Owner Scorecard


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DAL, Delta Air Lines Inc.

Airlines capital-intensive

Delta is a legacy network airline. It flies passengers and cargo through a system of connecting hubs, sells loyalty miles in bulk to a partner bank behind a co-branded credit card, leans on a heavier mix of premium seats up front, and runs its own engine-and-airframe maintenance shop that also services other operators.

As a global airline based in the United States, we connect customers across our expansive global network with a commitment to ensuring that the future of travel is connected, personalized and enjoyable.

In 2025, we served over 200 million customers safely, reliably and with industry-leading customer service innovation.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
DAL · Delta Air Lines Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$63.4B
+2.8% YoY · 30% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $68.3B 5-yr avg $52.7B
Operating margin 8.1% 5-yr avg 8.4%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 13%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
A seat is close to a commodity, bought on price and schedule, and the costs that matter most, fuel and labor, sit outside the carrier's hands. So the lever is whether Delta's softer assets lift it above the fare fight: the cash a bank pays for miles, the willingness of front-cabin flyers to pay for room, and the grip a fortress hub gives over a city's traffic. Set against that is the permanent weight of the business, the planes, the debt, the union contracts, and an industry whose long record of returns reads as a warning. Whether the loyalty and premium engine truly clears the cost of the metal, or merely softens a hard trade, the record below is where to look.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Jul 10, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue up 18.7% year over year; operating income down 11.3%

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$39.5B$41.1B$44.4B$47.0B$17.1B$29.9B$50.6B$58.0B$61.6B$63.4B$68.3BRevenueRevenue
$7.0B$6.0B$5.3B$6.6B($12.5B)$1.9B$3.7B$5.5B$6.0B$5.8B$5.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.7%14.5%11.8%14.1%−72.9%6.3%7.2%9.5%9.7%9.2%8.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$4.2B$3.2B$3.9B$4.8B($12.4B)$280M$1.3B$4.6B$3.5B$5.0B$4.0BNet incomeNet inc.
34%42%24%23%30%31%18%26%19%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$7.2B$5.0B$7.0B$8.4B($3.8B)$3.3B$6.4B$6.5B$8.0B$8.3B$8.1BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.9B$2.2B$2.3B$2.6B$2.3B$2.0B$2.1B$2.3B$2.5B$2.4B$2.5BDepreciationDeprec.
$980M($573M)$591M$916M$6.3B$986M$2.9B($486M)$2.1B$894M$1.5BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$3.4B$3.9B$5.2B$4.9B$1.9B$3.2B$6.4B$5.3B$5.1B$4.5B$4.5BCapexCapex
8.6%9.5%11.6%10.5%11.1%10.9%12.6%9.2%8.3%7.1%6.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$5.3B$2.8B$4.7B$5.8B($5.7B)$1.3B$4.3B$4.1B$5.5B$5.9B$5.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
13.5%6.8%10.5%12.4%−33.3%4.2%8.4%7.1%8.9%9.3%8.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$3.8B$1.1B$1.8B$3.5B($5.7B)$17M($3M)$1.1B$2.9B$3.8B$3.7BFree cash flowFCF
9.7%2.8%4.2%7.4%−33.3%0.1%−0.0%2.0%4.7%6.1%5.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$509M$731M$909M$980M$260M$0$0$128M$321M$440M$496MDividends paidDiv. paid
$2.6B$1.7B$1.6B$2.0B$344M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
30%18%19%23%-46%6%10%17%16%16%10%ROICROIC
37%26%29%31%-807%7%20%42%23%24%18%Return on equityROE
33%20%22%25%−824%7%20%40%21%22%16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3.2B$2.6B$1.8B$2.9B$14.1B$11.3B$6.5B$3.9B$3.1B$4.3B$4.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.1B$2.4B$2.3B$2.9B$1.4B$2.4B$3.2B$3.1B$3.2B$2.9B$4.3BReceivablesReceiv.
$2.6B$3.6B$3.0B$3.3B$2.8B$4.2B$5.1B$4.4B$4.7B$5.2B$6.7BAccounts payablePayables
($508M)($1.3B)($662M)($412M)($1.4B)($1.8B)($1.9B)($1.3B)($1.4B)($2.4B)($2.4B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$7.5B$7.8B$6.3B$8.2B$17.4B$15.9B$13.0B$10.3B$9.8B$11.0B$14.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$15.2B$19.0B$18.6B$20.2B$15.9B$21.0B$25.9B$26.4B$26.7B$27.6B$33.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.4×0.3×0.4×1.1×0.8×0.5×0.4×0.4×0.4×0.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$9.8B$9.8B$9.8B$9.8B$9.8B$9.8B$9.8B$9.8B$9.8B$9.8B$9.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$51.9B$53.7B$60.3B$64.5B$72.0B$72.5B$72.3B$73.6B$75.4B$81.3B$86.3BTotal assetsAssets
$7.0B$8.4B$9.4B$10.1B$28.0B$25.1B$21.4B$18.6B$15.3B$13.3B$26.1BTotal debtDebt
$3.8B$5.8B$7.6B$7.2B$13.9B$13.8B$14.8B$14.7B$12.3B$9.0B$21.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
18.0×15.1×13.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$11.3B$12.5B$13.7B$15.4B$1.5B$3.9B$6.6B$11.1B$15.3B$20.9B$21.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.4%0.4%0.3%0.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
755M723M694M653M636M641M641M643M648M654M657MShares out (diluted)Shares
$52.25$56.90$64.03$71.99$26.88$46.64$78.91$90.28$95.13$96.89$103.94Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.56$4.43$5.67$7.30$-19.47$0.44$2.06$7.17$5.33$7.65$6.01EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.06$3.87$6.75$8.95$-8.95$1.98$6.64$6.41$8.51$9.02$8.54Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.06$1.57$2.66$5.34$-8.95$0.03$-0.00$1.77$4.45$5.88$5.57Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.67$1.01$1.31$1.50$0.41$0.00$0.00$0.20$0.50$0.67$0.75Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.49$5.38$7.45$7.56$2.99$5.07$9.93$8.28$7.93$6.88$6.81Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.94$17.33$19.72$23.52$2.41$6.06$10.27$17.27$23.60$31.89$33.20Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.1%/yr+29.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+2.8%/yr
EPS+3.6%/yr
Dividends / share−0.0%/yr+10.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.9%/yr+18.2%/yr
Book value / share+8.8%/yr+67.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
654Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
16%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.5×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$5.9Bowner earningsvs.$5.0Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $5.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $3.8B.

Reported net income$5.0B
Owner earnings$5.9B · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$5.0B$3.5B$4.6B$1.3B$280M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.4B+$2.5B+$2.3B+$2.1B+$2.0B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$894M+$2.1B−$486M+$2.9B+$986M
Cash from operations$8.3B$8.0B$6.5B$6.4B$3.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$2.4B−$2.5B−$2.3B−$2.1B−$2.0B
Owner earnings$5.9B$5.5B$4.1B$4.3B$1.3B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$2.1B−$2.6B−$3.0B−$4.3B−$1.2B
Free cash flow$3.8B$2.9B$1.1B($3M)$17M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%9%7%8%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $5.8B ÷ interest expense $396M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $11.1B · 1.9× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $4.3B − debt $15.4B
    What this means

    Netting $4.3B of cash and short-term investments against $15.4B of debt leaves $11.1B owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (2.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -46%–30%; 15% latest = NOPAT $4.7B ÷ invested capital $32.0B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -33%–14%; latest $5.9B = operating cash $8.3B − maintenance capex $2.4B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.1B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $3.8B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $161M of SBC) leaves $5.7B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $8.3B ÷ net income $5.0B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $440M ÷ Owner Earnings $5.9B
    What this means

    Of $5.9B Owner Earnings, $440M (7%) went back to shareholders, $440M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.84×
    Expanding
    Capex $4.5B ÷ depreciation $2.4B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $63.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.40×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $15.4B vs ($16.7B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +15%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.63/share (latest year $7.61), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 15% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 15% early to 9% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −72.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, if we are unable to develop or deploy new technologies, including AI enabled capabilities, as quickly or effectively as our competitors, or if our investments do not deliver expected benefits, our ability to compete and meet customer expectations could be adversely affected.…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$14.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$4.7B
  • Receivables$4.3B
  • Other current assets$5.3B
Current liabilities$33.6B
  • Debt due within a year$2.8B
  • Accounts payable$6.7B
  • Other current liabilities$24.1B
Current ratio0.42×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.42×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($19.4B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2.8B due · $4.7B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+18.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 0.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$6.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$18.9B$6.0B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $22.4B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$1.3B
'27$1.3B
'28$907M
'29$690M
'30$617M
later$3.9B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$1.3Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$8.6Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$7.0Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$15.4B
Lease obligations (present value)$7.0B
Total fixed claims on the business$22.4B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $22.4B, of which the leases are 31%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $56.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$43.9B · 78%
  • Dividends$4.3B · 8%
  • Buybacks$8.2B · 15%
  • Returned to owners$12.5B

    37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4.3B as dividends and $8.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $19.1B and cash and short-term investments rose $1.4B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $8.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−13.0%

    The diluted count fell from 755M to 657M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.67/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 0% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained15%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($5.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $906M, so each retained $1 added about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Edward H. Bastian$12.4M$11.6M$1.3B
2022Edward H. Bastian$9.6M$7.6M$4.3B
2023Edward H. Bastian$34.2M$39.8M$4.1B
2024Edward H. Bastian$27.1M$56.4M$5.5B
2025Edward H. Bastian$19.2M$105.5M$5.9B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • CEO pay ratio190:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$161M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Delta Air Lines Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$7.0B → $26.1B

    Debt rose from $7.0B to $26.1B while owner earnings went from about $4.3B to $5.2B — about 1.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Airlines

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FDXFedEx Corporation$87.9B77%6.4%10%3%
DALDelta Air Lines Inc.$63.4B9.6%16%9%
UALUnited Airlines Holdings$59.1B7.9%12%9%
AALAmerican Airlines Group$54.6B5.3%8%2%
LUVSouthwest Airlines Co.$28.1B7.6%11%11%
ALKAlaska Air$14.2B6.3%7%10%
JBLUJetBlue Airways Corporation$9.1B-1.9%-2%4%
SKYWSkyWest Inc.$4.1B12%11.3%6%22%
Group median7.0%9%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Delta Air Lines Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Delta Air Lines Inc. earns about $5.5B on its 8.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+20%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $3.7B on 658M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-30; net debt $21.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4.5B) runs well above depreciation ($2.5B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $5.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Delta Air Lines Inc. (DAL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DAL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DAKT its page in the Manual DAN →

Industry order: ← CPA the Airlines chapter JBLU →