Owner Scorecard


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CTSH, Cognizant

IT Services & Consulting asset-light Serial acquirer

Cognizant is an information-technology services firm: it supplies the people and the know-how to build, run, and modernize the software and computing systems that large enterprises depend on. The work is sold by the engagement to big clients, weighted toward health-sciences and financial-services firms, and a large share of it is delivered by staff in lower-cost locations than the client could manage in-house. It earns its keep on the spread between what clients pay for that labor and what it costs to recruit, train, and keep the staff billed out.

We help clients modernize technology, reimagine processes and transform experiences so they can stay ahead in today's fast-changing world, where AI is reshaping organizations in every field.

As an AI builder, we provide deep expertise at the intersection of industry and technology, combining our perspective with extensive knowledge of our clients' organizations to build industry-specific platforms and incorporate context into systems, AI models and custom solutions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CTSH · Cognizant
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$21.1B
+7.0% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $21.4B 5-yr avg $19.6B
Operating margin 15.8% 5-yr avg 15.0%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 18%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Health Sciences (30%) and Financial Services (29%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 41% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
The question that governs this business is whether the work is a differentiated service clients will pay up for or a commodity priced at the cheapest competent supplier — by the company's own account it competes on differentiation, which is the admission that price discipline is never assured. Watch the cost position, since the model lives on the labor spread: wage inflation, the share of work delivered from lower-cost locations, and how fully the staff is kept billed all decide whether the margin holds. Switching costs and client stickiness are the test on the demand side — long-running, embedded engagements would show it, while clients moving to rival vendors or pulling work back in-house is the bad case, alongside the litigation the filing itself flags. The figures for margin, returns, and the balance sheet are in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 9 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Health Sciences at 30%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Health Sciences30%$6.3B
  • Financial Services29%$6.2B
  • Products and Resources25%$5.3B
  • Communications, Media and Technology16%$3.3B
By geographyNorth America75%Europe, excluding United Kingdom10%United Kingdom9%Rest of World6%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$13.5B$14.8B$16.1B$16.8B$16.7B$18.5B$19.4B$19.4B$19.7B$21.1B$21.4BRevenueRevenue
20%18%19%18%19%19%18%17%16%15%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$2.3B$2.5B$2.8B$2.5B$2.1B$2.8B$3.0B$2.7B$2.9B$3.4B$3.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.0%16.8%17.4%14.6%12.7%15.3%15.3%13.9%14.7%16.1%15.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.6B$1.5B$2.1B$1.8B$1.4B$2.1B$2.3B$2.1B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2BNet incomeNet inc.
34%43%25%26%34%24%24%24%24%36%36%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.6B$2.4B$2.6B$2.5B$3.3B$2.5B$2.6B$2.3B$2.1B$2.9B$2.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$379M$443M$498M$526M$559M$574M$569M$555M$542M$550M$555MDepreciationDeprec.
($504M)$239M($274M)($86M)$1.1B($462M)($552M)($527M)($833M)($78M)($212M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$300M$284M$377M$392M$398M$279M$332M$317M$297M$288M$287MCapexCapex
2.2%1.9%2.3%2.3%2.4%1.5%1.7%1.6%1.5%1.4%1.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.3B$2.1B$2.2B$2.1B$2.9B$2.2B$2.2B$2.0B$1.8B$2.6B$2.5BOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.0%14.3%13.7%12.6%17.4%12.0%11.5%10.4%9.3%12.3%11.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.3B$2.1B$2.2B$2.1B$2.9B$2.2B$2.2B$2.0B$1.8B$2.6B$2.5BFree cash flowFCF
10.0%14.3%13.7%12.6%17.4%12.0%11.5%10.4%9.3%12.3%11.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$334M$216M$1.1B$617M$1.1B$970M$367M$409M$1.6B$0$730MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$265M$468M$453M$480M$509M$564M$591M$600M$610M$614MDividends paidDiv. paid
$512M$1.9B$1.3B$2.2B$1.6B$771M$1.4B$1.1B$605M$1.4BBuybacksBuybacks
16%15%19%20%16%20%21%18%17%16%15%ROICROIC
14%14%18%17%13%18%19%16%16%15%15%Return on equityROE
14%12%14%13%8%14%14%12%11%11%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5.2B$5.1B$4.5B$3.4B$2.7B$2.7B$2.5B$2.6B$2.2B$1.9B$1.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.6B$2.9B$3.2B$3.3B$3.1B$3.6B$3.8B$3.8B$4.1B$4.4B$4.6BReceivablesReceiv.
$175M$210M$215M$239M$389M$361M$360M$337M$340M$308M$363MAccounts payablePayables
$2.4B$2.7B$3.0B$3.0B$2.7B$3.2B$3.4B$3.5B$3.7B$4.1B$4.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$8.6B$9.1B$8.6B$7.6B$6.9B$7.3B$7.3B$7.5B$7.5B$7.8B$7.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.4B$2.8B$2.7B$3.0B$3.5B$3.5B$3.3B$3.3B$3.6B$3.7B$3.5BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.6×3.2×3.2×2.6×1.9×2.1×2.2×2.3×2.1×2.1×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.6B$2.7B$3.5B$4.0B$5.0B$5.6B$5.7B$6.1B$7.0B$7.1B$7.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$14.3B$15.2B$15.8B$16.2B$16.9B$17.9B$17.9B$18.5B$20.0B$20.7B$20.5BTotal assetsAssets
$878M$873M$745M$738M$663M$626M$638M$606M$875M$543M$573MTotal debtDebt
($4.3B)($4.2B)($3.8B)($2.7B)($2.1B)($2.1B)($1.9B)($2.0B)($1.4B)($1.4B)($944M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
120.5×107.9×103.7×94.3×88.1×314.0×156.2×65.6×53.6×91.6×105.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$10.7B$10.7B$11.4B$11.0B$10.8B$12.0B$12.3B$13.2B$14.4B$15.0B$15.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.6%1.5%1.7%1.3%1.4%1.3%1.3%0.9%0.9%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
610M595M584M560M541M528M519M505M497M489M477MShares out (diluted)Shares
$22.11$24.89$27.61$29.97$30.78$35.05$37.43$38.32$39.71$43.17$44.88Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.55$2.53$3.60$3.29$2.57$4.05$4.41$4.21$4.51$4.56$4.67EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.20$3.57$3.79$3.76$5.36$4.20$4.31$3.99$3.68$5.31$5.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.20$3.57$3.79$3.76$5.36$4.20$4.31$3.99$3.68$5.31$5.18Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.45$0.80$0.81$0.89$0.96$1.09$1.17$1.21$1.25$1.29Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.49$0.48$0.65$0.70$0.74$0.53$0.64$0.63$0.60$0.59$0.60Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.59$17.93$19.56$19.68$20.03$22.71$23.72$26.19$28.99$30.71$31.59Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.7%/yr+7.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+10.3%/yr−0.2%/yr
EPS+6.7%/yr+12.1%/yr
Dividends / share+7.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.0%/yr−4.4%/yr
Book value / share+6.4%/yr+8.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
489Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
16%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.6Bowner earningsvs.$2.2Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $2.2B of profit into $2.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$2.2B
Owner earnings$2.6B · 12% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$2.2B$2.2B$2.1B$2.3B$2.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$550M+$542M+$555M+$569M+$574M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$181M+$175M+$176M+$261M+$246M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$78M−$833M−$527M−$552M−$462M
Cash from operations$2.9B$2.1B$2.3B$2.6B$2.5B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$288M−$297M−$317M−$332M−$279M
Owner earnings$2.6B$1.8B$2.0B$2.2B$2.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue12%9%10%12%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $181M), owner earnings is nearer $2.4B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $3.4B ÷ interest expense $37M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $1.9B + ST investments $13M − debt $581M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 15%–21%; 16% latest = NOPAT $2.2B ÷ invested capital $13.7B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 9%–17%; latest $2.6B = operating cash $2.9B − maintenance capex $288M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $181M of SBC) leaves $2.4B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.9B ÷ net income $2.2B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $2.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.6B
    What this means

    Of $2.6B Owner Earnings, $2.0B (77%) went back to shareholders, $610M dividends, $1.4B buybacks. Net of $181M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.2B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.52×
    Harvesting
    Capex $288M ÷ depreciation $550M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $21.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.14×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $581M vs $4.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Near
    Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +28%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.64/share (latest year $4.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.69/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 17% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    The recent-years average (15%) sits below the early years (17%), but the latest year (16%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 15% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 12.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$7.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.5B
  • Receivables$4.6B
  • Other current assets$1.7B
Current liabilities$3.5B
  • Debt due within a year$38M
  • Accounts payable$363M
  • Other current liabilities$3.1B
Current ratio2.23×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.23×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.43×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$4.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$38M due · $1.5B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$5.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$2.4BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$524M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$617Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$182M
'27$150M
'28$120M
'29$83M
'30$54M
later$84M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$182Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$673Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$576Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$581M
Lease obligations (present value)$576M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 50%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $24.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$3.3B · 13%
  • Dividends$4.5B · 18%
  • Buybacks$12.8B · 51%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$4.3B · 17%
  • Returned to owners$17.3B

    80% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4.5B as dividends and $12.8B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $12.8B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−21.8%

    The diluted count fell from 610M to 477M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.25/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained12%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $251M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$8.5B41% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity47%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$6.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $3.3B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Humphries$19.7M$22.4M$2.2B
2022Mr. Humphries$17.9M−$950k$2.2B
2023Brian Humphries$4.2M−$11.1M$2.0B
2023Mr. Kumar$22.6M$23.1M$2.0B
2024Mr. Kumar$16.8M$14.3M$1.8B
2025Mr. Kumar$21.5M$26.7M$2.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • CEO pay ratio477:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$181M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cognizant is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
XYZBlock Inc.$24.2B34%-0.7%-1%4%
ADBEAdobe Inc.$23.8B87%32.2%33%39%
CTSHCognizant$21.1B15.3%18%12%
ADPAutomatic Data Processing Inc.$20.6B43%21.3%46%19%
INTUIntuit Inc.$18.8B99%26.0%35%32%
LDOSLeidos Holdings Inc.$17.1B14%7.5%10%7%
FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc$16.4B48%-0.4%-0%8%
KDKyndryl Holdings Inc.$15.1B15%-2.5%-7%-0%
Group median11.4%14%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cognizant has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Cognizant earns about $2.6B on its 12.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2.5B on 474M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $944M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cognizant (CTSH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CTSH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CTS its page in the Manual CTVA →

Industry order: ← CLVT the IT Services & Consulting chapter CTW →