Share count
58Mpeak FY2025
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DAVA, Endava plc
For over 25 years, Endava has successfully delivered digital transformations, utilizing a holistic approach that leverages innovative technologies and enhances our clients' systems to create modern value propositions that fuel their competitive edge in the market.
By combining innovative technologies and deep industry expertise with an AI-native approach, we consult and partner with our clients to create solutions that drive transformation, augment intelligence and deliver lasting impact.
From ideation to production, we support our clients with tailor-made solutions at every stage of their digital transformation, regardless of industry, region or scale.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
£772M
+4.3% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Banking and Capital Markets (20%) and Technology, Media and Telecom (19%), with 5 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 33% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.7% to 17% — on a steadier 33% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 25%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Banking and Capital Markets at 20%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Banking and Capital Markets20%£152M
- Technology, Media and Telecom19%£147M
- Payments19%£145M
- Other13%£102M
- Healthcare12%£91M
- Insurance9%£70M
- Mobility8%£65M
By geographyNorth America38%United Kingdom33%Europe23%RoW5%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| £115M | £159M | £218M | £288M | £351M | £446M | £655M | £795M | £741M | £772M | £772M | RevenueRevenue |
| 35% | 32% | 33% | 34% | 29% | 35% | 33% | 33% | 24% | 25% | 26% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| £20M | £23M | £25M | £33M | £20M | £64M | £95M | £113M | £20M | £32M | £19M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 17.3% | 14.5% | 11.7% | 11.5% | 5.7% | 14.2% | 14.6% | 14.2% | 2.7% | 4.1% | 2.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| £17M | £17M | £19M | £24M | £20M | £43M | £83M | £94M | £17M | £21M | (£3M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 20% | 22% | 23% | 20% | 14% | 20% | 19% | 18% | 37% | 12% | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| £11M | £15M | £34M | £35M | £38M | £88M | £121M | £125M | £54M | £53M | £57M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| £2M | £2M | £3M | £4M | £5M | £5M | £7M | £9M | £10M | £9M | £9M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (£7M) | (£5M) | £12M | £7M | £13M | £39M | £31M | £22M | £27M | £23M | £51M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| £18M | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | £0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| £0 | £1M | £0 | £0 | — | — | — | £0 | £0 | £65M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 95% | 33% | 26% | 28% | 13% | 22% | 29% | 23% | 2% | 5% | — | ROICROIC |
| 56% | 35% | 27% | 15% | 9% | 15% | 19% | 16% | 3% | 4% | -1% | Return on equityROE |
| −5% | 35% | 27% | 15% | 9% | 15% | 19% | 16% | 3% | 4% | −1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| £13M | £24M | £15M | £70M | £101M | £70M | £163M | £165M | £62M | £59M | £68M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | £41M | £52M | £66M | £83M | £118M | £163M | £180M | £194M | £210M | £197M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | £62K | £16K | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | £16K | InventoryInvent. |
| — | £24M | £40M | £49M | £59M | £79M | £98M | £92M | £119M | £97M | £92M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | £17M | £12M | £17M | £24M | £40M | £64M | £88M | £75M | £113M | £105M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | £66M | £68M | £137M | £187M | £190M | £328M | £348M | £268M | £282M | £266M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | £55M | £71M | £54M | £76M | £103M | £128M | £121M | £154M | £122M | £112M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.2× | 1.0× | 2.5× | 2.5× | 1.8× | 2.6× | 2.9× | 1.7× | 2.3× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | £16M | £41M | £37M | £57M | £126M | £146M | £239M | £508M | £473M | £478M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | £106M | £151M | £223M | £357M | £469M | £622M | £770M | £1.0B | £936M | £928M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | £29M | £20M | £21K | — | — | — | — | — | — | £954K | Total debtDebt |
| — | £6M | £5M | (£70M) | — | — | — | — | — | — | (£68M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 117.3× | 16.8× | 31.1× | 5.2× | 10.3× | 6.8× | 30.4× | 7.6× | 2.0× | 2.0× | 1.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| £30M | £49M | £70M | £164M | £232M | £296M | £433M | £571M | £639M | £583M | £565M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 45.4M | 45.3M | 45.1M | 50.1M | 53.4M | 55.2M | 56.3M | 57.3M | 58.3M | 58.5M | 53.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| £2.54 | £3.52 | £4.83 | £5.75 | £6.57 | £8.08 | £11.64 | £13.87 | £12.70 | £13.21 | £14.58 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| £0.37 | £0.37 | £0.42 | £0.48 | £0.37 | £0.79 | £1.48 | £1.64 | £0.29 | £0.36 | £-0.06 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| £0.40 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | £0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| £0.66 | £1.08 | £1.54 | £3.26 | £4.34 | £5.37 | £7.69 | £9.97 | £10.96 | £9.97 | £10.68 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +20.1%/yr | +15.0%/yr |
| EPS | −0.2%/yr | −0.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +35.3%/yr | +18.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
5%low FY2024
Gross margin
25%low FY2024
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Restated past financials
“The previously reported financial statements have not been restated on the basis that the adjustment to the deferred tax asset from goodwill is not considered to be material.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income £19M ÷ interest expense £15M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- Net cashCash £68M − debt £954K
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by £68M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 93 + DIO 0 − DPO 59 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–95%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median -2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income (£3M) · cash from operations £57M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · £772M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.39×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · £954K vs £155M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +152%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are £0.83/share (latest year £-0.06), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is £10.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 7% lately, median 12% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2024 · 2.7% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +2.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets£266M
- Cash & short-term investments£68M
- Receivables£197M
- Inventory£16K
- Other current assets£1M
Current liabilities£112M
- Debt due within a year£954K
- Accounts payable£92M
- Other current liabilities£19M
Current ratio2.39×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.39×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.61×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital£155Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash£954K due · £68M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value(£12M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases£48M£47M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles£578M62% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity85%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring£0over 10 years buying other businesses
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASANAsana | $791M | 89% | -68.9% | -177% | -27% |
| UPWKUpwork Inc. | $788M | 73% | -5.3% | -7% | 3% |
| DAVAEndava plc | £772M | 33% | 12.9% | 25% | — |
| COURCoursera Inc. | $758M | 53% | -22.9% | — | 0% |
| LZLegalZoom.com Inc. | $756M | 66% | 3.3% | — | 15% |
| BANDBandwidth Inc. | $754M | 44% | -2.3% | -2% | 5% |
| SPSCSPS Commerce | $752M | 67% | 14.1% | 13% | 21% |
| DOCSDoximity | $645M | 88% | 33.0% | 16% | 40% |
| Group median | — | 66% | 0.5% | 5% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing the right to receive one Class”; Endava plc reports in GBP, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at GBP 1 = $1.349 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in GBP.
The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered18%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Endava plc (DAVA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DAVA, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← DAO its page in the Manual DCBO →
Industry order: ← CTW the IT Services & Consulting chapter DDI →