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DOX, Amdocs
Revenue is Managed services arrangements (58%) and Others (42%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 35% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has held in a narrow 11%–15% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Managed services arrangements at 58%.
- Managed services arrangements58%$2.9B
- Others42%$2.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2015–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2015’15 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMSep 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $3.6B | $3.7B | $3.9B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.2B | $4.3B | $4.6B | $4.9B | $5.0B | $5.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 36% | 35% | 35% | 35% | 35% | 34% | 34% | 35% | 35% | 35% | 35% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $516M | $483M | $517M | $428M | $570M | $595M | $599M | $665M | $654M | $629M | $629M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 14.2% | 13.0% | 13.4% | 10.8% | 13.9% | 14.3% | 14.0% | 14.5% | 13.4% | 12.6% | 12.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $446M | $409M | $437M | $354M | $479M | $498M | $688M | $550M | $543M | $496M | $496M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 13% | 16% | 15% | 16% | 16% | 15% | 15% | 15% | 15% | 16% | 16% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $773M | $620M | $636M | $557M | $656M | $658M | $926M | $757M | $823M | $724M | $724M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $175M | $212M | $215M | $211M | $206M | $198M | $209M | $225M | $128M | $129M | $225M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $152M | ($888K) | ($16M) | ($8M) | ($29M) | ($38M) | $29M | ($17M) | $152M | $99M | $4M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $121M | $130M | $133M | $231M | — | — | $210M | $227M | $124M | $105M | $105M | CapexCapex |
| 3.3% | 3.5% | 3.4% | 5.8% | — | — | 4.9% | 5.0% | 2.5% | 2.1% | 2.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $652M | $490M | $503M | $326M | — | — | $715M | $530M | $698M | $619M | $619M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 17.9% | 13.2% | 13.0% | 8.2% | — | — | 16.7% | 11.6% | 14.3% | 12.4% | 12.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $652M | $490M | $503M | $326M | — | — | $715M | $530M | $698M | $619M | $619M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 17.9% | 13.2% | 13.0% | 8.2% | — | — | 16.7% | 11.6% | 14.3% | 12.4% | 12.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $101M | $109M | $122M | $134M | $148M | $164M | $177M | $186M | $199M | $212M | $212M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $454M | $413M | $341M | $419M | $398M | $361M | $680M | $508M | $490M | $563M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 19% | 15% | 15% | 12% | 16% | 15% | 14% | 16% | 15% | 14% | 14% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 12% | 12% | 10% | 14% | 14% | 19% | 16% | 15% | 14% | 14% | Return on equityROE |
| 10% | 9% | 9% | 6% | 9% | 9% | 14% | 10% | 10% | 8% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.0B | $769M | $650M | $419M | $472M | $983M | $709M | $573M | $520M | $346M | $346M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $715M | $819M | $865M | $972M | $988M | $861M | $867M | $947M | $944M | $1.0B | $1.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $112M | $137M | $126M | $195M | $177M | $110M | $121M | $134M | $293M | $306M | $306M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $603M | $682M | $739M | $777M | $811M | $751M | $746M | $812M | $651M | $722M | $722M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.4B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.8B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.7× | 1.5× | 1.7× | 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $5.3B | $5.3B | $5.3B | $5.3B | $5.3B | $6.3B | $6.5B | $6.4B | $6.4B | $6.4B | $6.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | — | $644M | $645M | $645M | $646M | $646M | $646M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | — | ($339M) | ($65M) | $72M | $126M | $300M | $300M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 164.2× | 289.8× | 323.3× | 155.0× | 145.7× | 57.0× | 28.1× | 39.3× | 28.3× | 18.0× | 27.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 155M | 150M | 146M | 143M | 137M | 133M | 128M | 122M | 118M | 113M | 113M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $23.47 | $24.81 | $26.44 | $27.87 | $29.79 | $31.29 | $33.51 | $37.55 | $41.25 | $44.33 | $44.33 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.87 | $2.73 | $2.99 | $2.48 | $3.50 | $3.74 | $5.38 | $4.51 | $4.58 | $4.40 | $4.40 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.20 | $3.27 | $3.44 | $2.29 | — | — | $5.59 | $4.34 | $5.89 | $5.48 | $5.48 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $4.20 | $3.27 | $3.44 | $2.29 | — | — | $5.59 | $4.34 | $5.89 | $5.48 | $5.48 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.65 | $0.73 | $0.83 | $0.94 | $1.08 | $1.23 | $1.39 | $1.53 | $1.68 | $1.88 | $1.88 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.78 | $0.87 | $0.91 | $1.62 | — | — | $1.64 | $1.86 | $1.05 | $0.93 | $0.93 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $21.95 | $23.04 | $24.44 | $24.18 | $25.52 | $27.19 | $28.07 | $28.86 | $29.74 | $30.62 | $30.62 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.3%/yr | +8.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.0%/yr | −0.6%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | +4.8%/yr | +4.7%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +12.5%/yr | +11.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +2.1%/yr | −17.2%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +3.8%/yr | +3.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2015–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned $496M of profit into $619M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2018 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $496M | $543M | $550M | $688M | $354M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$129M | +$128M | +$225M | +$209M | +$211M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$99M | +$152M | −$17M | +$29M | −$8M |
| Cash from operations | $724M | $823M | $757M | $926M | $557M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$105M | −$124M | −$227M | −$210M | −$231M |
| Owner earnings | $619M | $698M | $530M | $715M | $326M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 12% | 14% | 12% | 17% | 8% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 27.2×ComfortableOperating income $629M ÷ interest expense $23M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $300M · 0.5× operating profitModest net debtCash $346M − debt $646M
What this means
Netting $346M of cash and short-term investments against $646M of debt leaves $300M owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit (1.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 75 + DIO 0 − DPO 34 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 12%–19%; 14% latest = NOPAT $528M ÷ invested capital $3.8BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median margin, range 8%–18%; latest $619M = operating cash $724M − maintenance capex $105MIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 8 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $724M ÷ net income $496M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $775M ÷ Owner Earnings $619M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $619M of Owner Earnings, $775M (125%) went back to shareholders, $212M dividends, $563M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.47×HarvestingCapex $105M ÷ depreciation $225M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.20×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $646M vs $300M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +23%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.69/share (latest year $4.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2015–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 14% early, 13% lately, median 13%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 10.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −3.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Sep 30, 2024Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$346M
- Receivables$1.0B
- Other current assets$397M
- Accounts payable$306M
- Other current liabilities$1.2B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2015–2024
Over the record, the business generated $5.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.3B · 22%
- Dividends$1.2B · 21%
- Buybacks$3.9B · 67%
- Returned to owners$5.1B
113% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.2B as dividends and $3.9B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$576M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $576M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $689M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−27.3%
The diluted count fell from 155M to 113M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$1.88/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Amdocs is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?12.7% vs 14.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 14.7% early in the record and 12.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EPAMEPAM Systems | $5.5B | 34% | 11.9% | 31% | 11% |
| OTEXOpen Text Corporation | $5.2B | 69% | 17.6% | 6% | 23% |
| TWLOTwilio Inc. | $5.1B | 52% | -19.4% | -7% | -1% |
| DOXAmdocs | $5.0B | 35% | 13.7% | 15% | 13% |
| GENGen Digital | $5.0B | 82% | 32.2% | 11% | 31% |
| GDDYGoDaddy Inc. | $5.0B | — | 9.1% | 15% | 21% |
| ZMZoom | $4.9B | 76% | 11.6% | 8% | 33% |
| ZSZscaler Inc. | $2.7B | 78% | -22.3% | -13% | 17% |
| Group median | — | 69% | 11.8% | 10% | 19% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Amdocs reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Amdocs has delivered.
Through the cycle, Amdocs earns about $655M on its 13.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $619M on 113M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2024-09-30; net debt $300M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
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