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DKL, Delek Logistics Partners L.P. Common

Pipelines & Midstream capital-intensive Capital build-out

Revenue is Gathering and Processing (49%), Wholesale Marketing and Terminalling (41%) and Storage and Transportation (10%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

DKL · Delek Logistics Partners L.P. Common

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.0B

+7.7% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $942M

Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 26%

Operating margin 16.4% 5-yr avg 22.1%

Owner-earnings margin 23% 5-yr avg 17%

Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: A midstream energy business, paid to move and store hydrocarbons under contract.
Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 26% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 24% and operating margin about 20% through the cycle, a thin spread, but one where almost nothing separates the gross and operating lines — the mark of cost-plus or fixed-price program work, so the contract structure and the order book set the result more than unit volume against a price. Read this kind of business on throughput and the contracts behind it. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Gathering and Processing at 49%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Gathering and Processing49%$498M
Wholesale Marketing and Terminalling41%$418M
Storage and Transportation10%$98M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$448M	$538M	$658M	$584M	$563M	$701M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$941M	$1.0B	$1.1B	RevenueRevenue
21%	20%	23%	26%	37%	31%	24%	28%	26%	21%	20%	Gross marginGross mgn
2%	2%	3%	4%	4%	3%	3%	2%	4%	3%	2%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$78M	$88M	$126M	$126M	$180M	$191M	$210M	$239M	$203M	$182M	$174M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
17.3%	16.4%	19.1%	21.5%	31.9%	27.2%	20.2%	23.4%	21.6%	17.9%	16.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$63M	$69M	$90M	$97M	$159M	$165M	$159M	$126M	$143M	$176M	$170M	Net incomeNet inc.
0%	-0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$101M	$91M	$153M	$130M	$193M	$275M	$192M	$225M	$206M	$237M	$376M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$21M	$22M	$26M	$27M	$36M	$43M	$63M	$92M	$96M	$126M	$134M	DepreciationDeprec.
$16M	($721K)	$36M	$5M	($3M)	$66M	($33M)	$4M	($33M)	($65M)	$68M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$11M	$18M	$13M	$9M	$13M	$23M	$141M	$96M	$129M	$268M	$261M	CapexCapex
2.5%	3.4%	2.0%	1.6%	2.4%	3.3%	13.6%	9.4%	13.7%	26.4%	24.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$89M	$73M	$140M	$121M	$180M	$252M	$129M	$129M	$110M	$112M	$242M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
20.0%	13.6%	21.3%	20.8%	31.9%	36.0%	12.5%	12.7%	11.7%	11.0%	22.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$89M	$73M	$140M	$121M	$180M	$252M	$51M	$129M	$77M	($31M)	$115M	Free cash flowFCF
20.0%	13.6%	21.3%	20.8%	31.9%	36.0%	4.9%	12.7%	8.2%	−3.0%	10.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	—	—	—	$0	$0	$626M	$0	$183M	$181M	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$10M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
											Balance sheet
$59K	$5M	$5M	$6M	$4M	$4M	$8M	$4M	$5M	$11M	$10M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$19M	$23M	$22M	$13M	$16M	$15M	$53M	—	—	—	$61M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$9M	$21M	$5M	$13M	$3M	$2M	$1M	$2M	$5M	$18M	$21M	InventoryInvent.
$11M	$19M	$14M	$12M	$7M	$8M	$57M	$26M	$41M	$293M	$509M	Accounts payablePayables
$17M	$25M	$13M	$13M	$12M	$10M	($3M)	($24M)	($36M)	($275M)	($427M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$32M	$50M	$33M	$34M	$29M	$23M	$65M	$76M	$146M	$401M	$536M	Current assetsCur. assets
$21M	$32M	$37M	$35M	$28M	$97M	$106M	$91M	$89M	$356M	$561M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×	1.6×	0.9×	1.0×	1.0×	0.2×	0.6×	0.8×	1.6×	1.1×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$12M	$12M	$12M	$12M	$12M	$12M	$27M	$12M	$12M	$12M	$12M	GoodwillGoodwill
$416M	$444M	$625M	$744M	$956M	$935M	$1.7B	$1.6B	$2.0B	$2.8B	$2.9B	Total assetsAssets
$393M	$423M	$700M	$833M	$992M	$899M	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$2.3B	Total debtDebt
$393M	$418M	$696M	$828M	$988M	$895M	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$2.3B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
5.7×	3.7×	3.0×	2.7×	4.2×	3.8×	2.5×	1.7×	1.3×	1.0×	0.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	—	—	0.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
—	24.4M	24.4M	24.4M	33.6M	43.5M	43.5M	43.6M	47.5M	53.6M	53.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	$22.07	$26.95	$23.92	$16.77	$16.13	$23.82	$23.40	$19.81	$18.92	$19.79	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	$2.85	$3.70	$3.96	$4.74	$3.79	$3.66	$2.89	$3.01	$3.30	$3.17	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	$3.00	$5.74	$4.97	$5.35	$5.80	$2.97	$2.96	$2.32	$2.08	$4.51	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	$3.00	$5.74	$4.97	$5.35	$5.80	$1.17	$2.96	$1.63	$-0.57	$2.15	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	$0.75	$0.53	$0.37	$0.40	$0.53	$3.24	$2.20	$2.72	$5.00	$4.87	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−1.9%/yr (8-yr)	+2.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−4.4%/yr (8-yr)	−17.2%/yr
EPS	+1.8%/yr (8-yr)	−7.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	+26.8%/yr (8-yr)	+66.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

54Mpeak FY2025

Gross margin

21%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

20.9×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$112Mowner earningsvs.$176Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $112M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $126M it takes just to hold its position. It put $142M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($31M).

Reported net income$176M

Owner earnings$112M · 11% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$176M	$143M	$126M	$159M	$165M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$126M	+$96M	+$92M	+$63M	+$43M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	—	—	+$3M	+$3M	+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$65M	−$33M	+$4M	−$33M	+$66M
Cash from operations	$237M	$206M	$225M	$192M	$275M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$126M	−$96M	−$96M	−$63M	−$23M
Owner earnings	$112M	$110M	$129M	$129M	$252M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$142M	−$33M	—	−$78M	—
Free cash flow	($31M)	$77M	$129M	$51M	$252M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	11%	12%	13%	12%	36%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $126M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $142M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.0×

Thin

Operating income $182M ÷ interest expense $179M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.3B · 12.8× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $11M − debt $2.3B

What this means
Netting $11M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $2.3B owed, about 12.8× a year's operating profit (12.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -107d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 19 + DIO 8 − DPO 134 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 14%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 11%–36%; latest $112M = operating cash $237M − maintenance capex $126M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. It chose to put $142M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($31M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $109M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.34×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $237M ÷ net income $176M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 9%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $10M ÷ Owner Earnings $112M

What this means
Of $112M Owner Earnings, $10M (9%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $10M buybacks. Net of $3M stock comp, the real buyback was about $7M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.13×

Expanding

Capex $268M ÷ depreciation $126M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.12×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs $44M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +100%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.79/share (latest year $3.32), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Operating margin 18% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 18% early to 21% lately, median 20% — pricing power intact or improving.
Owner earnings growth +4%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
Worst year 2017 · 16.4% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$536M

Cash & short-term investments$10M
Receivables$61M
Inventory$21M
Other current assets$445M

Current liabilities$561M

Accounts payable$509M
Other current liabilities$52M

Current ratio0.96×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.92×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($25M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+19.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Debt incl. operating leases$2.3B$6M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$722M · 40%
Buybacks$10M · 1%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 59%

Returned to owners$10M
1% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $10M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.9B and cash and short-term investments rose $10M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $10M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count119.9%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 54M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained1%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $16M, so each retained $1 added about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$383M14% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$989Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $722M of capital spent building

$15M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Delek Logistics Partners L.P. Common is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?11.8% vs 18.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 18.3% early in the record and 11.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?119.9%
Diluted shares grew 119.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $10M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$393M → $2.3B
Debt rose from $393M to $2.3B while owner earnings went from about $101M to $117M — about 3.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 20 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pipelines & Midstream

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PAAPlains All American Pipeline L.P. Common	$44.3B	10%	2.9%	—	5%
PAGPPlains GP Holdings L.P. Class A	$44.3B	10%	2.9%	—	5%
DINOHF Sinclair	$26.9B	19%	3.8%	7%	3%
MPLXMPLX LP Common	$9.7B	—	40.3%	18%	47%
GELGenesis Energy	$1.6B	—	10.9%	—	3%
DKLDelek Logistics Partners L.P. Common	$1.0B	25%	20.9%	—	17%
Group median	—	15%	7.3%	—	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Delek Logistics Partners L.P. Common has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Delek Logistics Partners L.P. Common earns about $170M on its 16.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($170M) Net of stock comp (−$3M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($250M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−13%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−13%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $115M on 53M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $2.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($261M) runs well above depreciation ($134M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $250M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh DKL against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Delek Logistics Partners L.P. Common (DKL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DKL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DK its page in the Manual DKNG →

Industry order: ← AM the Pipelines & Midstream chapter DTM →