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UAL, United Airlines Holdings
United is a legacy network airline built around hubs at big coastal gateways. It carries passengers and freight, sells miles to a card-issuing bank, and fills premium cabins, but its mark is reach: a network tilted toward long-haul international flying, fed through coastal gateway hubs into a broad map of overseas routes.
The hub and spoke system allows us to transport passengers between a large number of destinations with substantially more frequent service than if each route were served directly.
The hub system also allows us to add service to a new destination from a large number of cities using only one or a limited number of aircraft.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- On any single route the product is a commodity, won on fare and timing, and fuel and wages are set by forces the airline cannot steer. United's case for escape rests on the global network itself, the breadth of long-haul routes a rival cannot cheaply copy and the gateway hubs that funnel traffic into them, plus the loyalty and card income riding alongside. The same reach cuts the other way: long-haul flying drinks fuel, leans on costly wide-body fleets, and bends to the world's shocks and cycles, atop the usual burden of debt and an industry that has more often destroyed capital than built it. Whether the route map is a real moat or just a wider commodity, the record below holds the answer.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Revenue up 16.0% year over year; operating income down 17.3%
figures computed from the filing's XBRL
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $36.6B | $37.8B | $41.3B | $43.3B | $15.4B | $24.6B | $45.0B | $53.7B | $57.1B | $59.1B | $62.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| $4.3B | $3.6B | $3.2B | $4.3B | ($6.4B) | ($1.0B) | $2.3B | $4.2B | $5.1B | $4.7B | $4.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 11.9% | 9.6% | 7.8% | 9.9% | −41.4% | −4.1% | 5.2% | 7.8% | 8.9% | 8.0% | 7.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $3.0B | ($7.1B) | ($2.0B) | $737M | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.4B | $3.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 41% | 29% | 20% | 23% | — | — | 26% | 23% | 24% | 22% | 22% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $5.5B | $3.5B | $6.2B | $6.9B | ($4.1B) | $2.1B | $6.1B | $6.9B | $9.4B | $8.4B | $8.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.0B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $1.3B | ($765M) | $1.9B | $1.6B | $448M | $1.5B | $2.9B | $1.6B | $3.4B | $2.1B | $2.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $3.2B | $3.9B | $4.1B | $4.5B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $4.8B | $7.2B | $5.6B | $5.9B | $6.4B | CapexCapex |
| 8.8% | 10.2% | 9.9% | 10.5% | 11.2% | 8.6% | 10.7% | 13.3% | 9.8% | 9.9% | 10.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $3.6B | $1.4B | $4.0B | $4.6B | ($5.9B) | ($40M) | $3.6B | $4.2B | $6.5B | $5.5B | $5.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 9.8% | 3.6% | 9.7% | 10.7% | −38.2% | −0.2% | 8.0% | 7.9% | 11.4% | 9.3% | 9.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $2.3B | ($396M) | $2.1B | $2.4B | ($5.9B) | ($40M) | $1.2B | ($260M) | $3.8B | $2.6B | $2.5B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 6.3% | −1.0% | 5.1% | 5.5% | −38.2% | −0.2% | 2.8% | −0.5% | 6.7% | 4.3% | 4.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $2.6B | $1.8B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $353M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $162M | $637M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 15% | 12% | 12% | 14% | -23% | -4% | 6% | 10% | 13% | 12% | 12% | ROICROIC |
| 26% | 24% | 21% | 26% | -119% | -39% | 11% | 28% | 25% | 22% | 21% | Return on equityROE |
| 26% | 24% | 21% | 26% | −119% | −39% | 11% | 28% | 25% | 22% | 21% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $4.4B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.9B | $11.7B | $18.4B | $16.4B | $14.4B | $14.5B | $12.2B | $16.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $1.6B | $2.6B | $3.4B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.6B | $5.8B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($963M) | ($856M) | ($937M) | ($1.3B) | ($300M) | ($899M) | ($1.6B) | ($1.9B) | ($2.0B) | ($2.2B) | ($3.3B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $7.3B | $7.1B | $7.1B | $8.2B | $14.8B | $21.8B | $20.1B | $18.5B | $18.9B | $16.9B | $21.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $12.3B | $12.8B | $13.8B | $14.9B | $12.7B | $18.3B | $20.0B | $22.2B | $23.3B | $26.1B | $27.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.6× | 0.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | $4.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $40.1B | $42.3B | $49.0B | $52.6B | $59.5B | $68.2B | $67.4B | $71.1B | $74.1B | $76.4B | $84.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $10.8B | $13.3B | $13.4B | $14.6B | $26.7B | $33.4B | $31.2B | $29.1B | $25.2B | $21.3B | $24.3B | Total debtDebt |
| $6.3B | $9.5B | $9.5B | $9.6B | $15.1B | $15.0B | $14.8B | $14.7B | $10.7B | $9.0B | $7.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 6.4× | 5.8× | 4.8× | — | — | — | 1.3× | 2.2× | 3.1× | 3.4× | 3.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $8.6B | $8.8B | $10.0B | $11.5B | $6.0B | $5.0B | $6.9B | $9.3B | $12.7B | $15.3B | $16.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 330M | 304M | 277M | 260M | 279M | 322M | 330M | 332M | 333M | 329M | 327M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $110.68 | $124.45 | $149.27 | $166.44 | $54.96 | $76.53 | $136.19 | $161.85 | $171.26 | $179.82 | $192.54 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $6.76 | $7.06 | $7.67 | $11.58 | $-25.30 | $-6.10 | $2.23 | $7.89 | $9.45 | $10.21 | $10.70 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $10.79 | $4.54 | $14.45 | $17.78 | $-20.97 | $-0.12 | $10.94 | $12.77 | $19.56 | $16.72 | $18.11 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $7.02 | $-1.30 | $7.57 | $9.16 | $-20.97 | $-0.12 | $3.78 | $-0.78 | $11.49 | $7.78 | $7.79 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $9.76 | $12.75 | $14.71 | $17.42 | $6.18 | $6.55 | $14.60 | $21.61 | $16.85 | $17.88 | $19.49 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $25.96 | $28.95 | $36.29 | $44.37 | $21.33 | $15.62 | $20.89 | $28.09 | $38.04 | $46.52 | $51.11 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.5%/yr | +26.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +5.0%/yr | — |
| EPS | +4.7%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | +7.0%/yr | +23.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.7%/yr | +16.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $5.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.9B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $2.6B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $3.4B | $3.1B | $2.6B | $737M | ($2.0B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2.9B | +$2.9B | +$2.7B | +$2.5B | +$2.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$2.1B | +$3.4B | +$1.6B | +$2.9B | +$1.5B |
| Cash from operations | $8.4B | $9.4B | $6.9B | $6.1B | $2.1B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$2.9B | −$2.9B | −$2.7B | −$2.5B | −$2.1B |
| Owner earnings | $5.5B | $6.5B | $4.2B | $3.6B | ($40M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$2.9B | −$2.7B | −$4.5B | −$2.4B | — |
| Free cash flow | $2.6B | $3.8B | ($260M) | $1.2B | ($40M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 9% | 11% | 8% | 8% | 0% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.9B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $4.7B ÷ interest expense $1.4B
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $9.0B · 1.9× operating profitModest net debtCash $5.9B + ST investments $6.3B − debt $21.3B
What this means
Netting $12.2B of cash and short-term investments against $21.3B of debt leaves $9.0B owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (4.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -23%–15%; 12% latest = NOPAT $3.7B ÷ invested capital $30.6BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -38%–11%; latest $5.5B = operating cash $8.4B − maintenance capex $2.9BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $2.6B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $5.5B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $8.4B ÷ net income $3.4B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $637M ÷ Owner Earnings $5.5B
What this means
Of $5.5B Owner Earnings, $637M (12%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $637M buybacks. Net of $11M stock comp, the real buyback was about $626M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.00×ExpandingCapex $5.9B ÷ depreciation $2.9B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $59.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.65×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $21.3B vs ($9.3B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +40%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $9.37/share (latest year $10.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $47.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 10% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 10% early, 8% lately, median 8%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 9%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −41.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“The Company depends on technology and automated systems, including artificial intelligence ("AI"), to operate its business, including, but not limited to, computerized airline reservation systems, electronic tickets, electronic airport kiosks, demand prediction software, flight o…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$16.6B
- Receivables$2.5B
- Inventory$7M
- Other current assets$2.5B
- Debt due within a year$4.1B
- Accounts payable$5.8B
- Other current liabilities$17.9B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Jun 30, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $22.1B against the $5.0B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 4.4 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $27.8B, of which the leases are 23%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $50.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$43.0B · 85%
- Buybacks$8.5B · 17%
- Returned to owners$8.5B
31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $8.5B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $13.5B and cash and short-term investments rose $12.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$65.68
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 127M shares were bought for $8.3B, about $65.68 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $52.28 (2016) to $88.25 (2020); its heaviest year, 2016, paid $52.28 ($2.6B).
- Net change in share count−1.1%
The diluted count fell from 330M to 327M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained132%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $2.4B, so each retained $1 added about 1.32 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Scott Kirby | $9.8M | $11.1M | ($40M) |
| 2022 | Scott Kirby | $9.8M | $9.9M | $3.6B |
| 2023 | Scott Kirby | $18.6M | $23.1M | $4.2B |
| 2024 | Scott Kirby | $33.9M | $96.7M | $6.5B |
| 2025 | Scott Kirby | $32.3M | $45.6M | $5.5B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$11M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why United Airlines Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $1.4B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Airlines
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FDXFedEx Corporation | $87.9B | 77% | 6.4% | 10% | 3% |
| DALDelta Air Lines Inc. | $63.4B | — | 9.6% | 16% | 9% |
| UALUnited Airlines Holdings | $59.1B | — | 7.9% | 12% | 9% |
| AALAmerican Airlines Group | $54.6B | — | 5.3% | 8% | 2% |
| LUVSouthwest Airlines Co. | $28.1B | — | 7.6% | 11% | 11% |
| ALKAlaska Air | $14.2B | — | 6.3% | 7% | 10% |
| JBLUJetBlue Airways Corporation | $9.1B | — | -1.9% | -2% | 4% |
| SKYWSkyWest Inc. | $4.1B | 12% | 11.3% | 6% | 22% |
| Group median | — | — | 7.0% | 9% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what United Airlines Holdings has delivered.
Through the cycle, United Airlines Holdings earns about $5.1B on its 8.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $2.5B on 325M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-09; net debt $7.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6.4B) runs well above depreciation ($3.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $6.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← UAA its page in the Manual UAMY →
Industry order: ← SKYW the Airlines chapter ULCC →