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MHO, M/I Homes Inc.
Homes, Inc. and subsidiaries is one of the nation's leading builders of single-family homes.
Consists of two distinct operations: homebuilding and financial services.
Our financial services operations support our homebuilding operations by providing mortgage loans and title services to the customers of our homebuilding operations and are reported as an independent segment.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 20%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 regions, the largest Southern Homebuilding at 54%.
- Southern Homebuilding54%$2.4B
- Northern Homebuilding43%$1.9B
- Financial Service3%$125M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $3.0B | $3.7B | $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.5B | $4.4B | $4.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | 20% | 20% | 20% | 22% | 24% | 25% | 25% | 27% | 23% | 22% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $109M | $139M | $163M | $187M | $319M | $518M | $637M | $587M | $706M | $507M | $452M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.4% | 7.1% | 7.1% | 7.5% | 10.5% | 13.8% | 15.4% | 14.6% | 15.7% | 11.5% | 10.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $57M | $72M | $108M | $128M | $240M | $397M | $491M | $465M | $564M | $403M | $360M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 38% | 40% | 24% | 23% | 23% | 22% | 23% | 23% | 23% | 23% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $34M | ($53M) | ($3M) | $66M | $168M | ($17M) | $184M | $552M | $180M | $137M | $208M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $14M | $14M | $15M | $16M | $18M | $17M | $17M | $16M | $17M | $19M | $19M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($41M) | ($145M) | ($131M) | ($84M) | ($96M) | ($439M) | ($333M) | $60M | ($416M) | ($301M) | ($188M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $13M | $9M | $8M | $5M | $12M | $25M | $9M | $6M | $8M | $10M | $8M | CapexCapex |
| 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $21M | ($62M) | ($11M) | $61M | $157M | ($34M) | $175M | $546M | $171M | $128M | $200M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.2% | −3.2% | −0.5% | 2.4% | 5.1% | −0.9% | 4.2% | 13.5% | 3.8% | 2.9% | 4.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $21M | ($62M) | ($11M) | $61M | $157M | ($42M) | $175M | $546M | $171M | $128M | $200M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.2% | −3.2% | −0.5% | 2.4% | 5.1% | −1.1% | 4.2% | 13.5% | 3.8% | 2.9% | 4.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $101M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $5M | $4M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $0 | $26M | $5M | $2M | $52M | $55M | $65M | $177M | $202M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 7% | 14% | 15% | 14% | 25% | 29% | 28% | 25% | 26% | 16% | 13% | ROICROIC |
| 9% | 10% | 13% | 13% | 19% | 24% | 24% | 18% | 19% | 13% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 8% | 9% | 13% | 13% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $34M | $152M | $22M | $6M | $261M | $236M | $312M | $733M | $822M | $689M | $767M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $0 | $16M | $16M | $16M | $16M | $16M | $16M | $16M | $16M | $16M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.7B | $4.0B | $4.5B | $4.8B | $4.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $296M | $261K | $2M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $296M | Total debtDebt |
| $261M | ($151M) | ($19M) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | ($471M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 6.2× | 7.3× | 8.0× | 8.8× | 33.0× | 240.4× | 283.3× | — | — | — | — | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $654M | $747M | $855M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 30.1M | 30.7M | 29.2M | 28.5M | 29.2M | 29.9M | 28.5M | 28.7M | 28.6M | 27.3M | 26.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $56.16 | $63.93 | $78.36 | $87.81 | $104.49 | $125.36 | $145.15 | $140.46 | $157.51 | $161.60 | $164.23 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.88 | $2.35 | $3.69 | $4.48 | $8.23 | $13.28 | $17.24 | $16.21 | $19.71 | $14.74 | $13.54 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.70 | $-2.02 | $-0.37 | $2.15 | $5.37 | $-1.13 | $6.14 | $19.03 | $5.99 | $4.67 | $7.52 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.70 | $-2.02 | $-0.37 | $2.15 | $5.37 | $-1.41 | $6.14 | $19.03 | $5.99 | $4.67 | $7.52 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.16 | $0.12 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.44 | $0.29 | $0.28 | $0.16 | $0.40 | $0.85 | $0.33 | $0.20 | $0.29 | $0.35 | $0.32 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $21.72 | $24.35 | $29.31 | $35.24 | $43.18 | $54.36 | $72.75 | $87.65 | $102.79 | $115.82 | $120.18 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.5%/yr | +9.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +23.5%/yr | −2.8%/yr |
| EPS | +25.7%/yr | +12.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −2.3%/yr | −2.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +20.4%/yr | +21.8%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue-1.9%
“Our revenue decreased 2% due to 1% decreases in both our homes delivered and average sales price in 2025 compared to 2024.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $403M of profit but $128M of owner earnings: $275M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $403M | $564M | $465M | $491M | $397M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$19M | +$17M | +$16M | +$17M | +$17M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$17M | +$15M | +$11M | +$9M | +$9M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$301M | −$416M | +$60M | −$333M | −$439M |
| Cash from operations | $137M | $180M | $552M | $184M | ($17M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$10M | −$8M | −$6M | −$9M | −$17M |
| Owner earnings | $128M | $171M | $546M | $175M | ($34M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | — | −$8M |
| Free cash flow | $128M | $171M | $546M | $175M | ($42M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 4% | 14% | 4% | -1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $111M.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $689M − debt $296M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $394M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 7%–29%; 14% latest = NOPAT $388M ÷ invested capital $2.8BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $128M = operating cash $137M − maintenance capex $10M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)Industry peers: median 4%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves $111M.
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops $137M ÷ net income $403M
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 6% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $202M ÷ Owner Earnings $128M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $128M of Owner Earnings, $202M (158%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $202M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $17M stock comp, the real buyback was about $185M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.51×HarvestingCapex $10M ÷ depreciation $19M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +506%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $18.65/share (latest year $15.75), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $123.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 14% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2016 · 6.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$105M · 8%
- Dividends$9M · 1%
- Buybacks$584M · 47%
- Retained (debt / cash)$552M · 44%
- Returned to owners$592M
51% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $9M as dividends and $584M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $552K and cash and short-term investments rose $733M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$85.01
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $584M, about $85.01 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $19.12 (2020) to $147.46 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $126.27 ($202M).
- Net change in share count−11.8%
The diluted count fell from 30M to 27M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained13%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $299M, so each retained $1 added about 0.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Robert H. Schottenstein | $7.4M | $13.2M | ($34M) |
| 2022 | Robert H. Schottenstein | $8.2M | $4.8M | $175M |
| 2023 | Robert H. Schottenstein | $9.2M | $43.4M | $546M |
| 2024 | Robert H. Schottenstein | $10.9M | $8.2M | $171M |
| 2025 | Robert H. Schottenstein | $9.9M | $4.6M | $128M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership3.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio82:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$17M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why M/I Homes Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.43×
Across the record the business reported $2.9B of net income but generated $1.2B of operating cash, a 0.43-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $117M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Homebuilders
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TMHCTaylor Morrison Home Corporation | $8.1B | 20% | 9.1% | 8% | 10% |
| KBHKB Home | $6.2B | — | 8.8% | 15% | 5% |
| MHOM/I Homes Inc. | $4.4B | 23% | 11.0% | 20% | 3% |
| DFHDream Finders Homes Inc. | $4.3B | 16% | 7.8% | 41% | 3% |
| CCSCentury Communities Inc. | $4.1B | — | 7.9% | 6% | -1% |
| ECGEverus Construction Group Inc. | $3.7B | 12% | 6.7% | 29% | 4% |
| HOVHovnanian Enterprises Inc. | $3.0B | — | 1.8% | 3% | 7% |
| BZHBeazer Homes USA Inc. | $2.4B | 16% | 3.9% | 5% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 16% | 7.8% | 11% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what M/I Homes Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, M/I Homes Inc. earns about $118M on its 2.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $200M on 26M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net cash $471M. The if-converted diluted count is 27M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← MHNC its page in the Manual MIAX →
Industry order: ← LGIH the Homebuilders chapter NVR →