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DK, Delek US Holdings

Refining & Marketing capital-intensive UnprofitableCyclical

Our refining system produces a variety of petroleum-based products used in transportation and industrial markets, which are sold to a wide range of customers located principally in inland, domestic markets and which comply with current EPA clean fuels standards.

Wink to Webster Pipeline LLC $18.6 million September 2024 Sold 100% of the equity interests in four of Delek US' wholly-owned subsidiaries that owned and operated 249 retail fuel and convenience stores (the "Retail Stores") under the Delek US Retail brand to a subsidiary of Fomento Econ mico Mexicano, S.A.B. de C.V.

Under the terms of the Retail Purchase Agreement, we sold 100% of the equity interests in four of Delek's wholly-owned subsidiaries that own and operate the Retail Stores under the Delek US Retail brand ("Retail Transaction").

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

DK · Delek US Holdings

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$10.7B

−9.5% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $10.7B 5-yr avg $13.9B

Gross margin 5% 5-yr avg 3%

Operating margin 2.3% 5-yr avg 0.4%

Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 3.3% and operating margin about 1.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −10% and 6.0% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$4.2B	$7.3B	$10.2B	$9.3B	$7.3B	$10.6B	$19.8B	$16.5B	$11.9B	$10.7B	$10.7B	RevenueRevenue
1%	6%	10%	10%	−4%	2%	4%	3%	−0%	6%	5%	Gross marginGross mgn
3%	2%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($49M)	$180M	$612M	$492M	($732M)	($35M)	$458M	$245M	($492M)	$301M	$248M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−1.2%	2.5%	6.0%	5.3%	−10.0%	−0.3%	2.3%	1.5%	−4.1%	2.8%	2.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($154M)	$289M	$340M	$311M	($611M)	($128M)	$257M	$20M	($560M)	($23M)	($51M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	23%	19%	—	—	18%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$248M	$320M	$560M	$575M	($283M)	$371M	$425M	$1.0B	($67M)	$536M	$1.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$116M	$153M	$199M	$194M	$268M	$265M	$275M	$340M	$375M	$398M	$400M	DepreciationDeprec.
$269M	($140M)	($600K)	$45M	$38M	$211M	($136M)	$627M	$85M	$74M	$624M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$46M	$172M	$322M	$413M	$269M	$222M	$280M	$393M	$428M	$530M	$582M	CapexCapex
1.1%	2.4%	3.1%	4.4%	3.7%	2.1%	1.4%	2.4%	3.6%	4.9%	5.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$202M	$148M	$361M	$381M	($552M)	$149M	$145M	$621M	($495M)	$138M	$660M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.8%	2.0%	3.5%	4.1%	−7.6%	1.4%	0.7%	3.8%	−4.2%	1.3%	6.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$202M	$148M	$238M	$162M	($552M)	$149M	$145M	$621M	($495M)	$6M	$478M	Free cash flowFCF
4.8%	2.0%	2.3%	1.7%	−7.6%	1.4%	0.7%	3.8%	−4.2%	0.1%	4.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$626M	$0	$183M	$181M	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$38M	$44M	$80M	$87M	$69M	$0	$43M	$60M	$64M	$62M	$62M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$6M	$25M	$365M	$178M	$2M	$0	$64M	$0	$0	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-3%	7%	19%	14%	-22%	-1%	11%	—	-15%	8%	—	ROICROIC
-13%	15%	19%	17%	-55%	-13%	24%	2%	-97%	-4%	-17%	Return on equityROE
−16%	12%	14%	12%	−61%	−13%	20%	−4%	−109%	−15%	−37%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$689M	$932M	$1.1B	$955M	$788M	$857M	$841M	$822M	$736M	$626M	$624M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$266M	$580M	$514M	$793M	$528M	$777M	$1.2B	$784M	$618M	$649M	$943M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$392M	$808M	$678M	$947M	$728M	$1.3B	$1.5B	$941M	$893M	$726M	$931M	InventoryInvent.
$495M	$973M	$1.0B	$1.6B	$1.1B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$2.3B	Accounts payablePayables
$164M	$415M	$181M	$140M	$112M	$342M	$1.0B	($89M)	($303M)	($259M)	($436M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.4B	$2.6B	$2.4B	$3.0B	$2.3B	$3.0B	$3.7B	$2.7B	$2.3B	$2.1B	$2.6B	Current assetsCur. assets
$935M	$2.7B	$1.7B	$2.4B	$1.9B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$2.7B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$3.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×	1.0×	1.5×	1.3×	1.2×	1.0×	1.2×	1.0×	0.9×	0.8×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$12M	$817M	$858M	$856M	$730M	$730M	$702M	$688M	$475M	$475M	$475M	GoodwillGoodwill
$3.0B	$5.9B	$5.8B	$7.0B	$6.1B	$6.8B	$8.2B	$7.2B	$6.7B	$6.8B	$7.6B	Total assetsAssets
$833M	$1.5B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$3.1B	$2.6B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$3.2B	Total debtDebt
$144M	$534M	$704M	$1.1B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$2.2B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.6B	$2.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.9×	1.9×	4.9×	3.8×	-5.7×	-1.9×	19.6×	4.0×	—	—	3.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.2B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$960M	$575M	$547M	$302M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.2%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.8%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	—	$126M	—	—	$15M	$212M	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
61.9M	72.3M	86.8M	76.6M	73.6M	74.0M	71.5M	65.4M	63.9M	60.7M	60.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$67.79	$100.51	$117.94	$121.43	$99.21	$143.93	$276.87	$251.77	$185.53	$176.64	$178.14	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.48	$3.99	$3.92	$4.06	$-8.31	$-1.73	$3.59	$0.30	$-8.77	$-0.38	$-0.85	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.26	$2.04	$4.16	$4.97	$-7.50	$2.02	$2.03	$9.50	$-7.74	$2.27	$10.95	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.26	$2.04	$2.75	$2.12	$-7.50	$2.02	$2.03	$9.50	$-7.74	$0.10	$7.93	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.61	$0.61	$0.92	$1.13	$0.94	$0.00	$0.60	$0.92	$1.00	$1.02	$1.02	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.75	$2.38	$3.71	$5.39	$3.66	$3.00	$3.92	$6.00	$6.70	$8.72	$9.65	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$19.10	$27.17	$20.84	$23.97	$15.17	$13.71	$14.95	$14.67	$9.00	$9.02	$5.01	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+11.2%/yr	+12.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−3.9%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+6.0%/yr	+1.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+31.4%/yr	+19.0%/yr
Book value / share	−8.0%/yr	−9.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue-9.5%
“Net Revenues 2025 vs. 2024 We generated net revenues of $10,722.9 million and $11,852.2 million during the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively, a decrease of $1,129.3 million, or 9.5%. The decrease in net revenues was primarily due to the following: •in our refining segment, decreases in the average price of U.S.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

61Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

8%low FY2020

Gross margin

6%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

18.9×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$138Mowner earningsvs.($23M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $138M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $398M it takes just to hold its position. It put $132M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $6M.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($23M)	($560M)	$20M	$257M	($128M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$398M	+$375M	+$340M	+$275M	+$265M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$87M	+$34M	+$28M	+$29M	+$25M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$74M	+$85M	+$627M	−$136M	+$211M
Cash from operations	$536M	($67M)	$1.0B	$425M	$371M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$398M	−$428M	−$393M	−$280M	−$222M
Owner earnings	$138M	($495M)	$621M	$145M	$149M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$132M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$6M	($495M)	$621M	$145M	$149M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	-4%	4%	1%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $398M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $132M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $87M), owner earnings is nearer $51M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 4.9×

Adequate

Operating income $301M ÷ interest expense $61M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.6B · 8.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $626M − debt $3.2B

What this means
Netting $626M of cash and short-term investments against $3.2B of debt leaves $2.6B owed, about 8.7× a year's operating profit (10.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -11d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 22 + DIO 26 − DPO 59 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 7%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -22%–19%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -8%–5%; latest $138M = operating cash $536M − maintenance capex $398M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. It chose to put $132M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $6M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $87M of SBC) leaves $51M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $536M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($23M) · cash from operations $536M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 45%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $62M ÷ Owner Earnings $138M

What this means
Of $138M Owner Earnings, $62M (45%) went back to shareholders, $62M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.33×

Expanding

Capex $530M ÷ depreciation $398M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $10.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.82×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.2B vs ($461M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Near

Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −219%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.06/share (latest year $-0.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.93/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
The recent-years average (0%) sits below the early years (2%), but the latest year (3%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 1% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −24%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2020 · −10.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.2%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.6B

Cash & short-term investments$624M
Receivables$943M
Inventory$931M
Other current assets$150M

Current liabilities$3.5B

Debt due within a year$10M
Accounts payable$2.3B
Other current liabilities$1.2B

Current ratio0.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.49×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.18×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($847M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$10M due · $624M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($578M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$3.3B$69M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$10M

'27$221M

'28$410M

'29$1.9B

'30$0

later$700M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$10Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$231Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$1.9Bin 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$3.3Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$624M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$138M

Together, against $10M due next year80.2×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $762M against the $10M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 80 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$3.1B · 83%
Dividends$547M · 15%
Buybacks$640M · 17%

Returned to owners$1.2B
108% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $547M as dividends and $640M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$562M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $562M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $833M to $3.2B.
Average price paid for buybacks$33.15
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 18M shares were bought for $609M, about $33.15 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $15.02 (2022) to $40.49 (2018), and 2018, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($365M).
Net change in share count−2.7%
The diluted count fell from 62M to 60M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.02/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$881M13% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity87%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $3.1B of capital spent building

$353M written down across 3 years (2020, 2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 30% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$8.7M	$410k	$149M
2022	$12.4M	$14.7M	$145M
2022	$6.3M	$5.4M	$145M
2023	$7.7M	$6.7M	$621M
2024	$6.7M	$4.8M	($495M)
2025	$7.7M	$19.6M	$138M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio59:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$87M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 29% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Delek US Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.3% vs 3.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.5% early in the record and 0.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$833M → $3.2B
Debt rose from $833M to $3.2B while owner earnings went from about $237M to $88M — about 3.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 36 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Refining & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PBFPBF Energy	$29.3B	4%	2.4%	9%	2%
SUNSunoco LP Common	$25.2B	8%	2.8%	—	2%
SUNCSunocoCorp LLC Common	$25.2B	9%	3.5%	—	2%
HESHess Corporation	$12.9B	—	2.9%	1%	-5%
DKDelek US Holdings	$10.7B	4%	1.9%	7%	2%
IEPIcahn Enterprises L.P.	$9.7B	—	-5.4%	2%	3%
CVICVR Energy Inc.	$7.2B	5%	2.5%	9%	3%
CLMTCalumet Inc.	$4.1B	7%	2.7%	—	-5%
Group median	—	6%	2.6%	7%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Delek US Holdings has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Delek US Holdings earns about $184M on its 1.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($184M) Net of stock comp (−$87M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($662M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $478M on 61M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $2.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($582M) runs well above depreciation ($400M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $662M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh DK against another business →

The owners of DK: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Delek US Holdings (DK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DJTWW its page in the Manual DKL →

Industry order: ← DINO the Refining & Marketing chapter EQNR →