Owner Scorecard


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DDI, DoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd.

DoubleDown Casino was ranked the fifth among the top game titles by revenue during 2025, according to Eilers & Krejcik , which estimated that the global social casino market was approximately $6.8 billion in 2025.

Our agent for service of process in the United States is DoubleDown Interactive LLC, 6671 S.

The SEC maintains a website at www.sec.gov that contains reports, proxy and information statements and other information regarding registrants that make electronic filings through its Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval ("EDGAR") system.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · 1 ADS = 0.05 ordinary shares
DDI · DoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$360M
+5.5% YoY · 0% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $360M 5-yr avg $339M
Gross margin 72% 5-yr avg 70%
Operating margin 35.3% 5-yr avg 8.6%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 2%
Owner-earnings margin 38% 5-yr avg 26%
Free cash flow margin 38% 5-yr avg 26%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 70% and operating margin about 27% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −98% to 40% — on a steadier 70% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −26 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 28% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

United States is 67% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States67%$242M
  • United Kingdom16%$58M
  • International-other7%$24M
  • Canada5%$19M
  • Germany5%$17M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$274M$358M$363M$321M$309M$341M$360M$360MRevenueRevenue
68%70%72%72%Gross marginGross mgn
$68M$89M$99M($314M)$119M$137M$127M$127MOperating incomeOp. inc.
25.0%24.8%27.2%−97.8%38.4%40.1%35.3%35.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$36M$54M$78M($234M)$101M$124M$102M$102MNet incomeNet inc.
27%29%22%23%24%27%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$77M$100M$96M$51M$24M$148M$137M$137MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$33M$32M$18M$4M$728K$3M$6M$6MDepreciationDeprec.
$7M$15M$79K$281M($78M)$21M$28M$28MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$200K$217K$207K$269K$198K$867K$190K$190KCapexCapex
0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.3%0.1%0.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$76M$100M$96M$51M$24M$148M$137M$137MOwner earningsOwner earn.
27.9%27.8%26.4%15.7%7.7%43.2%37.9%37.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$76M$100M$96M$51M$24M$148M$137M$137MFree cash flowFCF
27.9%27.8%26.4%15.7%7.7%43.2%37.9%37.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$311K$85K$85KDividends paidDiv. paid
7%9%12%-55%18%19%17%17%ROICROIC
10%8%9%-37%16%15%11%11%Return on equityROE
16%15%11%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$42M$63M$242M$285M$275M$415M$389M$469MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$20M$23M$22M$21M$21M$31M$32M$32MReceivablesReceiv.
$14M$15M$25M$25MAccounts payablePayables
$20M$23M$22M$21M$7M$16M$7M$7MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$66M$91M$271M$313M$313M$453M$528M$528MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$50M$26M$21M$116M$116M$23M$68M$68MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×3.5×13.0×2.7×2.7×19.4×7.7×7.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$634M$634M$634M$379M$379M$396M$427M$427MGoodwillGoodwill
$815M$807M$970M$792M$792M$906M$1.0B$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$377M$46M$42M$39M$78M$34M$0$0Total debtDebt
$335M($17M)($200M)($246M)($196M)($381M)($389M)($469M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.6×8.2×49.1×-171.4×15.1×41.7×18.5×18.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$381M$700M$864M$626M$626M$842M$950M$950MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
2.0M2.1M2.3M2.5M2.5M2.5M2.5M2.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$137.14$166.74$157.70$129.57$124.66$137.76$145.27$145.27Revenue / shareRev/sh
$18.21$24.95$33.91$-94.43$40.78$50.09$41.37$41.37EPS (diluted)EPS
$38.32$46.36$41.64$20.39$9.64$59.56$55.12$55.12Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$38.32$46.36$41.64$20.39$9.64$59.56$55.12$55.12Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.13$0.03$0.03Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.10$0.10$0.09$0.11$0.08$0.35$0.08$0.08Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$190.80$325.49$375.08$252.75$252.67$339.80$383.50$383.50Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.0%/yr−2.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.2%/yr+3.5%/yr
EPS+14.7%/yr+10.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−4.4%/yr−5.4%/yr
Book value / share+12.3%/yr+3.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
2Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
17%low FY2022
Gross margin
72%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$137Mowner earningsvs.$102Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $102M of profit into $137M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$102M
Owner earnings$137M · 38% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$102M$124M$101M($234M)$78M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$6M+$3M+$728K+$4M+$18M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$28M+$21M−$78M+$281M+$79K
Cash from operations$137M$148M$24M$51M$96M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$190K−$867K−$198K−$269K−$207K
Owner earnings$137M$148M$24M$51M$96M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue38%43%8%16%26%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $127M ÷ interest expense $7M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $389M + ST investments $80M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $469M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 32 + DIO 0 − DPO 88 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    7-yr median, range -55%–19%; 17% latest = NOPAT $93M ÷ invested capital $561M
    Industry peers: median -6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range 8%–43%; latest $137M = operating cash $137M − maintenance capex $190K
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 38% of revenue this year, a 28% median across 7 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $137M ÷ net income $102M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $85K ÷ Owner Earnings $137M
    What this means

    Of $137M Owner Earnings, $85K (0%) went back to shareholders, $85K dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.03×
    Harvesting
    Capex $190K ÷ depreciation $6M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $360M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 7.74×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $459M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +95%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $44.08/share (latest year $41.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $383.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 26% → 38% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 26% early to 38% lately, median 27% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −97.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$528M
  • Cash & short-term investments$469M
  • Receivables$32M
  • Other current assets$27M
Current liabilities$68M
  • Accounts payable$25M
  • Other current liabilities$44M
Current ratio7.74×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio7.74×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio6.88×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$459Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$444Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$437MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5M$5M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $633M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

  • Reinvested$2M · 0%
  • Dividends$396K · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$630M · 100%
  • Returned to owners$396K

    0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $396K as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $377M and cash and short-term investments rose $426M.

  • Net change in share count24.2%

    The diluted count rose from 2M to 2M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.03/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained5%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($261M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $12M, so each retained $1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$507M49% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity45%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 7 years buying other businesses, against $2M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why DoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?24.2%

    Diluted shares grew 24.2% over 2019–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HNGEHinge Health Inc.$588M77%-44.6%12%
IBEXIBEX Limited$558M7.7%31%4%
LIFLife360 Inc.$489M76%-15.2%-28%-4%
YEXTYext Inc.$447M75%-24.8%-85%1%
TCXTucows Inc.$390M27%-0.2%0%10%
DDIDoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd.$360M70%27.2%12%28%
OOMAOoma Inc.$274M61%-2.7%-11%1%
INODInnodata Inc.$252M-0.8%-1%3%
Group median72%-1.7%-1%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, or ADSs, each twenty (20) ADSs representing one (1) Common”; DoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd. reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what DoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd. has delivered.

DoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, DoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd. earns about $100M on its 27.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 37.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $137M on 50M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $469M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "DoubleDown Interactive Co., Ltd. (DDI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DDI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DCX its page in the Manual DDL →

Industry order: ← DAVA the IT Services & Consulting chapter DGNX →