Share count
1.9Bpeak FY2022
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CSAN, Cosan S.A. ADS
A retailer, earning thin margins on high volume, where inventory turns, unit economics and scale decide the outcome.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
R$44.0B
+11.4% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue R$44.0B 5-yr avg R$33.9B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 28% and operating margin about 19% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Capital spending runs about 16% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMDec 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| R$16.8B | R$20.6B | R$20.4B | R$26.1B | R$39.3B | R$39.5B | R$44.0B | R$44.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 28% | 29% | 27% | 22% | 22% | 28% | 31% | 31% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| R$3.5B | R$4.5B | R$3.4B | R$4.1B | R$7.5B | R$11.0B | R$7.7B | R$7.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 20.7% | 21.8% | 16.5% | 15.7% | 19.0% | 27.8% | 17.5% | 17.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| R$975M | R$1.3B | R$859M | R$6.3B | R$1.2B | R$1.1B | (R$9.4B) | (R$9.4B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 44% | 37% | 37% | -8% | — | 20% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| R$5.4B | R$6.3B | R$5.7B | R$5.1B | R$10.0B | R$10.3B | R$13.1B | R$13.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| R$2.1B | R$2.3B | R$2.3B | R$2.5B | R$3.0B | R$3.4B | R$3.9B | R$3.9B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| R$2.4B | R$2.7B | R$2.5B | (R$3.7B) | R$5.8B | R$5.8B | R$18.6B | R$18.6B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| R$2.6B | R$2.8B | R$4.0B | R$4.8B | R$4.5B | R$6.3B | R$7.8B | R$7.8B | CapexCapex |
| 15.6% | 13.4% | 19.7% | 18.3% | 11.5% | 15.9% | 17.8% | 17.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| R$3.3B | R$3.5B | R$3.3B | R$2.6B | R$7.0B | R$6.9B | R$9.2B | R$9.2B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 19.8% | 17.1% | 16.2% | 10.1% | 17.7% | 17.5% | 21.0% | 21.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| R$2.7B | R$3.5B | R$1.6B | R$372M | R$5.4B | R$4.0B | R$5.2B | R$5.2B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 16.3% | 17.1% | 7.9% | 1.4% | 13.8% | 10.2% | 11.9% | 11.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| R$449M | R$738M | R$546M | R$2.6B | R$1.9B | R$2.6B | R$2.8B | R$2.8B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| R$608M | R$1.1B | R$495M | R$26M | R$85M | R$103M | R$193M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 11% | 6% | 9% | — | 14% | — | — | ROICROIC |
| 5% | 24% | 16% | 43% | 6% | 5% | -86% | -86% | Return on equityROE |
| 3% | 11% | 6% | 25% | −4% | −7% | −112% | −112% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| R$3.6B | R$8.6B | R$13.7B | R$16.2B | R$13.4B | R$14.7B | R$16.9B | R$16.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | R$1.8B | R$2.0B | R$2.6B | R$3.8B | R$3.3B | R$3.7B | R$3.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | R$787M | R$935M | R$1.1B | R$1.9B | R$1.8B | R$2.1B | R$2.1B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | R$2.6B | R$2.9B | R$3.7B | R$5.6B | R$5.1B | R$5.8B | R$5.8B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | R$16.0B | R$23.4B | R$27.3B | R$25.6B | R$28.6B | R$30.8B | R$30.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | R$8.9B | R$12.5B | R$13.0B | R$15.8B | R$16.2B | R$17.9B | R$17.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.8× | 1.9× | 2.1× | 1.6× | 1.8× | 1.7× | 1.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | R$65.7B | R$83.7B | R$97.8B | R$134.5B | R$139.9B | R$141.3B | R$141.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | R$29.1B | R$42.2B | R$45.7B | R$53.0B | R$56.9B | R$66.5B | R$66.5B | Total debtDebt |
| — | R$20.5B | R$28.5B | R$29.5B | R$39.6B | R$42.2B | R$49.6B | R$49.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.2× | 1.2× | 0.7× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| R$18.0B | R$5.4B | R$5.3B | R$14.7B | R$20.7B | R$21.0B | R$10.9B | R$10.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 30.5M | 229M | 229M | 229M | 234M | — | — | 238M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| R$551.81 | R$89.88 | R$89.12 | R$113.79 | R$168.31 | — | — | R$184.32 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| R$31.97 | R$5.74 | R$3.75 | R$27.53 | R$5.03 | — | — | R$-39.52 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| R$109.02 | R$15.41 | R$14.46 | R$11.52 | R$29.78 | — | — | R$38.64 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| R$90.13 | R$15.41 | R$7.07 | R$1.62 | R$23.29 | — | — | R$22.00 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| R$14.71 | R$3.22 | R$2.38 | R$11.16 | R$8.17 | — | — | R$11.65 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| R$86.15 | R$12.05 | R$17.59 | R$20.82 | R$19.40 | — | — | R$32.86 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| R$589.00 | R$23.56 | R$22.94 | R$64.28 | R$88.40 | — | — | R$45.73 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×7.52 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/8 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −25.7%/yr (4-yr) | −25.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | −27.7%/yr (4-yr) | −27.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | −37.0%/yr (4-yr) | −37.0%/yr (4-yr) |
| Dividends / share | −13.7%/yr (4-yr) | −13.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −31.1%/yr (4-yr) | −31.1%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −37.8%/yr (4-yr) | −37.8%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2018–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
14%low FY2020
Gross margin
31%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.4×peak FY2021
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
R$9.2Bowner earningsvs.(R$9.4B)net incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2018FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business earned R$9.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the R$3.9B it takes just to hold its position. It put R$4.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was R$5.2B.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (R$9.4B) | R$1.1B | R$1.2B | R$6.3B | R$859M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +R$3.9B | +R$3.4B | +R$3.0B | +R$2.5B | +R$2.3B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +R$18.6B | +R$5.8B | +R$5.8B | −R$3.7B | +R$2.5B |
| Cash from operations | R$13.1B | R$10.3B | R$10.0B | R$5.1B | R$5.7B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −R$3.9B | −R$3.4B | −R$3.0B | −R$2.5B | −R$2.3B |
| Owner earnings | R$9.2B | R$6.9B | R$7.0B | R$2.6B | R$3.3B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −R$4.0B | −R$2.9B | −R$1.5B | −R$2.3B | −R$1.7B |
| Free cash flow | R$5.2B | R$4.0B | R$5.4B | R$372M | R$1.6B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 21% | 18% | 18% | 10% | 16% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about R$3.9B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other R$4.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income R$7.7B ÷ interest expense R$7.6B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? R$49.6B · 6.4× operating profitHeavy net debtCash R$16.9B + ST investments R$675K − debt R$66.5B
What this means
Netting R$16.9B of cash and short-term investments against R$66.5B of debt leaves R$49.6B owed, about 6.4× a year's operating profit (8.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle4-yr median, range 6%–14%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 10%–21%; latest R$9.2B = operating cash R$13.1B − maintenance capex R$3.9BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 21% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 7 years. It chose to put R$4.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was R$5.2B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Are earnings backed by cash? R$13.1BLoss, but cash-generativeNet income (R$9.4B) · cash from operations R$13.1B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks R$3.0B ÷ Owner Earnings R$9.2B
What this means
Of R$9.2B Owner Earnings, R$3.0B (32%) went back to shareholders, R$2.8B dividends, R$193M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.03×ExpandingCapex R$7.8B ÷ depreciation R$3.9B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · R$44.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.72×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · R$66.5B vs R$12.9B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (7-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (7)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −327%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are R$-10.00/share (latest year R$-39.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is R$45.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 20% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 20% early, 21% lately, median 19%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 19%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · 15.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“She has built her career in new technologies and, more recently, in artificial intelligence, having spent much of her career in California, working with leading technology companies.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2024Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsR$30.8B
- Cash & short-term investmentsR$16.9B
- ReceivablesR$3.7B
- InventoryR$2.1B
- Other current assetsR$8.1B
Current liabilitiesR$17.9B
- Debt due within a yearR$4.4B
- Other current liabilitiesR$13.5B
Current ratio1.72×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.60×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.94×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalR$12.9Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cashR$4.4B due · R$16.9B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2024 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value(R$13.8B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(R$71.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesR$73.0BR$6.5B of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2018–2024
Over the record, the business generated R$55.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- ReinvestedR$32.8B · 59%
- DividendsR$11.6B · 21%
- BuybacksR$2.7B · 5%
- Retained (debt / cash)R$8.8B · 16%
- Returned to ownersR$14.2B
40% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, R$11.6B as dividends and R$2.7B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose R$13.3B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran R$2.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count681.6%
The diluted count rose from 31M to 238M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend recordR$8.17/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 14% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Cosan S.A. ADS is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2024.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?681.6%
Diluted shares grew 681.6% over 2018–2024, even as the company spent R$2.7B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Auto Dealers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CSANCosan S.A. ADS | R$44.0B | 28% | 19.0% | 10% | 18% |
| LADLithia Motors | $37.6B | 15% | 4.3% | 12% | 1% |
| PAGPenske Automotive | $31.8B | 16% | 3.7% | 13% | 3% |
| ANAutoNation | $27.6B | 18% | 4.3% | 14% | 2% |
| KMXCarMax | $25.9B | 12% | 5.3% | 4% | 0% |
| GPIGroup 1 Automotive | $22.6B | 16% | 3.9% | 13% | 3% |
| CVNACarvana | $20.3B | 14% | -0.7% | -3% | -17% |
| MUSAMurphy USA | $19.4B | 90% | 3.6% | 20% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 16% | 4.1% | 12% | 2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, each representing four common”; Cosan S.A. ADS reports in BRL, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at BRL 1 = $0.197 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in BRL.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cosan S.A. ADS has delivered.
Cosan S.A. ADS’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Cosan S.A. ADS earns about $1.5B on its 17.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+28%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’24+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’24+15%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $1.0B on 60M diluted shares; net debt $9.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.5B) runs well above depreciation ($761M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cosan S.A. ADS (CSAN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CSAN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CRNT its page in the Manual CSIQ →
Industry order: ← CPRT the Auto Dealers & Services chapter CVNA →