Share count
258Mpeak FY2019
← All companies ← LEGH Manual LESL → ← LEGH Homebuilders LGIH →
LEN, Lennar Corporation
Homebuilders capital-intensive
Lennar is among the largest US homebuilders, controlling land, developing lots, building houses, and selling them to buyers across many states, with a financial-services arm that writes mortgages and title for those same buyers. It earns the spread between the sale price of a finished home and the cost of the land, materials, and labor that went into it.
We are one of the largest homebuilders in the United States by deliveries, revenues and net earnings, an originator of residential and commercial mortgage loans, a provider of title insurance and closing services and a developer of multifamily rental properties.
During the 1980s and 1990s, we entered and expanded operations in a number of homebuilding markets, including California, Florida and Texas, through both organic growth and acquisitions, such as Pacific Greystone Corporation in 1997.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$34.2B
−3.5% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $32.7B 5-yr avg $32.9B
Revenue $7.9B −5.2% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $308M yr-ago $482M
Net margin 3.9% yr-ago 5.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by West (35%) and Central (23%), with 4 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- The economics are the industry's: a near-commodity product where buyers shop the payment, demand rides the housing cycle and mortgage rates, and capital can lie dead in land. Lennar's distinguishing lever is how it holds that land. Optioning lots rather than owning years of inventory shifts the carrying cost and the cycle risk onto a third party for a fee, trading some of the gain on land it no longer banks for a lighter balance sheet when buyers step back. Whether that land-light posture earns its keep shows only across a full cycle, when the option to walk away from lots is worth most. Weigh the returns and the share of lots owned versus optioned, in fat years and lean ones, in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 segments, the largest West at 35%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- West35%$11.9B
- Central23%$7.8B
- East20%$7.0B
- South Central16%$5.6B
- Financial Services4%$1.2B
- Multifamily2%$681M
- Other0%$68M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $10.9B | $12.6B | $20.6B | $22.3B | $22.5B | $27.1B | $33.7B | $34.2B | $35.4B | $34.2B | $32.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 2% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | — | 7% | 7% | 8% | 8% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $1.6B | $1.5B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $3.5B | $5.1B | $6.0B | $5.4B | $4.8B | $2.7B | $3.5B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 14.3% | 11.7% | 12.0% | 12.5% | 15.5% | 18.7% | 17.8% | 15.7% | 13.5% | 7.8% | 10.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $912M | $810M | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.5B | $4.4B | $4.6B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $2.1B | $1.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 31% | 34% | 24% | 24% | 21% | 24% | 23% | 24% | 24% | 25% | 25% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $508M | $982M | $1.7B | $1.5B | $4.2B | $2.5B | $3.3B | $5.2B | $2.4B | $217M | $883M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $50M | $66M | $91M | $92M | $95M | $86M | $87M | $110M | $116M | $134M | $138M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($510M) | $44M | ($168M) | ($546M) | $1.5B | ($2.1B) | ($1.6B) | $970M | ($1.8B) | ($2.2B) | ($1.0B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $76M | $112M | $130M | $86M | $73M | $65M | $57M | $100M | $172M | $189M | $166M | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 0.9% | 0.6% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $458M | $916M | $1.6B | $1.4B | $4.1B | $2.5B | $3.2B | $5.1B | $2.3B | $83M | $717M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 4.2% | 7.2% | 7.8% | 6.3% | 18.3% | 9.1% | 9.5% | 14.8% | 6.5% | 0.2% | 2.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $431M | $871M | $1.6B | $1.4B | $4.1B | $2.5B | $3.2B | $5.1B | $2.2B | $28M | $717M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.9% | 6.9% | 7.6% | 6.3% | 18.3% | 9.1% | 9.5% | 14.8% | 6.3% | 0.1% | 2.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $725K | $604M | $1.1B | $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | $0 | $254M | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $35M | $38M | $49M | $51M | $195M | $310M | $438M | $431M | $549M | $521M | $502M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $20M | $27M | $300M | $523M | $322M | $1.4B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $2.3B | $1.8B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 19% | 19% | 14% | 9% | 12% | 22% | 24% | 20% | 13% | 8% | — | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 10% | 12% | 12% | 14% | 21% | 19% | 15% | 14% | 9% | 7% | Return on equityROE |
| 12% | 10% | 11% | 11% | 13% | 20% | 17% | 13% | 12% | 7% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.3B | $2.7B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $4.8B | $6.6B | $4.9B | $3.8B | $2.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | — | $907M | $938M | — | — | — | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | $907M | $938M | — | — | — | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.5B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | — | — | $3.7B | $3.6B | — | — | — | $3.6B | $3.6B | $3.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $15.4B | $18.7B | $28.6B | $29.4B | $29.9B | $33.2B | $38.0B | $39.2B | $41.3B | $34.4B | $33.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $9.6B | $7.4B | — | — | — | $4.2B | $5.9B | $8.9B | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | $8.1B | $4.6B | — | — | — | ($720M) | $2.1B | $6.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $7.0B | $7.9B | $14.6B | $15.9B | $18.0B | $20.8B | $24.1B | $26.6B | $27.9B | $22.0B | $21.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 235M | 237M | 309M | 318M | 309M | 307M | 290M | 283M | 272M | 258M | 243M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $46.52 | $53.33 | $66.67 | $69.91 | $72.68 | $88.49 | $116.18 | $120.83 | $130.29 | $132.64 | $134.94 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $3.87 | $3.42 | $5.50 | $5.81 | $7.97 | $14.45 | $15.92 | $13.90 | $14.46 | $8.06 | $6.66 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.94 | $3.86 | $5.19 | $4.38 | $13.31 | $8.05 | $11.07 | $17.93 | $8.41 | $0.32 | $2.95 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.83 | $3.67 | $5.06 | $4.38 | $13.31 | $8.05 | $11.07 | $17.93 | $8.20 | $0.11 | $2.95 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.15 | $0.16 | $0.16 | $0.16 | $0.63 | $1.01 | $1.51 | $1.52 | $2.02 | $2.02 | $2.07 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.32 | $0.47 | $0.42 | $0.27 | $0.24 | $0.21 | $0.20 | $0.35 | $0.63 | $0.73 | $0.69 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $29.85 | $33.19 | $47.26 | $50.09 | $58.16 | $67.89 | $83.16 | $93.82 | $102.46 | $85.20 | $89.12 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.3%/yr | +12.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −18.2%/yr | −52.6%/yr |
| EPS | +8.5%/yr | +0.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +33.5%/yr | +26.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +9.4%/yr | +25.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +12.4%/yr | +7.9%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue-3.5%
“Revenues were lower primarily due to a 8% decrease in the average sales price of homes delivered, partially offset by a 3% increase in the number of home deliveries.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
8%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
25.7×peak FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$83Mowner earningsvs.$2.1Bnet incomelow FY2025
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $83M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $134M it takes just to hold its position. It put $54M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $28M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $2.1B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $4.6B | $4.4B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$134M | +$116M | +$110M | +$87M | +$86M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$163M | +$177M | +$161M | +$184M | +$135M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$2.2B | −$1.8B | +$970M | −$1.6B | −$2.1B |
| Cash from operations | $217M | $2.4B | $5.2B | $3.3B | $2.5B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$134M | −$116M | −$100M | −$57M | −$65M |
| Owner earnings | $83M | $2.3B | $5.1B | $3.2B | $2.5B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$54M | −$56M | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $28M | $2.2B | $5.1B | $3.2B | $2.5B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 0% | 6% | 15% | 10% | 9% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $134M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $54M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $163M), owner earnings is nearer ($81M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 752.7×ComfortableOperating income $3.5B ÷ interest expense $5M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 0.6× operating profitModest net debtCash $3.8B − debt $5.9B
What this means
Netting $3.8B of cash and short-term investments against $5.9B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 0.6× a year's operating profit (1.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 8%–24%; 11% latest = NOPAT $2.6B ÷ invested capital $24.1BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–18%; latest $83M = operating cash $217M − maintenance capex $134MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $163M of SBC) leaves ($81M).
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops $217M ÷ net income $2.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $2.3B ÷ Owner Earnings $83M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $83M of Owner Earnings, $2.3B (2823%) went back to shareholders, $521M dividends, $1.8B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $163M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.6B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.40×ExpandingCapex $189M ÷ depreciation $134M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $34.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +191%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $13.67/share (latest year $8.57), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $90.51/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 13% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 13% early, 12% lately, median 13%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 7.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +1.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $22.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.1B · 5%
- Dividends$2.6B · 12%
- Buybacks$8.9B · 40%
- Retained (debt / cash)$9.9B · 44%
- Returned to owners$11.5B
53% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.6B as dividends and $8.9B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$52.08
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 16M shares were bought for $823M, about $52.08 each.
- Net change in share count3.1%
The diluted count rose from 235M to 243M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$2.02/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 33% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($15.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $1.5B, so each retained $1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$163M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Lennar Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3.1%
Diluted shares grew 3.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $8.9B on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.84×
Across the record the business reported $26.7B of net income but generated $22.5B of operating cash, a 0.84-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Homebuilders
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DHID.R. Horton Inc. | $34.3B | 24% | 14.2% | 16% | 5% |
| LENLennar Corporation | $34.2B | — | 13.9% | 16% | 8% |
| PHMPulteGroup Inc. | $17.3B | — | 16.3% | 19% | 9% |
| TOLToll Brothers Inc. | $11.0B | 22% | 11.6% | 13% | 9% |
| NVRNVR Inc. | $10.3B | — | 16.0% | 76% | 12% |
| TMHCTaylor Morrison Home Corporation | $8.1B | 20% | 9.1% | 8% | 10% |
| IBPInstalled Building Products | $3.0B | 30% | 9.7% | 17% | 7% |
| GEOGeo Group Inc (The) REIT | $2.6B | — | 12.2% | 8% | 8% |
| Group median | — | — | 13.0% | 16% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lennar Corporation has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Lennar Corporation earns about $2.6B on its 7.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−20%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $717M on 243M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $6.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($166M) runs well above depreciation ($138M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $749M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lennar Corporation (LEN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LEN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← LEGH its page in the Manual LESL →
Industry order: ← LEGH the Homebuilders chapter LGIH →