevenueRevenue
95%97%97%96%95%94%94%Gross marginGross mgn
21%12%8%8%7%5%4%4%4%4%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($177M)$161M$363M$235M($521M)$793M$1.8B$1.2B$1.4B$1.2B$884MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−67.0%29.6%43.8%22.9%−61.3%42.6%55.0%42.9%41.2%33.5%24.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($97M)$126M$274M$88M($593M)$585M$1.2B$846M$885M$759M$483MNet incomeNet inc.
-7%-3%29%11%25%18%25%19%16%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$134M$299M$609M$552M$478M$1.1B$2.0B$1.9B$2.2B$2.4B$2.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$122M$178M$265M$351M$362M$345M$466M$717M$974M$1.2B$1.2BDepreciationDeprec.
$97M($21M)$52M$95M$695M$114M$283M$291M$372M$452M$459MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$454M$873M$1.5B$946M$722M$838M$1.1B$3.2B$3.9B$2.2B$2.1BCapexCapex
171.8%160.4%181.4%92.2%84.8%45.0%33.3%114.6%112.3%58.9%58.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$12M$122M$343M$202M$116M$708M$1.5B$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$962MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.6%22.3%41.4%19.6%13.6%38.0%47.3%40.9%36.6%33.6%26.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($320M)($574M)($896M)($394M)($244M)$215M$915M($1.4B)($1.7B)$270M$70MFree cash flowFCF
−121.1%−105.4%−108.0%−38.4%−28.7%11.6%28.6%−48.3%−47.7%7.4%1.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0$0$76M$76MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$15M$35M$77M$105M$163M$171MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$56MBuybacksBuybacks
-13%10%14%5%-25%31%35%16%13%11%8%ROICROIC
-14%11%16%5%-46%31%39%22%17%13%9%Return on equityROE
−46%30%38%20%15%11%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$213M$97M$65M$40M$58M$48M$505M$53M$23M$15M$30MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$34M$66M$68M$95M$85M$164M$225M$274M$332M$286M$412MReceivablesReceiv.
$5M$12M$67M$25M$14M$26M$59M$68M$147M$541M$702MAccounts payablePayables
$29M$54M$1M$70M$71M$138M$166M$206M$184M($254M)($290M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$279M$257M$306M$278M$262M$371M$1.1B$716M$927M$817M$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$170M$283M$330M$400M$291M$465M$576M$685M$995M$1.0B$1.5BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×0.9×0.9×0.7×0.9×0.8×1.9×1.0×0.9×0.8×0.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.5B$2.1B$3.5B$4.1B$3.7B$4.3B$5.6B$7.7B$10.9B$11.7B$12.2BTotal assetsAssets
$574M$574M$1.0B$1.3B$440M$385M$1.2B$2.2B$3.3B$3.4B$3.5BTotal debtDebt
$361M$478M$973M$1.3B$382M$337M$655M$2.2B$3.3B$3.4B$3.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-6.3×4.7×8.8×3.2×-6.8×10.6×26.2×10.0×8.4×5.9×4.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$690M$1.2B$1.7B$1.8B$1.3B$1.9B$3.1B$3.9B$5.1B$5.7B$5.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
4.7%3.1%2.1%1.8%1.6%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.4%0.5%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
91.3M103M114M117M116M119M120M120M124M125M123MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.90$5.31$7.30$8.77$7.33$15.63$26.61$23.48$28.04$29.35$29.09Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.07$1.23$2.41$0.75$-5.11$4.91$10.11$7.05$7.14$6.09$3.91EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.13$1.19$3.02$1.72$1.00$5.95$12.59$9.59$10.26$9.87$7.79Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-3.51$-5.60$-7.88$-3.37$-2.10$1.81$7.62$-11.34$-13.38$2.16$0.56Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.12$0.29$0.64$0.85$1.31$1.38Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.98$8.51$13.23$8.08$6.22$7.03$8.85$26.91$31.49$17.30$16.99Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.56$11.28$14.86$15.66$11.08$16.01$25.90$32.60$41.02$45.42$45.23Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+29.3%/yr+32.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+61.5%/yr+58.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+14.8%/yr+22.7%/yr
Book value / share+22.0%/yr+32.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
125Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
11%low FY2020
Gross margin
94%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.8×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.2Bowner earningsvs.$759Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1.2B it takes just to hold its position. It put $960M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $270M.

Reported net income$759M
Owner earnings$1.2B · 34% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$759M$885M$846M$1.2B$585M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1.2B+$974M+$717M+$466M+$345M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$18M+$15M+$14M+$15M+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$452M+$372M+$291M+$283M+$114M
Cash from operations$2.4B$2.2B$1.9B$2.0B$1.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$1.2B−$974M−$717M−$466M−$345M
Owner earnings$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.5B$708M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$960M−$2.9B−$2.5B−$597M−$493M
Free cash flow$270M($1.7B)($1.4B)$915M$215M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue34%37%41%47%38%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1.2B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $960M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $18M), owner earnings is nearer $1.2B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.2B ÷ interest expense $209M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.4B · 2.8× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $15M − debt $3.4B
    What this means

    Netting $15M of cash and short-term investments against $3.4B of debt leaves $3.4B owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 29 + DIO 0 − DPO 948 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -25%–35%; 11% latest = NOPAT $999M ÷ invested capital $9.0B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 5%–47%; latest $1.2B = operating cash $2.4B − maintenance capex $1.2B
    Industry peers: median 24%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a 34% median across 10 years. It chose to put $960M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $270M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $18M of SBC) leaves $1.2B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.4B ÷ net income $759M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $219M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.2B
    What this means

    Of $1.2B Owner Earnings, $219M (18%) went back to shareholders, $163M dividends, $56M buybacks. Net of $18M stock comp, the real buyback was about $38M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.80×
    Expanding
    Capex $2.2B ÷ depreciation $1.2B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.79×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.4B vs ($215M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +723%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.69/share (latest year $6.11), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $45.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 39% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 39% lately, median 34% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 15%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +38%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 38% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · −67.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$30M
  • Receivables$412M
  • Other current assets$642M
Current liabilities$1.5B
  • Accounts payable$702M
  • Other current liabilities$777M
Current ratio0.73×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.73×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($394M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−33.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$5.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$3.6B$144M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $11.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$15.7B · 135%
  • Dividends$395M · 3%
  • Buybacks$56M · 0%
  • Returned to owners$451M

    7% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $395M as dividends and $56M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$4.5B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $4.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $574M to $3.5B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$41.33

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $56M, about $41.33 each.

  • Net change in share count35.3%

    The diluted count rose from 91M to 123M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.31/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained29%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($3.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $1.1B, so each retained $1 added about 0.29 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Foran$9.1M$27.4M$708M
2022Mr. Foran$9.0M$21.9M$1.5B
2023Mr. Foran$8.1M$7.6M$1.2B
2024Mr. Foran$8.4M$9.3M$1.3B
2025Mr. Foran$9.8M$6.8M$1.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership5.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$18M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Matador Resources is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?35.3%

    Diluted shares grew 35.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $56M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PRPermian Resources$5.1B31.8%7%50%
CHRDChord Energy$4.9B80%8.1%1%24%
MTDRMatador Resources$3.7B95%37.4%12%35%
CRGYCrescent Energy$3.6B13.6%2%23%
RRCRange Resources$3.0B91%5.4%-3%26%
CRCCalifornia Resources$2.9B24%19.7%13%12%
NOGNorthern Oil and Gas$2.5B81%20.3%9%58%
CRKComstock Resources Inc.$2.2B16.7%-0%16%
Group median81%18.2%4%25%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Matador Resources has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Matador Resources earns about $1.3B on its 35.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 33.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $70M on 124M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-06; net debt $3.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2.1B) runs well above depreciation ($1.2B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $972M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Matador Resources (MTDR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MTDR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MTD its page in the Manual MTG →

Industry order: ← MNR the Oil & Gas Producers chapter MUR →