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TMHC, Taylor Morrison Home Corporation

Homebuilders capital-intensive Cyclical

Our homebuilding business operates under the Taylor Morrison and Esplanade brand names.

We serve a variety of customers in the entry-level, move-up and resort lifestyle buyer groups across the country.

With each of our consumer groups seeking varying levels of home specification and affordability considerations, we have a dynamic and flexible operating strategy and product offering that allows us to serve each of these segments and respond quickly to changing market conditions to maximize our financial performance.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TMHC · Taylor Morrison Home Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$8.1B

−0.6% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $7.6B 5-yr avg $7.9B

Gross margin 22% 5-yr avg 23%

Operating margin 11.6% 5-yr avg 13.7%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 12%

Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%

Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 19% and operating margin about 7.0% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 4.5% and 17% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 55% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.6B	$3.9B	$4.2B	$4.8B	$6.1B	$7.5B	$8.2B	$7.4B	$8.2B	$8.1B	$7.6B	RevenueRevenue
19%	19%	17%	17%	17%	21%	25%	24%	24%	23%	22%	Gross marginGross mgn
10%	10%	10%	10%	9%	9%	8%	9%	4%	3%	3%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$160M	$270M	$269M	$322M	$318M	$844M	$1.4B	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$884M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.5%	7.0%	6.4%	6.8%	5.2%	11.2%	16.9%	13.7%	14.1%	12.7%	11.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$53M	$91M	$206M	$255M	$243M	$663M	$1.1B	$769M	$883M	$783M	$668M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	23%	21%	23%	21%	24%	24%	23%	24%	24%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$373M	$386M	$136M	$393M	$1.1B	$377M	$1.1B	$806M	$210M	$817M	$730M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$4M	$4M	$26M	$31M	$37M	$40M	$34M	$33M	$41M	$40M	$42M	DepreciationDeprec.
$305M	$279M	($118M)	$92M	$810M	($346M)	($6M)	($22M)	($737M)	($34M)	($8M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M	$3M	$20M	$30M	$38M	$21M	$31M	$33M	$36M	$40M	$42M	CapexCapex
0.1%	0.1%	0.5%	0.6%	0.6%	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%	0.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$371M	$383M	$115M	$363M	$1.1B	$355M	$1.1B	$773M	$174M	$777M	$688M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
10.4%	9.9%	2.7%	7.6%	17.7%	4.7%	13.1%	10.4%	2.1%	9.6%	9.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$371M	$383M	$115M	$363M	$1.1B	$355M	$1.1B	$773M	$174M	$777M	$688M	Free cash flowFCF
10.4%	9.9%	2.7%	7.6%	17.7%	4.7%	13.1%	10.4%	2.1%	9.6%	9.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$53M	$0	$193M	$0	$279M	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$0	$138M	$157M	$103M	$281M	$376M	$128M	$348M	$381M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
4%	5%	5%	6%	4%	10%	16%	12%	12%	10%	8%	ROICROIC
10%	6%	9%	10%	7%	17%	23%	14%	15%	12%	11%	Return on equityROE
10%	6%	9%	10%	7%	17%	23%	14%	15%	12%	11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$300M	$574M	$330M	$326M	$533M	$833M	$724M	$799M	$487M	$850M	$653M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$3.9B	$4.5B	$4.7B	$4.8B	InventoryInvent.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$3.9B	$4.5B	$4.7B	$4.8B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$66M	$66M	$152M	$149M	$663M	$663M	$663M	$663M	$663M	$663M	$663M	GoodwillGoodwill
$4.2B	$4.3B	$5.3B	$5.2B	$7.7B	$8.7B	$8.5B	$8.7B	$9.3B	$9.8B	$9.8B	Total assetsAssets
$1.6B	$1.5B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$2.9B	$3.3B	$2.5B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.3B	Total debtDebt
$1.3B	$924M	$1.9B	$1.6B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$1.8B	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.7B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$552M	$1.6B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$3.5B	$3.9B	$4.6B	$5.3B	$5.9B	$6.3B	$6.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
121M	121M	115M	108M	129M	128M	116M	110M	107M	101M	97.5M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$29.38	$32.13	$36.72	$43.98	$47.45	$58.59	$70.77	$67.35	$76.45	$80.64	$78.05	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.44	$0.75	$1.79	$2.35	$1.88	$5.18	$9.06	$6.98	$8.27	$7.77	$6.85	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.07	$3.17	$1.00	$3.35	$8.40	$2.78	$9.27	$7.02	$1.63	$7.72	$7.05	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.07	$3.17	$1.00	$3.35	$8.40	$2.78	$9.27	$7.02	$1.63	$7.72	$7.05	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02	$0.03	$0.18	$0.28	$0.29	$0.17	$0.26	$0.30	$0.34	$0.40	$0.43	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.57	$13.20	$20.98	$23.43	$27.13	$30.67	$39.84	$48.25	$54.91	$62.49	$64.06	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+11.9%/yr	+11.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+10.8%/yr	−1.7%/yr
EPS	+37.7%/yr	+32.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+43.2%/yr	+6.5%/yr
Book value / share	+33.7%/yr	+18.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

101Mpeak FY2020

ROIC

10%low FY2020

Gross margin

23%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.9×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$777Mowner earningsvs.$783Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $783M of profit but $777M of owner earnings: $6M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$783M

Owner earnings$777M · 10% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$783M	$883M	$769M	$1.1B	$663M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$40M	+$41M	+$33M	+$34M	+$40M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$29M	+$22M	+$26M	+$27M	+$20M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$34M	−$737M	−$22M	−$6M	−$346M
Cash from operations	$817M	$210M	$806M	$1.1B	$377M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$40M	−$36M	−$33M	−$31M	−$21M
Owner earnings	$777M	$174M	$773M	$1.1B	$355M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	10%	2%	10%	13%	5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $29M), owner earnings is nearer $748M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.4B · 1.4× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $850M − debt $2.3B

What this means
Netting $850M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $1.4B owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (2.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range 4%–16%; 10% latest = NOPAT $783M ÷ invested capital $7.7B

Industry peers: median 19%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 2%–18%; latest $777M = operating cash $817M − maintenance capex $40M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $29M of SBC) leaves $748M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.04×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $817M ÷ net income $783M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 49%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $381M ÷ Owner Earnings $777M

What this means
Of $777M Owner Earnings, $381M (49%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $381M buybacks. Net of $29M stock comp, the real buyback was about $352M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.00×

Maintaining

Capex $40M ÷ depreciation $40M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity —

Current ratio ≥ 2× · —

What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +595%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.69/share (latest year $8.38), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $67.36/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 6% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 14% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 15%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 4.5% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −2.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$232M

'27$104M

'28$511M

'29$145M

'30$636M

later$593M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$232Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$336Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$636Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$2.2Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$653M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$777M

Together, against $232M due next year6.2×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.4B against the $232M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 6.2 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$256M · 4%
Buybacks$1.9B · 33%
Retained (debt / cash)$3.6B · 62%

Returned to owners$1.9B
35% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.9B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$30.76
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 62M shares were bought for $1.9B, about $30.76 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $16.28 (2018) to $61.98 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $59.05 ($381M).
Net change in share count−19.3%
The diluted count fell from 121M to 98M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained9%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($3.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $285M, so each retained $1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Sheryl D. Palmer	$12.1M	$17.7M	$355M
2022	Sheryl D. Palmer	$8.8M	$6.9M	$1.1B
2023	Sheryl D. Palmer	$14.4M	$25.0M	$773M
2024	Sheryl D. Palmer	$15.4M	$23.9M	$174M
2025	Sheryl D. Palmer	$10.1M	$13.3M	$777M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$29M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Taylor Morrison Home Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Homebuilders

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PHMPulteGroup Inc.	$17.3B	—	16.3%	19%	9%
TOLToll Brothers Inc.	$11.0B	22%	11.6%	13%	9%
NVRNVR Inc.	$10.3B	—	16.0%	76%	12%
TMHCTaylor Morrison Home Corporation	$8.1B	20%	9.1%	8%	10%
KBHKB Home	$6.2B	—	8.8%	15%	5%
MHOM/I Homes Inc.	$4.4B	23%	11.0%	20%	3%
DFHDream Finders Homes Inc.	$4.3B	16%	7.8%	41%	3%
CCSCentury Communities Inc.	$4.1B	—	7.9%	6%	-1%
Group median	—	21%	10.0%	17%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Taylor Morrison Home Corporation has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Taylor Morrison Home Corporation earns about $789M on its 9.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($789M) Net of stock comp (−$28M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−10%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $688M on 93M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $1.7B. The if-converted diluted count is 98M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TMHC against another business →

The owners of TMHC: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Taylor Morrison Home Corporation (TMHC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TMHC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TMDX its page in the Manual TMO →

Industry order: ← SPHL the Homebuilders chapter TOL →