Share count
16Mpeak FY2025
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DGNX, Diginex Limited
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$4M
+174.3% YoY
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $2M
Cash burn · annual $9M
Runway 3 mo
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −447% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMSep 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $2M | $1M | $2M | $4M | RevenueRevenue |
| ($7M) | ($8M) | ($8M) | ($10M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −447.5% | −620.5% | −406.9% | −284.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($9M) | ($5M) | ($5M) | ($5M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| ($7M) | ($6M) | ($8M) | ($9M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1K | $103K | $126K | $153K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $3M | ($1M) | ($3M) | ($4M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | -453% | -79% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -114% | -48% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −114% | −48% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $1M | $77K | $3M | $2M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $182K | $1M | $2M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $1M | $908K | $3M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($1M) | $487K | ($867K) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $582K | $6M | $15M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $14M | $2M | $4M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.0× | 3.8× | 3.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $1M | — | $1M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $1M | — | ($710K) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -33.0× | -14.6× | -20.2× | -58.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | ($23M) | $5M | $11M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||
| 9.5M | 9.5M | 15.7M | 2.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.17 | $0.14 | $0.13 | $1.38 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.97 | $-0.51 | $-0.33 | $-2.01 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $-2.42 | $0.29 | $4.21 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.65 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/6.05 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The record, charted
FY2023–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F/A · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -58.4×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($10M) ÷ interest expense $174K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $2M − debt $1M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $710K, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($8M) ÷ invested capital $10M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -124%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -500%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Loss, and burning cashNet income ($5M) · cash from operations ($9M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $4M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.56×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1M vs $11M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.03/share (latest year $-0.03), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.
“In par with the software market, investment in ESG and sustainability consulting reached USD 11.5 billion in 2022, expected to grow to USD 48 billion by 2028 at a CAGR of 27%. 1 Going forward, technological innovations like AI are expected to keep driving market growth, making da…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Sep 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$15M
- Cash & short-term investments$2M
- Receivables$2M
- Other current assets$10M
Current liabilities$4M
- Debt due within a year$1M
- Accounts payable$3M
Current ratio3.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.56×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.45×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$11Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1M due · $2M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Sep 30, 2025 balance sheet
Cash runway0.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$11Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$1M$229K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$611Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PDYNPalladyne AI Corp. | $5M | 30% | -916.4% | -333% | -500% |
| KDKKodiak AI Inc. Common Stock | $4M | — | -413.3% | — | -363% |
| DJTTrump Media & Technology Group Corp. | $4M | 55% | -3360.9% | -18% | -943% |
| DGNXDiginex Limited | $4M | — | -447.5% | -79% | — |
| ODYSOdysight.ai Inc. | $3M | 29% | -593.1% | -442% | -584% |
| AURAurora Innovation Inc. | $3M | — | -1807.5% | -37% | -758% |
| PHUNPhunware Inc. | $3M | 51% | -175.0% | -124% | -161% |
| SHAZSharonAI Holdings Inc. | $2M | 6% | -880.0% | — | -299% |
| Group median | — | — | -736.6% | -101% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Diginex Limited's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Diginex Limited (DGNX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DGNX, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← DEFT its page in the Manual DHT →
Industry order: ← DDI the IT Services & Consulting chapter DOX →