Owner Scorecard


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UAL, United Airlines Holdings

Airlines capital-intensive Cyclical

United is a legacy network airline built around hubs at big coastal gateways. It carries passengers and freight, sells miles to a card-issuing bank, and fills premium cabins, but its mark is reach: a network tilted toward long-haul international flying, fed through coastal gateway hubs into a broad map of overseas routes.

The hub and spoke system allows us to transport passengers between a large number of destinations with substantially more frequent service than if each route were served directly.

The hub system also allows us to add service to a new destination from a large number of cities using only one or a limited number of aircraft.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UAL · United Airlines Holdings
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$59.1B
+3.5% YoY · 31% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $62.9B 5-yr avg $47.9B
Operating margin 7.7% 5-yr avg 5.2%
ROIC 12% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
On any single route the product is a commodity, won on fare and timing, and fuel and wages are set by forces the airline cannot steer. United's case for escape rests on the global network itself, the breadth of long-haul routes a rival cannot cheaply copy and the gateway hubs that funnel traffic into them, plus the loyalty and card income riding alongside. The same reach cuts the other way: long-haul flying drinks fuel, leans on costly wide-body fleets, and bends to the world's shocks and cycles, atop the usual burden of debt and an industry that has more often destroyed capital than built it. Whether the route map is a real moat or just a wider commodity, the record below holds the answer.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Jul 16, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue up 16.0% year over year; operating income down 17.3%

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMJun 2026
Income statement
$36.6B$37.8B$41.3B$43.3B$15.4B$24.6B$45.0B$53.7B$57.1B$59.1B$62.9BRevenueRevenue
$4.3B$3.6B$3.2B$4.3B($6.4B)($1.0B)$2.3B$4.2B$5.1B$4.7B$4.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.9%9.6%7.8%9.9%−41.4%−4.1%5.2%7.8%8.9%8.0%7.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.2B$2.1B$2.1B$3.0B($7.1B)($2.0B)$737M$2.6B$3.1B$3.4B$3.5BNet incomeNet inc.
41%29%20%23%26%23%24%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$5.5B$3.5B$6.2B$6.9B($4.1B)$2.1B$6.1B$6.9B$9.4B$8.4B$8.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$2.3B$2.5B$2.5B$2.5B$2.7B$2.9B$2.9B$3.0BDepreciationDeprec.
$1.3B($765M)$1.9B$1.6B$448M$1.5B$2.9B$1.6B$3.4B$2.1B$2.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$3.2B$3.9B$4.1B$4.5B$1.7B$2.1B$4.8B$7.2B$5.6B$5.9B$6.4BCapexCapex
8.8%10.2%9.9%10.5%11.2%8.6%10.7%13.3%9.8%9.9%10.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3.6B$1.4B$4.0B$4.6B($5.9B)($40M)$3.6B$4.2B$6.5B$5.5B$5.9BOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.8%3.6%9.7%10.7%−38.2%−0.2%8.0%7.9%11.4%9.3%9.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.3B($396M)$2.1B$2.4B($5.9B)($40M)$1.2B($260M)$3.8B$2.6B$2.5BFree cash flowFCF
6.3%−1.0%5.1%5.5%−38.2%−0.2%2.8%−0.5%6.7%4.3%4.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.6B$1.8B$1.2B$1.6B$353M$0$0$0$162M$637MBuybacksBuybacks
15%12%12%14%-23%-4%6%10%13%12%12%ROICROIC
26%24%21%26%-119%-39%11%28%25%22%21%Return on equityROE
26%24%21%26%−119%−39%11%28%25%22%21%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$4.4B$3.8B$4.0B$4.9B$11.7B$18.4B$16.4B$14.4B$14.5B$12.2B$16.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$2.2B$2.4B$2.5BReceivablesReceiv.
$2.1B$2.2B$2.4B$2.7B$1.6B$2.6B$3.4B$3.8B$4.2B$4.6B$5.8BAccounts payablePayables
($963M)($856M)($937M)($1.3B)($300M)($899M)($1.6B)($1.9B)($2.0B)($2.2B)($3.3B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$7.3B$7.1B$7.1B$8.2B$14.8B$21.8B$20.1B$18.5B$18.9B$16.9B$21.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$12.3B$12.8B$13.8B$14.9B$12.7B$18.3B$20.0B$22.2B$23.3B$26.1B$27.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×0.6×0.5×0.5×1.2×1.2×1.0×0.8×0.8×0.6×0.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.5BGoodwillGoodwill
$40.1B$42.3B$49.0B$52.6B$59.5B$68.2B$67.4B$71.1B$74.1B$76.4B$84.6BTotal assetsAssets
$10.8B$13.3B$13.4B$14.6B$26.7B$33.4B$31.2B$29.1B$25.2B$21.3B$24.3BTotal debtDebt
$6.3B$9.5B$9.5B$9.6B$15.1B$15.0B$14.8B$14.7B$10.7B$9.0B$7.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
6.4×5.8×4.8×1.3×2.2×3.1×3.4×3.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$8.6B$8.8B$10.0B$11.5B$6.0B$5.0B$6.9B$9.3B$12.7B$15.3B$16.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
330M304M277M260M279M322M330M332M333M329M327MShares out (diluted)Shares
$110.68$124.45$149.27$166.44$54.96$76.53$136.19$161.85$171.26$179.82$192.54Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.76$7.06$7.67$11.58$-25.30$-6.10$2.23$7.89$9.45$10.21$10.70EPS (diluted)EPS
$10.79$4.54$14.45$17.78$-20.97$-0.12$10.94$12.77$19.56$16.72$18.11Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$7.02$-1.30$7.57$9.16$-20.97$-0.12$3.78$-0.78$11.49$7.78$7.79Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$9.76$12.75$14.71$17.42$6.18$6.55$14.60$21.61$16.85$17.88$19.49Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$25.96$28.95$36.29$44.37$21.33$15.62$20.89$28.09$38.04$46.52$51.11Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.5%/yr+26.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.0%/yr
EPS+4.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.0%/yr+23.7%/yr
Book value / share+6.7%/yr+16.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
329Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
12%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.6×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$5.5Bowner earningsvs.$3.4Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $5.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.9B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $2.6B.

Reported net income$3.4B
Owner earnings$5.5B · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$3.4B$3.1B$2.6B$737M($2.0B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.9B+$2.9B+$2.7B+$2.5B+$2.5B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$2.1B+$3.4B+$1.6B+$2.9B+$1.5B
Cash from operations$8.4B$9.4B$6.9B$6.1B$2.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$2.9B−$2.9B−$2.7B−$2.5B−$2.1B
Owner earnings$5.5B$6.5B$4.2B$3.6B($40M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$2.9B−$2.7B−$4.5B−$2.4B
Free cash flow$2.6B$3.8B($260M)$1.2B($40M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%11%8%8%0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.9B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $4.7B ÷ interest expense $1.4B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $9.0B · 1.9× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $5.9B + ST investments $6.3B − debt $21.3B
    What this means

    Netting $12.2B of cash and short-term investments against $21.3B of debt leaves $9.0B owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (4.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -23%–15%; 12% latest = NOPAT $3.7B ÷ invested capital $30.6B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -38%–11%; latest $5.5B = operating cash $8.4B − maintenance capex $2.9B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $2.6B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $5.5B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $8.4B ÷ net income $3.4B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $637M ÷ Owner Earnings $5.5B
    What this means

    Of $5.5B Owner Earnings, $637M (12%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $637M buybacks. Net of $11M stock comp, the real buyback was about $626M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.00×
    Expanding
    Capex $5.9B ÷ depreciation $2.9B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $59.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.65×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $21.3B vs ($9.3B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +40%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $9.37/share (latest year $10.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $47.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 10% early, 8% lately, median 8%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 9%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −41.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.1%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“The Company depends on technology and automated systems, including artificial intelligence ("AI"), to operate its business, including, but not limited to, computerized airline reservation systems, electronic tickets, electronic airport kiosks, demand prediction software, flight o…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$21.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$16.6B
  • Receivables$2.5B
  • Inventory$7M
  • Other current assets$2.5B
Current liabilities$27.8B
  • Debt due within a year$4.1B
  • Accounts payable$5.8B
  • Other current liabilities$17.9B
Current ratio0.78×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.78×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.60×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($6.1B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$4.1B due · $16.6B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Jun 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$9.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$28.5B$7.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $27.8B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$5.0B
'27$2.8B
'28$2.6B
'29$3.6B
'30$3.0B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$5.0Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$7.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$5.0Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$17.0Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $21.3B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Jun 30, 2026$16.6B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$5.5B
Together, against $5.0B due next year4.4×

Cash on hand as of Jun 30, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $22.1B against the $5.0B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 4.4 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$1.0B
'27$1.4B
'28$1.1B
'29$766M
'30$792M
later$3.6B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$1.0Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$8.7Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$6.5Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$21.3B
Lease obligations (present value)$6.5B
Total fixed claims on the business$27.8B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $27.8B, of which the leases are 23%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $50.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$43.0B · 85%
  • Buybacks$8.5B · 17%
  • Returned to owners$8.5B

    31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $8.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $13.5B and cash and short-term investments rose $12.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$65.68

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 127M shares were bought for $8.3B, about $65.68 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $52.28 (2016) to $88.25 (2020); its heaviest year, 2016, paid $52.28 ($2.6B).

  • Net change in share count−1.1%

    The diluted count fell from 330M to 327M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained132%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $2.4B, so each retained $1 added about 1.32 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Scott Kirby$9.8M$11.1M($40M)
2022Scott Kirby$9.8M$9.9M$3.6B
2023Scott Kirby$18.6M$23.1M$4.2B
2024Scott Kirby$33.9M$96.7M$6.5B
2025Scott Kirby$32.3M$45.6M$5.5B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$11M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why United Airlines Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $1.4B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Airlines

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FDXFedEx Corporation$87.9B77%6.4%10%3%
DALDelta Air Lines Inc.$63.4B9.6%16%9%
UALUnited Airlines Holdings$59.1B7.9%12%9%
AALAmerican Airlines Group$54.6B5.3%8%2%
LUVSouthwest Airlines Co.$28.1B7.6%11%11%
ALKAlaska Air$14.2B6.3%7%10%
JBLUJetBlue Airways Corporation$9.1B-1.9%-2%4%
SKYWSkyWest Inc.$4.1B12%11.3%6%22%
Group median7.0%9%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what United Airlines Holdings has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, United Airlines Holdings earns about $5.1B on its 8.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+35%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $2.5B on 325M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-09; net debt $7.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6.4B) runs well above depreciation ($3.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $6.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "United Airlines Holdings (UAL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UAL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UAA its page in the Manual UAMY →

Industry order: ← SKYW the Airlines chapter ULCC →