Share count
186Mpeak FY2022
← All companies ← DIN Manual DIOD → ← CVX Refining & Marketing DK →
DINO, HF Sinclair
We provide petroleum product and crude oil transportation, terminalling, storage and throughput services to our refineries and the petroleum industry.
In the Refining segment, we saw improved refining margins in the Mid-Continent and West regions in 2025.
In the Renewables segment, we saw lower volumes and margins.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$26.9B
−6.0% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $27.6B 5-yr avg $28.8B
Revenue $7.1B +11.8% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 11.9% yr-ago 1.3%
Net income $650M yr-ago ($2M)
Net margin 9.1% yr-ago −0.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Refining (76%) and Marketing (12%), with 2 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 18% and operating margin about 3.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −6.6% and 11% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on throughput and the contracts behind it. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Refining is 76% of revenue, with Marketing the other meaningful segment at 12%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Refining76%$20.5B
- Marketing12%$3.1B
- Lubricants & Specialties9%$2.5B
- Renewables2%$551M
- Midstream0%$121M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $11.2B | $18.4B | $38.2B | $32.0B | $28.6B | $26.9B | $27.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 18% | 15% | 20% | 19% | — | — | 7% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 3% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($734M) | $749M | $4.1B | $2.2B | $261M | $927M | $1.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −6.6% | 4.1% | 10.6% | 6.9% | 0.9% | 3.5% | 6.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($601M) | $558M | $2.9B | $1.6B | $177M | $579M | $1.2B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 18% | 23% | 22% | 16% | 20% | 21% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $458M | $407M | $3.8B | $2.3B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $521M | $504M | $657M | $771M | $832M | $909M | $913M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $507M | ($694M) | $166M | ($105M) | $78M | ($206M) | ($318M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $271M | $725M | $524M | $385M | $470M | $449M | $465M | CapexCapex |
| 2.4% | 3.9% | 1.4% | 1.2% | 1.6% | 1.7% | 1.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $187M | ($97M) | $3.3B | $1.9B | $640M | $866M | $1.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.7% | −0.5% | 8.5% | 6.0% | 2.2% | 3.2% | 5.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $187M | ($318M) | $3.3B | $1.9B | $640M | $866M | $1.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.7% | −1.7% | 8.5% | 6.0% | 2.2% | 3.2% | 5.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $624M | $251M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $229M | $58M | $256M | $341M | $386M | $376M | $372M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $8M | $7M | $1.4B | $999M | $672M | $354M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 7% | 29% | 15% | 2% | 7% | 11% | ROICROIC |
| -11% | 10% | 32% | 16% | 2% | 6% | 13% | Return on equityROE |
| −15% | 9% | 29% | 12% | −2% | 2% | 9% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $1.4B | $234M | $1.7B | $1.4B | $800M | $978M | $1.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $2.1B | $3.2B | $2.9B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $3.3B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $1.6B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $1.9B | $2.7B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.5B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $3.8B | $6.7B | $6.1B | $5.0B | $4.8B | $6.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $2.1B | $3.2B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $2.5B | $3.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.8× | 2.1× | 2.2× | 1.6× | 1.9× | 1.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $2.3B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $12.9B | $18.1B | $17.7B | $16.6B | $16.5B | $18.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $3.1B | $3.3B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.3B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $2.8B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -5.8× | 6.0× | 23.1× | 11.5× | 1.6× | 4.3× | 8.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $5.7B | $5.7B | $9.2B | $10.2B | $9.3B | $9.2B | $9.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 162M | 163M | 203M | 190M | 192M | 186M | 181M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $69.04 | $113.12 | $188.61 | $168.20 | $148.80 | $144.10 | $152.90 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-3.71 | $3.43 | $14.43 | $8.37 | $0.92 | $3.11 | $6.81 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.15 | $-0.60 | $16.06 | $10.06 | $3.33 | $4.64 | $7.73 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.15 | $-1.96 | $16.06 | $10.06 | $3.33 | $4.64 | $7.73 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.42 | $0.35 | $1.26 | $1.79 | $2.01 | $2.02 | $2.06 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.67 | $4.46 | $2.59 | $2.03 | $2.45 | $2.41 | $2.57 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $35.33 | $34.99 | $45.63 | $53.51 | $48.30 | $49.25 | $53.49 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +15.9%/yr | +15.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +32.1%/yr | +32.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +7.3%/yr | +7.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +7.6%/yr | +7.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.9%/yr | +6.9%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue-6.0%
“Sales and Other Revenues Sales and other revenues decreased 6% from $28,580 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 to $26,869 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, principally due to decreased refined product sales prices.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
7%low FY2024
Gross margin
19%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.1×peak FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$866Mowner earningsvs.$579Mnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2020FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $579M of profit into $866M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $579M | $177M | $1.6B | $2.9B | $558M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$909M | +$832M | +$771M | +$657M | +$504M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$33M | +$23M | +$41M | +$31M | +$39M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$206M | +$78M | −$105M | +$166M | −$694M |
| Cash from operations | $1.3B | $1.1B | $2.3B | $3.8B | $407M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$449M | −$470M | −$385M | −$524M | −$504M |
| Owner earnings | $866M | $640M | $1.9B | $3.3B | ($97M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | — | −$222M |
| Free cash flow | $866M | $640M | $1.9B | $3.3B | ($318M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 2% | 6% | 9% | -1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $33M), owner earnings is nearer $833M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $927M ÷ interest expense $217M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.8B · 1.9× operating profitModest net debtCash $978M − debt $2.8B
What this means
Netting $978M of cash and short-term investments against $2.8B of debt leaves $1.8B owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (3.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 15 + DIO 36 − DPO 27 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range 2%–29%; 7% latest = NOPAT $740M ÷ invested capital $11.0B
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $866M = operating cash $1.3B − maintenance capex $449M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (6-yr median 2%)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $33M of SBC) leaves $833M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $579M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $730M ÷ Owner Earnings $866M
What this means
Of $866M Owner Earnings, $730M (84%) went back to shareholders, $376M dividends, $354M buybacks. Net of $33M stock comp, the real buyback was about $321M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.49×HarvestingCapex $449M ÷ depreciation $909M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $26.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.94×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $2.8B vs $2.3B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (6-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (6)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −19%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.34/share (latest year $3.21), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $50.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 4% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +76%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 76% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −6.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$6.4B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
- Receivables$1.9B
- Inventory$3.3B
- Other current assets$129M
Current liabilities$3.6B
- Accounts payable$2.7B
- Other current liabilities$908M
Current ratio1.79×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.88×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.32×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.8Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 1.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$6.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.2B$397M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.2B (annual-report basis)
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$500Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$2.8Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$118Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$609Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$463Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$2.8B
Lease obligations (present value)$463M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.2B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.2B, of which the leases are 14%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2020–2025
Over the record, the business generated $9.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2.8B · 30%
- Dividends$1.6B · 18%
- Buybacks$3.4B · 36%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.5B · 16%
- Returned to owners$5.1B
75% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.6B as dividends and $3.4B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$53.62
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 63M shares were bought for $3.4B, about $53.62 each.
- Net change in share count11.5%
The diluted count rose from 162M to 181M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$2.02/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$3.3B20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity32%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$875Mover 6 years buying other businesses, against $2.8B of capital spent building
$545M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 62% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Jennings | $11.5M | $13.1M | ($97M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Jennings | $13.8M | $21.8M | $3.3B |
| 2023 | Michael C. Jennings | $24.2M | $1.7M | $1.9B |
| 2023 | Mr. Go | $15.5M | $18.6M | $1.9B |
| 2024 | Timothy Go | $12.8M | $5.0M | $640M |
| 2025 | Mr. Go | $14.3M | $19.2M | $866M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- CEO pay ratio82:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$33M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why HF Sinclair is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.5%
Diluted shares grew 11.5% over 2020–2025, even as the company spent $3.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Refining & Marketing
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PAAPlains All American Pipeline L.P. Common | $44.3B | 10% | 2.9% | — | 5% |
| PAGPPlains GP Holdings L.P. Class A | $44.3B | 10% | 2.9% | — | 5% |
| DINOHF Sinclair | $26.9B | 19% | 3.8% | 7% | 3% |
| MPLXMPLX LP Common | $9.7B | — | 40.3% | 18% | 47% |
| GELGenesis Energy | $1.6B | — | 10.9% | — | 3% |
| DKLDelek Logistics Partners L.P. Common | $1.0B | 25% | 20.9% | — | 17% |
| Group median | — | 15% | 7.3% | — | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what HF Sinclair has delivered.
HF Sinclair’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, HF Sinclair earns about $734M on its 2.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022−36%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+76%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $1.4B on 180M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $2.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "HF Sinclair (DINO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DINO, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← DIN its page in the Manual DIOD →
Industry order: ← CVX the Refining & Marketing chapter DK →