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DCBO, Docebo Inc.
Docebo to provide an integrated learning platform and community while enhancing the social learning experience for existing Docebo customers.
Since then, the Company has focused on developing its platform and growing its sales and marketing to expand its customer base.
On April 4, 2023, the Company announced the acquisition (the " PeerBoard Acquisition ") of PeerBoard, a plug and play community-as-a-service platform owned and operated by Circles Collective Inc.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −2.1% through the cycle on a 80% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −251 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →United States is 69% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.
- United States69%$167M
- Rest of World26%$63M
- Canada5%$13M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $41M | $63M | $104M | $143M | $181M | $217M | $243M | $243M | RevenueRevenue |
| 80% | 82% | 80% | 80% | 81% | 81% | 80% | 80% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($10M) | ($8M) | ($13M) | $4M | ($4M) | $21M | $23M | $23M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −23.7% | −12.1% | −12.9% | 2.9% | −2.1% | 9.8% | 9.6% | 9.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($12M) | ($8M) | ($14M) | $7M | $3M | $27M | $38M | $38M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| ($5M) | $5M | ($3M) | $2M | $16M | $29M | $28M | $28M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $693K | $1M | $2M | $2M | $3M | $3M | $3M | $3M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $7M | $12M | $8M | ($7M) | $10M | ($871K) | ($13M) | ($13M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $366K | $1M | $1M | $1M | $635K | $1M | $981K | $981K | CapexCapex |
| 0.9% | 1.7% | 1.1% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($5M) | $4M | ($4M) | $1M | $15M | $28M | $27M | $27M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −11.9% | 5.9% | −4.2% | 0.8% | 8.5% | 12.9% | 11.2% | 11.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($5M) | $4M | ($4M) | $1M | $15M | $28M | $27M | $27M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −11.9% | 5.9% | −4.2% | 0.8% | 8.5% | 12.9% | 11.2% | 11.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -38% | -4% | -7% | 4% | 6% | 46% | 51% | 51% | Return on equityROE |
| −38% | −4% | −7% | 4% | 6% | 46% | 51% | 51% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $46M | $220M | $215M | $216M | $72M | $93M | $74M | $74M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $10M | $16M | $28M | $38M | $42M | $46M | $55M | $55M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $10M | $16M | $23M | $26M | $32M | $35M | $36M | $36M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $519K | ($431K) | $5M | $12M | $10M | $11M | $19M | $19M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $59M | $240M | $252M | $264M | $127M | $154M | $152M | $152M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $29M | $46M | $69M | $84M | $101M | $129M | $124M | $124M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 5.2× | 3.6× | 3.1× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $0 | $6M | $5M | $6M | $14M | $14M | $15M | $15M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $64M | $254M | $268M | $284M | $158M | $191M | $207M | $207M | Total assetsAssets |
| $16K | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| ($46M) | ($220M) | — | — | — | — | — | ($74M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $31M | $200M | $191M | $192M | $51M | $58M | $74M | $74M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 24.4M | 28.9M | 32.9M | 33.1M | 32.5M | 30.3M | 28.7M | 28.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.70 | $2.17 | $3.17 | $4.32 | $5.56 | $7.17 | $8.46 | $8.46 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.49 | $-0.28 | $-0.41 | $0.21 | $0.09 | $0.88 | $1.31 | $1.31 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.20 | $0.13 | $-0.13 | $0.04 | $0.47 | $0.93 | $0.95 | $0.95 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.20 | $0.13 | $-0.13 | $0.04 | $0.47 | $0.93 | $0.95 | $0.95 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.02 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.03 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.29 | $6.92 | $5.80 | $5.81 | $1.56 | $1.91 | $2.58 | $2.58 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +30.6%/yr | +31.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +49.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +14.7%/yr | −1.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | +12.3%/yr | −17.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $38M of profit but $27M of owner earnings: $10M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $38M | $27M | $3M | $7M | ($14M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$3M | +$3M | +$3M | +$2M | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$13M | −$871K | +$10M | −$7M | +$8M |
| Cash from operations | $28M | $29M | $16M | $2M | ($3M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$981K | −$1M | −$635K | −$1M | −$1M |
| Owner earnings | $27M | $28M | $15M | $1M | ($4M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 11% | 13% | 8% | 1% | -4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $74M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $74M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 83 + DIO 0 − DPO 274 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -18%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -12%–13%; latest $27M = operating cash $28M − maintenance capex $981KIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 7 years.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $28M ÷ net income $38M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.31×HarvestingCapex $981K ÷ depreciation $3M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $243M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.22×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $28M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.78/share (latest year $1.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −16% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −16% early to 6% lately, median −2% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2019 · −23.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Finally, our ability to grow is subject to the risk of disruptive technologies, including, but not limited to, generative AI, which has created the need to adapt rapidly to the shifting landscape and to generate insights from these technologies to increase the value that our platform brings to our customers.…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$74M
- Receivables$55M
- Other current assets$22M
- Accounts payable$36M
- Other current liabilities$88M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $73M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$7M · 9%
- Retained (debt / cash)$66M · 91%
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $16K and cash and short-term investments rose $28M.
- Net change in share count17.8%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 29M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained63%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($41M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $25M, so each retained $1 added about 0.63 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Docebo Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?17.8%
Diluted shares grew 17.8% over 2019–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MKTWMarketWise Inc. | $328M | 57% | 11.6% | — | 14% |
| DOMODomo, Inc. | $319M | 73% | -34.5% | — | -8% |
| CRNCCerence Inc. | $252M | 70% | 1.3% | -1% | 12% |
| AIC3.ai Inc. | $250M | 67% | -80.5% | -36% | -37% |
| DCBODocebo Inc. | $243M | 80% | -2.1% | — | 6% |
| WEAVWeave Communications Inc. | $239M | 63% | -35.0% | -111% | -10% |
| XZOExzeo Group Inc. | $217M | 40% | 28.4% | — | 35% |
| IIIVi3 Verticals Inc. | $213M | 32% | 1.9% | 1% | 10% |
| Group median | — | 65% | -0.4% | — | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Docebo Inc.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Docebo Inc. has delivered.
Docebo Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Docebo Inc. earns about $14M on its 5.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $27M on 29M shares outstanding, per the 40-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $74M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← DAVA its page in the Manual DCX →
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