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E, ENI S.p.A.
ENI is an Italian integrated oil and gas company. It explores for, produces, refines and sells crude oil and natural gas, and through its Plenitude arm it markets gas and electricity to retail customers. It makes money on the spread between what it costs to pull hydrocarbons from the ground and process them, and the price the market will pay for the barrel or the unit of energy.
Global Gas & LNG Portfolio and Power: engages in the wholesale activity of supplying and marketing gas via pipeline and LNG, maximizing supply of equity gas/LNG, wholesale marketing of electricity and international transport activity.
Refining and Chemicals: the Refining business engages in refining crude oil to manufacture fuels and in wholesale marketing activities, which mainly consist of the inter-company supply of refined products to the Group subsidiary Enilive and in sales to large accounts.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Exploration & Production (45%) and Enilive (20%), with 3 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- The governing question is franchise or commodity, and the filing answers candidly against itself: it calls its main segments "commoditized," sensitive to the cycle and to overcapacity, with retail customers who can switch suppliers at will. So the tests are whether ENI is a low-cost producer that earns its keep across a full price cycle rather than a price-taker, and whether the capital it sinks into reserves and plant comes back at a worthwhile return; pricing power, if it exists at all, would show as margins that hold when the oil price does not. The bad case is the plain one for any commodity producer carrying net debt — a long stretch of weak prices that turns heavy reinvestment into a treadmill. The figures for margins, returns on capital, and the debt load are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 7 segments, the largest Exploration & Production at 45%.
- Exploration & Production45%€37.1B
- Enilive20%€16.3B
- Global Gas & LNG Portfolio and Power16%€13.1B
- Plenitude12%€10.1B
- Refining and Chemicals6%€5.2B
- Corporate and Other activities0%€262M
- Others0%€262M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| €56.7B | €71.0B | €76.9B | €69.9B | €44.0B | €76.6B | €132.5B | €93.7B | €88.8B | €82.2B | €82.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 67% | 74% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 77% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| €2.2B | €8.0B | €10.0B | €6.4B | (€3.3B) | €12.3B | €17.5B | €8.3B | €5.2B | €5.0B | €5.0B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.8% | 11.3% | 13.0% | 9.2% | −7.4% | 16.1% | 13.2% | 8.8% | 5.9% | 6.1% | 6.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (€1.5B) | €3.4B | €4.1B | €148M | (€8.6B) | €5.8B | €13.9B | €4.8B | €2.6B | €2.6B | €2.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 51% | 59% | — | — | 45% | 37% | 53% | 59% | 54% | 54% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| €7.7B | €10.1B | €13.6B | €12.4B | €4.8B | €12.9B | €17.5B | €15.1B | €13.1B | €13.3B | €13.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| €7.6B | €7.5B | €7.0B | €8.1B | €7.3B | €7.1B | €7.2B | €7.5B | €7.6B | €7.3B | €7.3B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| €1.6B | (€740M) | €2.5B | €4.1B | €6.2B | (€23M) | (€3.6B) | €2.9B | €2.9B | €3.4B | €3.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| €9.1B | €8.5B | €8.8B | €8.0B | €4.4B | €5.0B | €7.7B | €8.7B | €8.0B | €8.7B | €8.7B | CapexCapex |
| 16.0% | 12.0% | 11.4% | 11.5% | 10.0% | 6.5% | 5.8% | 9.3% | 9.0% | 10.6% | 10.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (€1.4B) | €1.6B | €6.7B | €4.3B | €415M | €7.9B | €9.8B | €6.4B | €5.1B | €4.6B | €4.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −2.5% | 2.3% | 8.7% | 6.2% | 0.9% | 10.3% | 7.4% | 6.8% | 5.7% | 5.6% | 5.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (€1.4B) | €1.6B | €4.9B | €4.3B | €415M | €7.9B | €9.8B | €6.4B | €5.1B | €4.6B | €4.6B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −2.5% | 2.3% | 6.3% | 6.2% | 0.9% | 10.3% | 7.4% | 6.8% | 5.7% | 5.6% | 5.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| €2.9B | €2.9B | €3.0B | €3.0B | €2.0B | €2.4B | €3.0B | €3.0B | €3.1B | €3.1B | €3.1B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | €400M | — | €400M | €2.4B | €1.8B | €2.0B | €1.9B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 2% | 6% | 8% | 5% | -5% | 11% | 16% | 6% | 4% | 4% | 4% | ROICROIC |
| -3% | 7% | 8% | 0% | -23% | 13% | 25% | 9% | 5% | 5% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| −8% | 1% | 2% | −6% | −28% | 8% | 20% | 3% | −1% | −1% | −1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| €5.7B | €7.7B | €11.1B | €6.4B | €9.7B | €12.6B | €11.7B | €11.1B | €9.3B | €11.8B | €11.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| €17.6B | €15.4B | €14.1B | €12.9B | €10.9B | €18.9B | €20.8B | €16.6B | €16.9B | €12.4B | €12.4B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| €4.6B | €4.6B | €4.7B | €4.7B | €3.9B | €6.1B | €7.7B | €6.2B | €6.3B | €5.1B | €5.1B | InventoryInvent. |
| €16.7B | €16.7B | €16.7B | €15.5B | €12.9B | €21.7B | €25.7B | €20.7B | €22.1B | €20.3B | €20.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| €5.5B | €3.3B | €2.0B | €2.1B | €1.9B | €3.2B | €2.8B | €2.1B | €1.1B | (€2.7B) | (€2.7B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| €38.0B | €36.4B | €39.5B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | €39.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| €27.7B | €24.7B | €28.4B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | €28.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.4× | 1.5× | 1.4× | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| €1.3B | €1.2B | €1.3B | €1.3B | €1.3B | €2.9B | €3.1B | €3.1B | €3.2B | €3.2B | €3.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| €124.5B | €114.9B | €118.4B | €123.4B | €109.6B | €137.8B | €100.7B | €142.6B | €146.9B | €137.1B | €137.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| €24.0B | €22.4B | €22.3B | €21.4B | €24.8B | €26.0B | €23.8B | €25.8B | €25.8B | €25.1B | €25.1B | Total debtDebt |
| €18.3B | €14.7B | €11.1B | €15.0B | €15.1B | €13.5B | €12.2B | €14.7B | €16.5B | €13.3B | €13.3B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.3× | 1.4× | 2.1× | 1.6× | -0.7× | 2.9× | 1.9× | 1.0× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| €53.0B | €48.0B | €51.0B | €47.8B | €37.4B | €44.4B | €54.8B | €53.2B | €52.8B | €47.9B | €47.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 3.60B | 3.60B | 3.60B | 3.59B | 3.57B | 3.57B | 3.48B | 3.30B | 3.17B | 3.02B | 33.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| €15.74 | €19.71 | €21.36 | €19.45 | €12.31 | €21.47 | €38.04 | €28.37 | €28.04 | €27.16 | €2486.02 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| €-0.41 | €0.94 | €1.15 | €0.04 | €-2.42 | €1.63 | €3.99 | €1.44 | €0.83 | €0.86 | €78.92 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| €-0.39 | €0.45 | €1.85 | €1.21 | €0.12 | €2.22 | €2.80 | €1.93 | €1.61 | €1.53 | €140.05 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| €-0.39 | €0.45 | €1.35 | €1.21 | €0.12 | €2.22 | €2.80 | €1.93 | €1.61 | €1.53 | €140.05 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| €0.80 | €0.80 | €0.82 | €0.84 | €0.55 | €0.66 | €0.86 | €0.92 | €0.97 | €1.02 | €93.21 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| €2.52 | €2.36 | €2.44 | €2.24 | €1.23 | €1.39 | €2.21 | €2.65 | €2.53 | €2.88 | €263.34 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| €14.73 | €13.34 | €14.17 | €13.32 | €10.47 | €12.46 | €15.72 | €16.10 | €16.67 | €15.85 | €1450.74 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/91.53 into TTM — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.2%/yr | +17.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +67.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +2.7%/yr | +13.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +1.5%/yr | +18.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +0.8%/yr | +8.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned €2.6B of profit into €4.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | €2.6B | €2.6B | €4.8B | €13.9B | €5.8B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +€7.3B | +€7.6B | +€7.5B | +€7.2B | +€7.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +€3.4B | +€2.9B | +€2.9B | −€3.6B | −€23M |
| Cash from operations | €13.3B | €13.1B | €15.1B | €17.5B | €12.9B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −€8.7B | −€8.0B | −€8.7B | −€7.7B | −€5.0B |
| Owner earnings | €4.6B | €5.1B | €6.4B | €9.8B | €7.9B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 6% | 7% | 7% | 10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income €5.0B ÷ interest expense €8.2B
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? €13.3B · 2.6× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash €8.1B + ST investments €3.7B − debt €25.1B
What this means
Netting €11.8B of cash and short-term investments against €25.1B of debt leaves €13.3B owed, about 2.6× a year's operating profit (5.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 55 + DIO 100 − DPO 394 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -5%–16%; 4% latest = NOPAT €2.5B ÷ invested capital €64.9BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -2%–10%; latest €4.6B = operating cash €13.3B − maintenance capex €8.7BIndustry peers: median 20%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops €13.3B ÷ net income €2.6B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks €5.0B ÷ Owner Earnings €4.6B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against €4.6B of Owner Earnings, €5.0B (108%) went back to shareholders, €3.1B dividends, €1.9B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.18×MaintainingCapex €8.7B ÷ depreciation €7.3B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €82.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.39×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · €25.1B vs €11.1B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +66%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €1.06/share (latest year €0.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €15.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 9% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to 7% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +51%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 51% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −7.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2018Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments€11.8B
- Receivables€12.4B
- Inventory€5.1B
- Other current assets€10.1B
- Debt due within a year€4.9B
- Accounts payable€20.3B
- Other current liabilities€3.2B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated €120.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested€76.9B · 64%
- Dividends€28.3B · 23%
- Buybacks€8.9B · 7%
- Retained (debt / cash)€6.5B · 5%
- Returned to owners€37.2B
82% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, €28.3B as dividends and €8.9B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran €8.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−99.1%
The diluted count fell from 3601M to 33M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record€1.02/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why ENI S.p.A. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Oil & Gas Producers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EENI S.p.A. | €82.2B | 77% | 9.0% | 6% | 6% |
| SLBSLB Limited | $35.7B | 77% | 13.1% | 13% | 12% |
| EOGEOG Resources Inc. | $22.6B | — | 27.0% | 15% | 25% |
| OXYOccidental Petroleum Corporation | $21.6B | 86% | 17.9% | 7% | 21% |
| DVNDevon Energy Corporation | $16.8B | 53% | 20.7% | 12% | 20% |
| FANGDiamondback Energy Inc. | $15.0B | — | 43.6% | 7% | 47% |
| EXEExpand Energy Corporation | $12.1B | — | -0.9% | -0% | 5% |
| OVVOvintiv | $8.7B | — | 17.7% | 12% | 17% |
| Group median | — | 77% | 17.8% | 9% | 19% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. ENI S.p.A. reports in EUR, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that EUR, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in EUR. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ENI S.p.A. has delivered.
Through the cycle, ENI S.p.A. earns about €4.9B on its 6.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings €4.6B on 3147M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt €13.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← DUO its page in the Manual EC →
Industry order: ← DVN the Oil & Gas Producers chapter EC →