Share count
310Mpeak FY2018
← All companies ← DHCNL Manual DHR → ← DFH Homebuilders ECG →
DHI, D.R. Horton Inc.
Homebuilders capital-intensive
D.R. Horton builds houses and sells them, weighted toward entry-level and first-move-up buyers across many states. It buys raw land, develops it into lots, frames the homes, and closes the sale, often pairing it with its own mortgage and title services. The money comes from the gap between what a finished house fetches and what the land, materials, and labor to build it cost.
We construct and sell homes through our operating divisions in 126 markets across 36 states.
Operations consist of homebuilding, rental, a majority-owned residential lot development company, financial services and other activities.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$34.3B
−6.9% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $33.3B 5-yr avg $33.6B
Revenue $7.6B −2.3% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $658M yr-ago $819M
Net margin 8.7% yr-ago 10.6%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Home Building (92%) and Forestar Group (5%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- This looks far closer to a commodity builder than a brand. A house is largely a house, and the buyer tends to shop the monthly payment, so the lever looks like volume and the speed at which land turns into a closed sale rather than a premium on the name. A builder weighted to entry-level buyers lives by hitting an affordable price and moving houses fast, which throws the whole weight onto turnover: cash sits in dirt and half-built homes, and the longer it sits, the more a turn of the cycle can catch the firm holding lots bought for a market that has since cooled. Demand rides the housing cycle, mortgage rates, and the job market, none of which the builder sets, and the mortgage arm leans on the same buyer. So the questions are how cheaply it turns land into houses, and how it carries that inventory when buyers step back. Weigh the turnover and the land position across good years and bad in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Home Building is 92% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Home Building92%$31.5B
- Forestar Group5%$1.7B
- Rental5%$1.6B
- Financial Services2%$841M
- Eliminations and Other-4%($1.4B)
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $12.2B | $14.1B | $16.1B | $17.6B | $20.3B | $27.8B | $33.5B | $35.5B | $36.8B | $34.3B | $33.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 22% | 22% | 23% | 22% | 24% | 28% | 31% | 26% | 26% | 24% | 23% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 11% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 9% | 9% | 9% | 10% | 11% | 11% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $3.0B | $5.3B | $7.6B | $6.3B | $6.2B | $4.7B | $4.2B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 11.1% | 11.4% | 12.8% | 12.1% | 14.7% | 19.2% | 22.7% | 17.7% | 16.9% | 13.7% | 12.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $886M | $1.0B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $2.4B | $4.2B | $5.9B | $4.7B | $4.8B | $3.6B | $3.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 35% | 35% | 29% | 24% | 20% | 22% | 23% | 24% | 24% | 24% | 24% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $624M | $440M | $545M | $892M | $1.4B | $534M | $562M | $4.3B | $2.2B | $3.4B | $3.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $61M | $55M | $62M | $72M | $91M | $82M | $81M | $92M | $87M | $101M | $108M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($372M) | ($712M) | ($1.0B) | ($872M) | ($1.1B) | ($3.8B) | ($5.5B) | ($644M) | ($2.8B) | ($397M) | $239M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $78M | $103M | $68M | $127M | $97M | $94M | $148M | $149M | $165M | $137M | $154M | CapexCapex |
| 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $563M | $386M | $477M | $820M | $1.3B | $441M | $480M | $4.2B | $2.1B | $3.3B | $3.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 4.6% | 2.7% | 3.0% | 4.7% | 6.5% | 1.6% | 1.4% | 11.9% | 5.7% | 9.7% | 10.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $546M | $338M | $477M | $765M | $1.3B | $441M | $414M | $4.2B | $2.0B | $3.3B | $3.5B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 4.5% | 2.4% | 3.0% | 4.3% | 6.5% | 1.6% | 1.2% | 11.7% | 5.5% | 9.6% | 10.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $82M | $4M | $159M | $316M | $10M | $25M | $272M | $213M | $40M | $53M | $88M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $119M | $150M | $188M | $223M | $256M | $289M | $317M | $341M | $395M | $495M | $502M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $61M | $128M | $480M | $360M | $874M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.8B | $4.3B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 10% | 11% | 14% | 14% | 18% | 24% | 26% | 20% | 18% | 13% | 11% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 13% | 16% | 16% | 20% | 28% | 30% | 21% | 19% | 15% | 13% | Return on equityROE |
| 11% | 11% | 14% | 14% | 18% | 26% | 29% | 19% | 17% | 13% | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.3B | $1.0B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $2.5B | $3.9B | $4.5B | $3.0B | $1.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $80M | $109M | $164M | $164M | $164M | $164M | $164M | $164M | $164M | $164M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $11.6B | $12.2B | $14.1B | $15.6B | $18.9B | $24.0B | $30.4B | $32.6B | $36.1B | $35.5B | $35.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $3.3B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $4.3B | $5.4B | $6.1B | $5.1B | $5.9B | $6.0B | $6.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.3B | $2.2B | $3.5B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $3.0B | $4.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $6.8B | $7.7B | $9.0B | $10.0B | $11.8B | $14.9B | $19.4B | $22.7B | $25.3B | $24.2B | $23.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 375M | 379M | 383M | 377M | 370M | 366M | 355M | 343M | 332M | 310M | 291M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $32.41 | $37.19 | $41.91 | $46.62 | $54.87 | $75.93 | $94.36 | $103.29 | $110.98 | $110.52 | $114.52 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.36 | $2.74 | $3.81 | $4.29 | $6.41 | $11.42 | $16.51 | $13.82 | $14.34 | $11.57 | $10.89 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.50 | $1.02 | $1.24 | $2.17 | $3.58 | $1.21 | $1.35 | $12.27 | $6.34 | $10.71 | $12.17 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.46 | $0.89 | $1.24 | $2.03 | $3.58 | $1.21 | $1.17 | $12.10 | $6.11 | $10.60 | $12.01 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.32 | $0.39 | $0.49 | $0.59 | $0.69 | $0.79 | $0.89 | $0.99 | $1.19 | $1.60 | $1.72 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.21 | $0.27 | $0.18 | $0.34 | $0.26 | $0.26 | $0.42 | $0.43 | $0.50 | $0.44 | $0.53 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $18.11 | $20.45 | $23.43 | $26.55 | $31.98 | $40.70 | $54.67 | $66.11 | $76.34 | $78.06 | $81.13 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +14.6%/yr | +15.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +24.4%/yr | +24.5%/yr |
| EPS | +19.3%/yr | +12.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +19.7%/yr | +18.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +8.8%/yr | +11.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +17.6%/yr | +19.5%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue-6.9%
“Revenues from our title operations decreased 7% to $185.9 million in fiscal 2025 from $200.9 million in fiscal 2024, due to a decrease in transactions closed through our title operations.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
13%low FY2016
Gross margin
24%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.9×peak FY2022
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$3.3Bowner earningsvs.$3.6Bnet incomelow FY2017
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $3.3B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $101M it takes just to hold its position. It put $36M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $3.3B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $3.6B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $5.9B | $4.2B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$101M | +$87M | +$92M | +$81M | +$82M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$131M | +$118M | +$111M | +$105M | +$91M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$397M | −$2.8B | −$644M | −$5.5B | −$3.8B |
| Cash from operations | $3.4B | $2.2B | $4.3B | $562M | $534M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$101M | −$87M | −$92M | −$81M | −$94M |
| Owner earnings | $3.3B | $2.1B | $4.2B | $480M | $441M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$36M | −$78M | −$57M | −$67M | — |
| Free cash flow | $3.3B | $2.0B | $4.2B | $414M | $441M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 10% | 6% | 12% | 1% | 2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $101M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $36M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $131M), owner earnings is nearer $3.2B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.0B · 0.6× operating profitModest net debtCash $3.0B − debt $6.0B
What this means
Netting $3.0B of cash and short-term investments against $6.0B of debt leaves $3.0B owed, about 0.6× a year's operating profit (1.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 10%–26%; 13% latest = NOPAT $3.6B ÷ invested capital $27.2BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 1%–12%; latest $3.3B = operating cash $3.4B − maintenance capex $101MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $131M of SBC) leaves $3.2B.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $3.4B ÷ net income $3.6B
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 5% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $4.8B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.3B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $3.3B of Owner Earnings, $4.8B (144%) went back to shareholders, $495M dividends, $4.3B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $131M stock comp, the real buyback was about $4.2B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.36×ExpandingCapex $137M ÷ depreciation $101M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $34.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +287%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $15.38/share (latest year $12.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $85.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 12% → 16% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 16% lately, median 14% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 20%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 11.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −2.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $14.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.2B · 8%
- Dividends$2.8B · 19%
- Buybacks$10.3B · 69%
- Retained (debt / cash)$693M · 5%
- Returned to owners$13.1B
93% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.8B as dividends and $10.3B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.3B and cash and short-term investments rose $615M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$100.76
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 102M shares were bought for $10.3B, about $100.76 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $32.76 (2017) to $144.00 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $140.07 ($4.3B).
- Net change in share count−22.4%
The diluted count fell from 375M to 291M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$1.60/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 20% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained16%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($17.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $2.7B, so each retained $1 added about 0.16 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Auld | $30.6M | $51.3M | $441M |
| 2022 | Mr. Auld | $30.0M | $26.2M | $480M |
| 2023 | Mr. Auld | $32.1M | $47.0M | $4.2B |
| 2024 | Mr. Romanowski | $25.1M | $40.6M | $2.1B |
| 2025 | Mr. Romanowski | $25.1M | $21.4M | $3.3B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership0.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio194:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$131M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why D.R. Horton Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.49×
Across the record the business reported $30.5B of net income but generated $14.9B of operating cash, a 0.49-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Homebuilders
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DHID.R. Horton Inc. | $34.3B | 24% | 14.2% | 16% | 5% |
| LENLennar Corporation | $34.2B | — | 13.9% | 16% | 8% |
| PHMPulteGroup Inc. | $17.3B | — | 16.3% | 19% | 9% |
| TOLToll Brothers Inc. | $11.0B | 22% | 11.6% | 13% | 9% |
| NVRNVR Inc. | $10.3B | — | 16.0% | 76% | 12% |
| TMHCTaylor Morrison Home Corporation | $8.1B | 20% | 9.1% | 8% | 10% |
| KBHKB Home | $6.2B | — | 8.8% | 15% | 5% |
| MHOM/I Homes Inc. | $4.4B | 23% | 11.0% | 20% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 23% | 12.7% | 16% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what D.R. Horton Inc. has delivered.
D.R. Horton Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, D.R. Horton Inc. earns about $1.6B on its 4.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
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The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+56%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+22%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $3.5B on 284M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-16; net debt $4.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($154M) runs well above depreciation ($108M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $3.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "D.R. Horton Inc. (DHI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DHI, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← DHCNL its page in the Manual DHR →
Industry order: ← DFH the Homebuilders chapter ECG →