Owner Scorecard


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CSTE, Caesarstone Ltd.

Building Products capital-intensive Cyclical

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share
CSTE · Caesarstone Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$397M
−10.4% YoY · −4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $397M 5-yr avg $548M
Gross margin 18% 5-yr avg 21%
Operating margin −31.6% 5-yr avg −12.2%
ROIC −113% 5-yr avg −34%
Owner-earnings margin −12% 5-yr avg −1%
Free cash flow margin −12% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 27% and operating margin about 4.3% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −32% and 17% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 24% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 7 regions, the largest United States at 47%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States47%$187M
  • Australia17%$67M
  • EMEA13%$52M
  • Canada13%$52M
  • Israel5%$19M
  • Asia5%$18M
  • Latin America0%$1M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$539M$588M$576M$546M$486M$644M$691M$565M$443M$397M$397MRevenueRevenue
39%34%28%27%28%27%24%16%22%18%18%Gross marginGross mgn
$93M$41M$33M$25M$23M$27M($59M)($88M)($42M)($126M)($126M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
17.2%6.9%5.7%4.5%4.6%4.3%−8.5%−15.6%−9.5%−31.6%−31.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$76M$28M$25M$13M$8M$18M($56M)($108M)($43M)($138M)($138M)Net incomeNet inc.
15%21%16%33%38%10%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$102M$61M$15M$83M$48M$21M($23M)$67M$32M($38M)($38M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$28M$30M$29M$29M$29M$35M$36M$30M$17M$14M$14MDepreciationDeprec.
($3M)$4M($38M)$42M$11M($33M)($3M)$145M$58M$86M$86MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$23M$23M$21M$24M$20M$31M$18M$11M$10M$9M$9MCapexCapex
4.3%3.9%3.6%4.3%4.1%4.9%2.6%2.0%2.4%2.3%2.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$79M$38M($6M)$59M$28M($11M)($41M)$55M$21M($47M)($47M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
14.6%6.5%−1.1%10.9%5.7%−1.7%−6.0%9.8%4.8%−11.8%−11.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$79M$38M($6M)$59M$28M($11M)($41M)$55M$21M($47M)($47M)Free cash flowFCF
14.6%6.5%−1.1%10.9%5.7%−1.7%−6.0%9.8%4.8%−11.8%−11.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$243K$20M$5M$5M$11M$9M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
24%10%7%5%4%6%-12%-27%-15%-123%-113%ROICROIC
17%6%5%3%2%4%-13%-34%-16%-99%-99%Return on equityROE
17%1%2%1%1%−15%−34%−16%−99%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$106M$139M$94M$139M$122M$86M$59M$55M$57M$58M$58MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$63M$73M$73M$78M$85M$83M$78M$67M$47M$48M$48MReceivablesReceiv.
$101M$133M$158M$123M$152M$205M$238M$136M$113M$94M$94MInventoryInvent.
$49M$64M$56M$53M$55M$81M$62M$43M$53M$38M$38MAccounts payablePayables
$116M$142M$175M$148M$182M$206M$254M$160M$107M$105M$105MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$310M$378M$350M$374M$386M$409M$408M$320M$348M$253M$253MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$93M$127M$111M$126M$157M$183M$165M$121M$152M$138M$138MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.3×3.0×3.1×3.0×2.5×2.2×2.5×2.6×2.3×1.8×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$36M$37M$35M$35M$47M$46M$0$0$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$585M$653M$617M$704M$821M$868M$753M$580M$549M$398M$398MTotal assetsAssets
$0$13M$13M$26M$7MTotal debtDebt
($139M)($110M)($73M)($33M)($51M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
13.5×-169.6×-233.5×-139.6×-1821.9×-1821.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$438M$470M$467M$478M$487M$494M$421M$315M$272M$139M$139MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
34.8M34.4M34.4M34.5M34.5M34.6M34.5M34.5M34.5M34.6M34.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.49$17.10$16.74$15.84$14.11$18.63$20.03$16.37$12.83$11.49$11.49Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.20$0.80$0.71$0.37$0.22$0.52$-1.63$-3.14$-1.24$-3.99$-3.98EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.26$1.12$-0.18$1.73$0.81$-0.31$-1.19$1.60$0.62$-1.36$-1.36Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.26$1.12$-0.18$1.73$0.81$-0.31$-1.19$1.60$0.62$-1.36$-1.36Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.01$0.59$0.15$0.14$0.31$0.25$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.66$0.66$0.61$0.68$0.58$0.91$0.52$0.32$0.30$0.26$0.26Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.59$13.67$13.56$13.86$14.14$14.30$12.21$9.13$7.86$4.03$4.03Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−3.3%/yr−4.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−9.8%/yr−14.6%/yr
Book value / share−11.9%/yr−22.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
35Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
−123%low FY2025
Gross margin
18%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($47M)owner earningsvs.($138M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $138M loss into ($47M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($138M)($43M)($108M)($56M)$18M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$14M+$17M+$30M+$36M+$35M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$86M+$58M+$145M−$3M−$33M
Cash from operations($38M)$32M$67M($23M)$21M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$9M−$10M−$11M−$18M−$31M
Owner earnings($47M)$21M$55M($41M)($11M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-12%5%10%-6%-2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($126M) ÷ interest expense $69K
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $58M − debt $7M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $51M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 44 + DIO 106 − DPO 43 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -123%–24%; -113% latest = NOPAT ($99M) ÷ invested capital $88M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -113% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -12%–15%; latest ($47M) = operating cash ($38M) − maintenance capex $9M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -12% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years.

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($138M) · cash from operations ($38M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.64×
    Harvesting
    Capex $9M ÷ depreciation $14M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $397M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.83×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $7M vs $115M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 9 tagged yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design. One year of this record is untagged in the data, with the dividend paid on both sides; a lone missing tag is treated as unknown, not a suspension, so the streak is judged on the tagged years.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −325%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.79/share (latest year $-3.98), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → −19% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −19% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2025 · −31.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.1%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$253M
  • Cash & short-term investments$58M
  • Receivables$48M
  • Inventory$94M
  • Other current assets$52M
Current liabilities$138M
  • Debt due within a year$2M
  • Accounts payable$38M
  • Other current liabilities$99M
Current ratio1.83×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.15×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.42×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$115Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2M due · $58M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Cash runway1.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$139Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$34M$27M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $366M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$190M · 52%
  • Dividends$50M · 14%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$126M · 34%
  • Returned to owners$50M

    28% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $50M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Net change in share count−0.5%

    The diluted count barely moved (35M to 35M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Caesarstone Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.9% vs 6.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 6.7% early in the record and 0.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Building Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AMRZAmrize Ltd$11.8B26%16.2%12%
OCOwens Corning Inc Common Stock New$10.1B25%12.4%8%11%
OIO-I Glass Inc.$6.4B18%5.5%6%3%
JHXJames Hardie Industries plc.$4.8B39%16.9%16%15%
EXPEagle Materials$2.3B28.6%18%20%
APOGApogee Enterprises Inc.$1.4B23%7.5%11%6%
TGLSTecnoglass Inc.$984M39%20.5%20%12%
CSTECaesarstone Ltd.$397M27%4.4%4%5%
Group median26%14.3%11%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Caesarstone Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Caesarstone Ltd. has delivered.

Caesarstone Ltd.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Caesarstone Ltd. earns about $21M on its 5.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −11.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($47M) on 35M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $51M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Caesarstone Ltd. (CSTE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CSTE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CSIQ its page in the Manual CTW →

Industry order: ← CSL the Building Products chapter CSW →