Owner Scorecard


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EPAM, EPAM Systems

EPAM has used its software engineering expertise to become a leading global provider of digital engineering, cloud and artificial intelligence-enabled transformation services, and a leading business and experience consulting partner for global enterprises and ambitious start-ups.

We address our clients' transformation challenges by fusing EPAM Continuum's integrated strategy, experience and technology consulting with our 30+ years of engineering execution to speed our clients' time to market and drive greater value from their innovations and digital investments.

Through platforms like EPAM AI/RUN and initiatives like DIALX Lab , we integrate advanced AI technologies into tailored business strategies, driving significant industry impact and fostering continuous innovation.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
EPAM · EPAM Systems
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$5.5B
+15.4% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.6B 5-yr avg $4.7B
Gross margin 29% 5-yr avg 31%
Operating margin 9.7% 5-yr avg 11.6%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 28%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Americas (58%) and Europe (42%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 34% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 31%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Americas at 58%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Americas58%$3.2B
  • Europe42%$2.3B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.2B$1.5B$1.8B$2.3B$2.7B$3.8B$4.8B$4.7B$4.7B$5.5B$5.6BRevenueRevenue
36%36%36%35%35%34%32%31%31%29%29%Gross marginGross mgn
23%23%20%20%18%17%18%17%17%17%17%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$134M$173M$246M$303M$379M$542M$573M$501M$545M$520M$537MOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.5%11.9%13.3%13.2%14.3%14.4%11.9%10.7%11.5%9.5%9.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$99M$73M$240M$261M$327M$482M$419M$417M$455M$378M$387MNet incomeNet inc.
22%58%4%13%14%10%17%22%22%25%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$167M$193M$292M$287M$544M$572M$464M$563M$559M$655M$594MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$23M$29M$37M$45M$63M$83M$92M$92M$90M$125M$125MDepreciationDeprec.
($5M)$39M($44M)($91M)$79M($104M)($147M)($94M)($152M)($24M)($95M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$29M$30M$38M$99M$69M$112M$82M$28M$32M$42M$51MCapexCapex
2.5%2.1%2.0%4.3%2.6%3.0%1.7%0.6%0.7%0.8%0.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$144M$163M$255M$242M$476M$489M$382M$534M$527M$613M$544MOwner earningsOwner earn.
12.4%11.2%13.8%10.6%17.9%13.0%7.9%11.4%11.1%11.2%9.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$138M$163M$255M$188M$476M$461M$382M$534M$527M$613M$544MFree cash flowFCF
11.9%11.2%13.8%8.2%17.9%12.3%7.9%11.4%11.1%11.2%9.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M$7M$74M$39M$19M$315M$11M$25M$912M$3M$7MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$165M$398M$662MBuybacksBuybacks
24%21%46%39%48%46%35%27%18%16%15%ROICROIC
13%7%19%16%16%19%14%12%13%10%11%Return on equityROE
13%7%19%16%16%19%14%12%13%10%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$362M$583M$771M$937M$1.4B$1.4B$1.7B$2.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$200M$266M$0$339MReceivablesReceiv.
$3M$6M$7M$8M$10M$25M$31M$32M$45M$55M$40MAccounts payablePayables
$197M$260M($7M)$299MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$647M$960M$1.2B$1.5B$1.9B$2.3B$2.8B$3.1B$2.4B$2.5B$2.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$116M$181M$263M$387M$466M$763M$747M$645M$821M$977M$884MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
5.6×5.3×4.6×3.8×4.1×3.0×3.7×4.8×3.0×2.6×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$109M$120M$167M$195M$212M$531M$529M$562M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$926M$1.3B$1.6B$2.2B$2.7B$3.5B$4.0B$4.4B$4.8B$4.9B$4.7BTotal assetsAssets
$25M$25M$25M$25M$25M$30M$28M$26M$25M$25M$165MTotal debtDebt
($337M)($558M)($746M)($911M)($1.4B)($1.4B)($1.7B)($2.1B)($1.3B)($1.3B)($874M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$781M$975M$1.3B$1.6B$2.0B$2.5B$3.0B$3.5B$3.6B$3.7B$3.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
4.2%3.6%3.2%3.1%2.8%3.0%2.1%3.1%3.5%3.2%3.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
53.2M55.0M56.7M57.7M58.4M59.1M59.2M59.1M58.0M56.2M54.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$21.80$26.38$32.52$39.78$45.50$63.63$81.54$79.39$81.54$97.04$102.53Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.87$1.32$4.24$4.53$5.60$8.15$7.09$7.06$7.84$6.72$7.14EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.70$2.96$4.49$4.20$8.14$8.28$6.46$9.04$9.09$10.90$10.03Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.59$2.96$4.49$3.26$8.14$7.80$6.46$9.04$9.09$10.90$10.03Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.55$0.54$0.66$1.72$1.18$1.89$1.38$0.48$0.55$0.75$0.94Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.68$17.73$22.28$27.68$33.93$42.11$50.73$58.74$62.59$65.39$63.32Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+18.0%/yr+16.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+16.8%/yr+6.0%/yr
EPS+15.3%/yr+3.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.5%/yr−8.6%/yr
Book value / share+18.1%/yr+14.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
56Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
16%low FY2025
Gross margin
29%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$613Mowner earningsvs.$378Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $378M of profit into $613M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$378M
Owner earnings$613M · 11% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$378M$455M$417M$419M$482M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$125M+$90M+$92M+$92M+$83M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$177M+$167M+$148M+$100M+$112M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$24M−$152M−$94M−$147M−$104M
Cash from operations$655M$559M$563M$464M$572M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$42M−$32M−$28M−$82M−$83M
Owner earnings$613M$527M$534M$382M$489M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$28M
Free cash flow$613M$527M$534M$382M$461M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%11%11%8%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $177M), owner earnings is nearer $436M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $1.3B + ST investments $2M − debt $25M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 0 + DIO 0 − DPO 5 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 16%–48%; 16% latest = NOPAT $388M ÷ invested capital $2.4B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–18%; latest $613M = operating cash $655M − maintenance capex $42M
    Industry peers: median 23%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $177M of SBC) leaves $436M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $655M ÷ net income $378M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $662M ÷ Owner Earnings $613M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $613M of Owner Earnings, $662M (108%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $662M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $177M stock comp, the real buyback was about $485M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.34×
    Harvesting
    Capex $42M ÷ depreciation $125M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.59×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $25M vs $1.6B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +203%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.97/share (latest year $7.23), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $70.39/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 12% early, 11% lately, median 12%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 16%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 9.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.6%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We leverage AI to deliver transformative solutions that accelerate our clients' digital innovation and enhance their competitive edge.”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.0B
  • Receivables$339M
  • Other current assets$980M
Current liabilities$884M
  • Accounts payable$40M
  • Other current liabilities$844M
Current ratio2.67×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.67×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.8× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.1BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$288M$123M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$105Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$561M · 13%
  • Buybacks$1.2B · 29%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.5B · 58%
  • Returned to owners$1.2B

    32% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.2B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$201.56

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 6M shares were bought for $1.2B, about $201.56 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $187.16 (2025) to $240.41 (2023); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $187.16 ($662M).

  • Net change in share count1.8%

    The diluted count rose from 53M to 54M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained19%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $371M, so each retained $1 added about 0.19 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.6B33% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity33%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $561M of capital spent building

$686K written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$5.9M$26.7M$489M
2022$6.5M−$13.9M$382M
2023$7.5M$5.3M$534M
2024$9.0M$2.3M$527M
2025$5.2M$4.6M$613M
2025$8.1M$7.2M$613M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio186:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$177M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 34% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why EPAM Systems is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $31M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
APPAppLovin$5.5B70%19.6%10%17%
EPAMEPAM Systems$5.5B34%11.9%31%11%
CDNSCadence Design Systems Inc.$5.3B99%24.1%28%28%
TEAMAtlassian$5.2B83%-2.5%27%
OTEXOpen Text Corporation$5.2B69%17.6%6%23%
TWLOTwilio Inc.$5.1B52%-19.4%-7%-1%
GENGen Digital$5.0B82%32.2%11%31%
GDDYGoDaddy Inc.$5.0B9.1%15%21%
Group median70%14.8%11%22%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what EPAM Systems has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, EPAM Systems earns about $617M on its 11.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $544M on 52M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $874M. The if-converted diluted count is 54M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($51M) runs well above depreciation ($125M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $552M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "EPAM Systems (EPAM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EPAM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EPAC its page in the Manual EPC →

Industry order: ← DXC the IT Services & Consulting chapter EVTC →