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DUK, Duke Energy Corporation

Multi-Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utility

Duke Energy is a regulated utility. It generates and delivers electricity, and distributes natural gas, to homes and businesses across the U.S. — most of the money comes from the electric side, the rest from gas. In nearly all the places it serves, it is the only supplier a customer can buy electricity from.

Segments Duke Energy's segment structure includes two reportable business segments: Electric Utilities and Infrastructure (EU&I) and Gas Utilities and Infrastructure (GU&I).

Duke Energy's chief operating decision-maker routinely reviews financial information about these business segments in deciding how to allocate resources and evaluate the performance of the business.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

DUK · Duke Energy Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$32.2B

+6.2% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $33.2B 5-yr avg $29.0B

Gross margin 79%

Operating margin 27.2% 5-yr avg 24.1%

ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 12%

Free cash flow margin −10% 5-yr avg −8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Electric Utilities and Infrastructure (91%) and Gas Utilities and Infrastructure (9%).
Situation: Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
What moves the needle: A utility like this does not set its own prices; state regulators do, and they decide what return Duke may earn on the plants, wires and pipes it builds. So the test is not whether the franchise exists — within its territories it is the lone seller — but whether regulators keep granting rates that recover the heavy, never-ending capital this business swallows, and whether that capital earns back more than it costs. The bad case is plain enough: a monopoly that must keep spending while its allowed return sits below the price of the debt that funds it. Watch returns on capital against the cost of that debt in the record below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Electric Utilities and Infrastructure is 91% of revenue, with Gas Utilities and Infrastructure the other meaningful segment at 9%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Electric Utilities and Infrastructure91%$28.9B
Gas Utilities and Infrastructure9%$2.9B
Other0%$28M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$22.7B	$23.6B	$24.5B	$25.1B	$23.4B	$24.6B	$28.8B	$29.1B	$30.4B	$32.2B	$33.2B	RevenueRevenue
71%	73%	72%	73%	—	—	—	—	—	—	79%	Gross marginGross mgn
$5.2B	$5.6B	$4.7B	$5.7B	$4.6B	$5.5B	$6.0B	$7.1B	$7.9B	$8.6B	$9.0B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
22.9%	23.9%	19.1%	22.8%	19.6%	22.3%	20.9%	24.3%	26.1%	26.8%	27.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.2B	$3.1B	$2.7B	$3.7B	$1.4B	$3.9B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$4.5B	$5.0B	$5.1B	Net incomeNet inc.
35%	28%	14%	12%	—	6%	11%	13%	12%	11%	13%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$6.9B	$6.6B	$7.2B	$8.2B	$8.9B	$8.3B	$5.9B	$9.9B	$12.3B	$12.3B	$11.7B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$3.9B	$4.0B	$4.7B	$5.2B	$5.5B	$5.7B	$5.8B	$6.1B	$6.4B	$7.7B	$7.9B	DepreciationDeprec.
$831M	($481M)	($176M)	($715M)	$2.0B	($1.3B)	($2.5B)	$953M	$1.4B	($342M)	($1.4B)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$7.9B	$8.1B	$9.4B	$11.1B	$9.9B	$9.7B	$11.4B	$12.6B	$12.3B	$14.0B	$15.0B	CapexCapex
34.7%	34.2%	38.3%	44.3%	42.4%	39.5%	39.5%	43.4%	40.5%	43.5%	45.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3.0B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$3.0B	$3.4B	$2.6B	$84M	$3.8B	$5.9B	$4.6B	$3.8B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
13.1%	10.9%	10.2%	12.1%	14.4%	10.7%	0.3%	13.1%	19.5%	14.3%	11.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($1.0B)	($1.4B)	($2.2B)	($2.9B)	($1.1B)	($1.4B)	($5.4B)	($2.7B)	$48M	($1.7B)	($3.3B)	Free cash flowFCF
−4.6%	−6.1%	−9.0%	−11.6%	−4.5%	−5.8%	−18.9%	−9.4%	0.2%	−5.3%	−9.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$3.1B	$3.2B	—	—	—	$3.2B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
4%	4%	4%	5%	—	4%	4%	5%	5%	5%	5%	ROICROIC
5%	7%	6%	8%	3%	8%	5%	6%	9%	10%	9%	Return on equityROE
−0%	1%	0%	2%	−3%	2%	−1%	—	—	—	4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$392M	$358M	$442M	$311M	$259M	$341M	$409M	$253M	$314M	$245M	$2.3B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.4B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$1.9B	$16M	$16M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$3.0B	$3.0B	$3.5B	$3.5B	$3.1B	$3.5B	$4.8B	$4.2B	$5.4B	$5.2B	$4.7B	Accounts payablePayables
($1.1B)	($1.0B)	($1.3B)	($1.5B)	($1.0B)	($1.1B)	($1.6B)	($1.2B)	($3.5B)	($5.2B)	($3.0B)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$8.0B	$8.5B	$9.7B	$9.2B	$8.7B	$9.9B	$13.2B	$12.8B	$12.9B	$11.6B	$13.4B	Current assetsCur. assets
$11.6B	$12.5B	$15.0B	$14.8B	$16.3B	$15.9B	$18.9B	$17.3B	$19.4B	$21.0B	$20.3B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×	0.7×	0.6×	0.6×	0.5×	0.6×	0.7×	0.7×	0.7×	0.6×	0.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$19.4B	$19.4B	$19.3B	$19.3B	$19.3B	$19.3B	$19.3B	$19.3B	$19.0B	$19.0B	$19.0B	GoodwillGoodwill
$132.8B	$137.9B	$145.4B	$158.8B	$162.4B	$169.6B	$178.1B	$176.9B	$186.3B	$195.7B	$198.0B	Total assetsAssets
$50.4B	$54.4B	$57.9B	$61.3B	$62.7B	$67.1B	$73.7B	$79.5B	$84.3B	$89.8B	$89.8B	Total debtDebt
$50.0B	$54.1B	$57.5B	$61.0B	$62.5B	$66.8B	$73.3B	$79.3B	$84.0B	$89.6B	$87.5B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.7×	2.8×	2.2×	2.6×	2.2×	2.5×	2.5×	2.3×	2.3×	2.4×	2.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$41.0B	$41.7B	$43.8B	$46.8B	$48.0B	$49.3B	$49.3B	$49.1B	$50.1B	$51.8B	$54.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
691M	700M	708M	729M	738M	769M	770M	771M	772M	777M	779M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$32.91	$33.66	$34.63	$34.40	$31.66	$32.02	$37.36	$37.69	$39.32	$41.49	$42.58	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.11	$4.37	$3.77	$5.14	$1.87	$5.08	$3.31	$3.68	$5.86	$6.39	$6.60	EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.32	$3.68	$3.52	$4.16	$4.57	$3.42	$0.11	$4.92	$7.65	$5.95	$4.84	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.50	$-2.04	$-3.11	$-4.00	$-1.42	$-1.85	$-7.06	$-3.54	$0.06	$-2.18	$-4.23	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.37	$3.50	$3.49	$3.66	$3.81	$4.05	$4.13	—	—	—	$4.08	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$11.43	$11.50	$13.26	$15.26	$13.42	$12.63	$14.76	$16.35	$15.91	$18.05	$19.21	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$59.38	$59.63	$61.89	$64.23	$64.99	$64.10	$64.05	$63.70	$64.93	$66.72	$69.91	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.6%/yr	+5.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+3.6%/yr	+5.4%/yr
EPS	+8.3%/yr	+27.9%/yr
Dividends / share	+3.4%/yr (6-yr)	+3.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+5.2%/yr	+6.1%/yr
Book value / share	+1.3%/yr	+0.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

777Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

5%low FY2016

Gross margin

73%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

19.4×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$4.6Bowner earningsvs.$5.0Bnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $4.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $7.7B it takes just to hold its position. It put $6.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.7B).

Reported net income$5.0B

Owner earnings$4.6B · 14% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$5.0B	$4.5B	$2.8B	$2.5B	$3.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$7.7B	+$6.4B	+$6.1B	+$5.8B	+$5.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$342M	+$1.4B	+$953M	−$2.5B	−$1.3B
Cash from operations	$12.3B	$12.3B	$9.9B	$5.9B	$8.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$7.7B	−$6.4B	−$6.1B	−$5.8B	−$5.7B
Owner earnings	$4.6B	$5.9B	$3.8B	$84M	$2.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$6.3B	−$5.9B	−$6.5B	−$5.5B	−$4.1B
Free cash flow	($1.7B)	$48M	($2.7B)	($5.4B)	($1.4B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	14%	19%	13%	0%	11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $7.7B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $6.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.4×

Adequate

Operating income $8.6B ÷ interest expense $3.6B

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $89.5B · 10.4× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $245M + ST investments $44M − debt $89.8B

What this means
Netting $289M of cash and short-term investments against $89.8B of debt leaves $89.5B owed, about 10.4× a year's operating profit. It also holds $190M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $89.4B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -194d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 0 + DIO 85 − DPO 279 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range 4%–5%; 5% latest = NOPAT $7.6B ÷ invested capital $141.4B

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 12%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 0%–19%; latest $4.6B = operating cash $12.3B − maintenance capex $7.7B

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. It chose to put $6.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($1.7B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $67M of SBC) leaves $4.6B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.48×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $12.3B ÷ net income $5.0B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 101%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $4.7B ÷ Owner Earnings $4.6B

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $4.6B of Owner Earnings, $4.7B (101%) went back to shareholders, $3.2B dividends, $1.5B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $67M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.4B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.82×

Expanding

Capex $14.0B ÷ depreciation $7.7B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $32.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.55×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $89.8B vs ($9.4B) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 7 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +57%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.27/share (latest year $6.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $66.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 22% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 22% early to 26% lately, median 23% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +7%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.
Worst year 2018 · 19.1% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +1.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“This involves significant development and implementation costs to keep pace with changing technologies, including AI, and customer demand.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$13.4B

Cash & short-term investments$2.1B
Receivables$16M
Inventory$1.8B
Other current assets$9.5B

Current liabilities$20.3B

Debt due within a year$7.4B
Accounts payable$4.7B
Other current liabilities$8.2B

Current ratio0.66×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.57×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($6.9B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$7.4B due · $2.1B cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$35.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$89.1B$1.3B of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$7.1B

'27$3.6B

'28$4.1B

'29$4.6B

'30$4.4B

later$63.0B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$7.1Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$10.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$7.1Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$86.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$2.1B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$4.6B

Together, against $7.1B due next year0.95×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $6.8B against the $7.1B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 95% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $86.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$106.4B · 123%
Dividends$19.0B · 22%

Returned to owners$19.0B
60% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $19.0B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Source of funding−$38.9B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $38.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $50.4B to $89.8B.
Net change in share count12.7%
The diluted count rose from 691M to 779M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$4.13/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained16%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($12.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $2.1B, so each retained $1 added about 0.16 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$16.5M	$27.3M	$2.6B
2022	$21.4M	$24.0M	$84M
2023	$20.6M	$23.3M	$3.8B
2024	$21.3M	$31.4M	$5.9B
2025	$13.7M	$15.1M	$4.6B
2025	$8.3M	$17.0M	$4.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$67M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Duke Energy Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?12.7%
Diluted shares grew 12.7% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $2.5B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Multi-Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
DUKDuke Energy Corporation	$32.2B	72%	22.8%	4%	13%
PCGPG&E Corp.	$24.9B	—	10.2%	4%	-11%
EXCExelon Corporation	$24.3B	—	14.1%	5%	-8%
EDConsolidated Edison Inc.	$17.0B	—	22.1%	6%	12%
XELXcel Energy Inc.	$14.7B	67%	17.7%	6%	13%
PEGPublic Service Enterprise Group Inc	$12.2B	68%	21.1%	6%	17%
WECWEC Energy Group Inc.	$9.8B	64%	22.1%	6%	18%
AEEAmeren Corporation	$8.8B	—	21.5%	5%	18%
Group median	—	67%	21.3%	6%	13%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Duke Energy Corporation has delivered.

Duke Energy Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Duke Energy Corporation earns about $4.1B on its 12.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($4.1B) Net of stock comp (−$59M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($4.0B)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+40%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($3.3B) on 780M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $87.5B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($15.0B) runs well above depreciation ($7.9B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $4.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh DUK against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Duke Energy Corporation (DUK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DUK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DTW its page in the Manual DUKB →

Industry order: ← CMSD the Multi-Utilities chapter DUKB →