What it is: An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 21% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 49% and operating margin about 20% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −69% and 47% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −10 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Oil, Gas and NGL Sales is 67% of revenue, with Marketing and Midstream Revenues the other meaningful line at 33%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Oil, Gas and NGL Sales67%$11.2B
Marketing and Midstream Revenues33%$5.6B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$6.8B	$6.5B	$8.4B	$6.7B	$4.7B	$13.8B	$19.8B	$15.1B	$15.9B	$16.8B	$16.7B	RevenueRevenue
58%	45%	49%	58%	—	—	—	—	—	—	84%	Gross marginGross mgn
11%	10%	7%	7%	7%	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($2.9B)	$1.2B	$3.9B	($385M)	($3.2B)	$2.9B	$7.8B	$4.6B	$3.7B	$3.4B	$2.2B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−42.9%	19.1%	46.6%	−5.8%	−69.1%	20.9%	39.2%	30.3%	23.0%	20.4%	13.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($1.1B)	$898M	$3.1B	($355M)	($2.7B)	$2.8B	$6.0B	$3.7B	$2.9B	$2.6B	$2.3B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	1%	7%	—	—	2%	22%	18%	21%	23%	23%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.5B	$2.9B	$1.6B	$2.0B	$1.5B	$4.9B	$8.5B	$6.5B	$6.6B	$6.7B	$6.4B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1.6B	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$3.3B	$3.6B	$3.6B	DepreciationDeprec.
$761M	$877M	($2.8B)	$786M	$2.8B	($171M)	$188M	$158M	$353M	$375M	$478M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$849M	$44M	$55M	$31M	$1.2B	$2.0B	$2.5B	$3.9B	$3.6B	$3.6B	$3.5B	CapexCapex
12.6%	0.7%	0.7%	0.5%	24.7%	14.5%	12.8%	25.6%	22.9%	21.4%	20.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$651M	$2.9B	$1.5B	$2.0B	$311M	$2.9B	$6.0B	$4.0B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$2.9B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
9.6%	44.1%	18.1%	30.1%	6.7%	21.2%	30.2%	26.4%	18.6%	18.6%	17.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$651M	$2.9B	$1.5B	$2.0B	$311M	$2.9B	$6.0B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$2.9B	Free cash flowFCF
9.6%	44.1%	18.1%	30.1%	6.7%	21.2%	30.2%	17.6%	18.6%	18.6%	17.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$140M	$257M	$1.3B	$3.4B	$1.9B	$937M	—	$613M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	$3.0B	$1.8B	$38M	$589M	$718M	$979M	$1.1B	$1.1B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-14%	9%	33%	-4%	-50%	21%	37%	22%	13%	12%	8%	ROICROIC
-13%	10%	33%	-6%	-93%	30%	54%	31%	20%	17%	15%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	−9%	−102%	16%	24%	16%	13%	—	11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$1.9B	$2.6B	$2.4B	$1.5B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$1.3B	$853M	$811M	$1.4B	$2.6B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.4B	$989M	$812M	$832M	$601M	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$2.3B	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	—	—	—	—	$114M	$201M	$249M	$294M	$336M	$319M	InventoryInvent.
$642M	$633M	$530M	$428M	$242M	$500M	$859M	$760M	$806M	$790M	$975M	Accounts payablePayables
$714M	$356M	$282M	$404M	$359M	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.6B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.8B	$4.8B	$4.4B	$3.9B	$3.3B	$4.2B	$3.9B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$4.0B	$4.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.6B	$3.3B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$1.4B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$2.9B	$3.3B	$4.1B	$4.7B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×	1.4×	2.0×	2.0×	2.3×	1.4×	1.3×	1.1×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.4B	$841M	$753M	$753M	$753M	$753M	$753M	$753M	$753M	$753M	$753M	GoodwillGoodwill
$28.7B	$30.2B	$19.6B	$13.7B	$9.9B	$21.0B	$23.3B	$24.5B	$30.5B	$31.6B	$32.5B	Total assetsAssets
$10.2B	$6.9B	$4.5B	$4.3B	$4.3B	$6.5B	$6.4B	$6.2B	$8.9B	$8.4B	$8.4B	Total debtDebt
$8.2B	$4.2B	$2.0B	$2.8B	$2.3B	$4.4B	$5.1B	$5.3B	$8.1B	$7.0B	$5.8B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.0×	3.7×	6.2×	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$8.3B	$9.3B	$9.2B	$5.8B	$2.9B	$9.3B	$11.2B	$12.1B	$14.5B	$15.5B	$15.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
3.0%	1.9%	1.6%	1.7%	1.9%	0.7%	0.4%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
507M	520M	497M	401M	377M	665M	653M	642M	634M	633M	618M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$13.32	$12.50	$16.98	$16.64	$12.40	$20.68	$30.36	$23.58	$25.11	$26.52	$27.09	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.08	$1.73	$6.16	$-0.89	$-7.11	$4.23	$9.24	$5.82	$4.56	$4.17	$3.67	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.28	$5.51	$3.07	$5.02	$0.82	$4.38	$9.17	$6.21	$4.66	$4.93	$4.74	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.28	$5.51	$3.07	$5.02	$0.82	$4.38	$9.17	$4.14	$4.66	$4.93	$4.74	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	$0.35	$0.68	$1.98	$5.17	$2.89	$1.48	—	$0.99	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.67	$0.08	$0.11	$0.08	$3.06	$2.99	$3.89	$6.05	$5.75	$5.67	$5.66	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.32	$17.80	$18.48	$14.47	$7.65	$13.93	$17.10	$18.79	$22.86	$24.53	$24.96	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.76 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.0%/yr	+16.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+16.1%/yr	+43.0%/yr
Dividends / share	+33.5%/yr (5-yr)	+33.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+14.5%/yr	+13.2%/yr
Book value / share	+4.6%/yr	+26.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

633Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

12%low FY2020

Gross margin

58%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.2×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.1Bowner earningsvs.$2.6Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $2.6B of profit into $3.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$2.6B

Owner earnings$3.1B · 19% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2.6B	$2.9B	$3.7B	$6.0B	$2.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$3.6B	+$3.3B	+$2.6B	+$2.2B	+$2.2B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$99M	+$99M	+$93M	+$88M	+$99M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$375M	+$353M	+$158M	+$188M	−$171M
Cash from operations	$6.7B	$6.6B	$6.5B	$8.5B	$4.9B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$3.6B	−$3.6B	−$2.6B	−$2.5B	−$2.0B
Owner earnings	$3.1B	$3.0B	$4.0B	$6.0B	$2.9B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	−$1.3B	—	—
Free cash flow	$3.1B	$3.0B	$2.7B	$6.0B	$2.9B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	19%	26%	30%	21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $99M), owner earnings is nearer $3.0B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -4.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($2.9B) ÷ interest expense $635M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.7B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $1.4B + ST investments $2.3B − debt $8.4B

What this means
Netting $3.7B of cash and short-term investments against $8.4B of debt leaves $4.7B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -20d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 39 + DIO 44 − DPO 103 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 12%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -50%–37%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($2.2B) ÷ invested capital $22.5B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 19%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 7%–44%; latest $3.1B = operating cash $6.7B − maintenance capex $3.6B

Industry peers: median 21%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $99M of SBC) leaves $3.0B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.54×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $6.7B ÷ net income $2.6B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 64%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $2.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.1B

What this means
Of $3.1B Owner Earnings, $2.0B (64%) went back to shareholders, $937M dividends, $1.1B buybacks. Net of $99M stock comp, the real buyback was about $951M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.00×

Maintaining

Capex $3.6B ÷ depreciation $3.6B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $16.8B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.98×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $8.4B vs ($80M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +219%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.97/share (latest year $4.25), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.99/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 8% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 8% early to 25% lately, median 20% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 31%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +6%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −69.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +2.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Failure to effectively integrate AI and other emerging technologies into our operations could put us at a competitive disadvantage to other oil and gas companies who have more successfully implemented such technologies.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.8B

Cash & short-term investments$2.6B
Receivables$2.3B
Inventory$319M

Current liabilities$4.7B

Debt due within a year$999M
Accounts payable$975M
Other current liabilities$2.8B

Current ratio1.01×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.94×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.56×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$28Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$999M due · $2.6B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−14.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$13.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$8.7B$280M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.0B

'27$463M

'28$325M

'29$0

'30$585M

later$6.0B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.0Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$1.5Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$1.0Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$8.4Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$2.6B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.1B

Together, against $1.0B due next year5.8×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $5.8B against the $1.0B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 5.8 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $42.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$17.8B · 42%
Dividends$7.9B · 18%
Buybacks$9.2B · 22%
Retained (debt / cash)$7.9B · 18%

Returned to owners$17.1B
65% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $7.9B as dividends and $9.2B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$37.83
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 78M shares were bought for $3.0B, about $37.83 each.
Net change in share count21.9%
The diluted count rose from 507M to 618M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$1.48/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 33% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.3B7% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity5%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $17.8B of capital spent building

$873M written down across 1 year (2016): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Clay M. Gaspar	$12k	$48k	$2.9B
2021	Clay M. Gaspar	$3,391	$32k	$2.9B
2022	Clay M. Gaspar	$15k	$41k	$6.0B
2023	Clay M. Gaspar	$15k	$814	$4.0B
2024	Clay M. Gaspar	$17k	$6,709	$3.0B
2025	Clay M. Gaspar	$13k	$14k	$3.1B
2025	Clay M. Gaspar	$857	$1,247	$3.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio66:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$99M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Devon Energy Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?21.2% vs 23.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 23.9% early in the record and 21.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?21.9%
Diluted shares grew 21.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $9.2B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $4.4B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
EOGEOG Resources Inc.	$22.6B	—	27.0%	15%	25%
OXYOccidental Petroleum Corporation	$21.6B	86%	17.9%	7%	21%
DVNDevon Energy Corporation	$16.8B	53%	20.7%	12%	20%
FANGDiamondback Energy Inc.	$15.0B	—	43.6%	7%	47%
EXEExpand Energy Corporation	$12.1B	—	-0.9%	-0%	5%
OVVOvintiv	$8.7B	—	17.7%	12%	17%
EQTEQT Corporation	$8.6B	63%	-3.8%	-1%	18%
CTRACoterra Energy Inc.	$7.3B	—	34.8%	9%	33%
Group median	—	63%	19.3%	8%	20%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Devon Energy Corporation has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Devon Energy Corporation earns about $3.3B on its 19.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($3.3B) Net of stock comp (−$91M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−9%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2.9B on 621M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $5.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh DVN against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Devon Energy Corporation (DVN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DVN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DVLT its page in the Manual DX →

Industry order: ← DMLP the Oil & Gas Producers chapter E →