Owner Scorecard


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ELF, e.l.f. Beauty

Personal Care Products consumer brand Cyclical

Beauty" and together with our subsidiaries is a multi-brand beauty company that offers inclusive, accessible, clean, vegan and cruelty free cosmetics and skin care products.

To be a different kind of beauty company by building brands that disrupt industry norms, shape culture and connect communities through positivity, inclusivity and accessibility.

Our brands are available online and across leading beauty, mass-market and specialty retailers.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
ELF · e.l.f. Beauty
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$1.6B
+24.6% YoY · 39% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.6B 5-yr avg $989M
Gross margin 71% 5-yr avg 69%
Operating margin 4.5% 5-yr avg 10.1%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 64% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 3.0% to 15% — on a steadier 64% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

21% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2026
  • United States79%$1.3B
  • International21%$344M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$230M$270M$267M$283M$318M$392M$579M$1.0B$1.3B$1.6B$1.6BRevenueRevenue
58%61%61%64%65%64%67%71%71%71%71%Gross marginGross mgn
48%49%51%56%61%57%56%56%59%63%63%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$23M$33M$26M$30M$9M$30M$68M$150M$158M$74M$74MOperating incomeOp. inc.
10.1%12.3%9.8%10.6%3.0%7.6%11.8%14.6%12.0%4.5%4.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$5M$33M$16M$18M$6M$22M$62M$128M$112M$26M$26MNet incomeNet inc.
46%14%26%14%4%9%23%35%35%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$2M$12M$56M$44M$29M$20M$102M$71M$134M$213M$213MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$13M$15M$18M$23M$25M$27M$18M$30M$44M$79M$79MDepreciationDeprec.
($23M)($49M)$5M($12M)($22M)($49M)($6M)($127M)($94M)$20M$20MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$9M$8M$9M$9M$6M$5M$2M$9M$19M$22M$22MCapexCapex
4.0%2.8%3.3%3.3%2.0%1.2%0.3%0.8%1.4%1.4%1.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($7M)$5M$47M$35M$23M$15M$100M$62M$115M$190M$190MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−3.1%1.8%17.5%12.3%7.2%3.7%17.3%6.1%8.8%11.6%11.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($7M)$5M$47M$35M$23M$15M$100M$62M$115M$190M$190MFree cash flowFCF
−3.1%1.8%17.5%12.3%7.2%3.7%17.3%6.1%8.8%11.6%11.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$26M$0$0$0$275M$0$582M$582MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$8M$0$0$0$0$67M$50MBuybacksBuybacks
4%10%6%7%3%7%18%17%14%3%ROICROIC
4%17%7%7%2%7%15%20%15%2%2%Return on equityROE
4%17%7%7%2%7%15%20%15%2%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$15M$10M$10M$46M$58M$43M$121M$108M$149M$290M$290MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$38M$45M$37M$30M$40M$46M$68M$124M$126M$175M$175MReceivablesReceiv.
$69M$63M$46M$46M$57M$84M$81M$191M$187M$220M$220MInventoryInvent.
$38M$27M$20M$12M$16M$19M$31M$81M$72M$97M$97MAccounts payablePayables
$69M$81M$63M$64M$81M$111M$118M$234M$241M$297M$297MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$125M$124M$142M$132M$170M$193M$303M$477M$541M$789M$789MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$80M$51M$43M$51M$73M$65M$108M$299M$177M$336M$336MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×2.4×3.3×2.6×2.3×3.0×2.8×1.6×3.1×2.3×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$157M$157M$157M$171M$172M$172M$172M$341M$341M$853M$853MGoodwillGoodwill
$415M$417M$436M$453M$487M$495M$596M$1.1B$1.2B$2.4B$2.4BTotal assetsAssets
$165M$156M$150M$139M$127M$97M$66M$262M$257M$842M$842MTotal debtDebt
$150M$146M$140M$92M$69M$54M($54M)$154M$108M$552M$552MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.4×3.8×3.3×4.7×11.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$141M$194M$229M$242M$270M$312M$411M$643M$761M$1.1B$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
3.1%5.0%6.3%5.5%6.2%5.0%5.0%4.0%5.5%5.3%5.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
50.4M49.4M49.3M50.8M52.0M53.7M55.3M57.8M58.3M59.4M59.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$4.55$5.47$5.43$5.57$6.12$7.31$10.46$17.72$22.51$27.57$27.57Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.11$0.68$0.32$0.35$0.12$0.41$1.11$2.21$1.92$0.44$0.44EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.14$0.10$0.95$0.69$0.44$0.27$1.81$1.08$1.98$3.20$3.20Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.14$0.10$0.95$0.69$0.44$0.27$1.81$1.08$1.98$3.20$3.20Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.18$0.15$0.18$0.19$0.12$0.09$0.03$0.15$0.32$0.38$0.38Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.79$3.93$4.65$4.77$5.19$5.82$7.43$11.12$13.04$19.05$19.05Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2017 are restated ×4 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
10-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+19.7%/yr+35.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+48.6%/yr
EPS+15.5%/yr+29.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.5%/yr+24.9%/yr
Book value / share+21.2%/yr+29.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
59Mpeak FY2026
ROIC
3%low FY2021
Gross margin
71%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.9×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$190Mowner earningsvs.$26Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $26M of profit into $190M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$26M
Owner earnings$190M · 12% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$26M$112M$128M$62M$22M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$79M+$44M+$30M+$18M+$27M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$87M+$72M+$41M+$29M+$20M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$20M−$94M−$127M−$6M−$49M
Cash from operations$213M$134M$71M$102M$20M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$22M−$19M−$9M−$2M−$5M
Owner earnings$190M$115M$62M$100M$15M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue12%9%6%17%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $87M), owner earnings is nearer $103M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $74M ÷ interest expense $6M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $552M · 7.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $290M − debt $842M
    What this means

    Netting $290M of cash and short-term investments against $842M of debt leaves $552M owed, about 7.5× a year's operating profit (11.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 39 + DIO 168 − DPO 74 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–18%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–17%; latest $190M = operating cash $213M − maintenance capex $22M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $87M of SBC) leaves $103M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $213M ÷ net income $26M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $50M ÷ Owner Earnings $190M
    What this means

    Of $190M Owner Earnings, $50M (26%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $50M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($87M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.28×
    Harvesting
    Capex $22M ÷ depreciation $79M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.35×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $842M vs $453M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +390%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.49/share (latest year $0.44), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $19.02/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 11% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 11% early, 10% lately, median 10%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2021 · 3.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“This Executive Order establishes a federal policy favoring a uniform national AI regulatory framework designed to promote innovation and U.S. global competitiveness and directs federal agencies to identify, challenge, and potentially pre-empt state and local AI laws that are viewed as inconsistent with or burdensome to…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$789M
  • Cash & short-term investments$290M
  • Receivables$175M
  • Inventory$220M
  • Other current assets$105M
Current liabilities$336M
  • Accounts payable$97M
  • Other current liabilities$239M
Current ratio2.35×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.69×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.86×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$453Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+35.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 2.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($276M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($474M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$919M$78M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2026

Over the record, the business generated $683M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$98M · 14%
  • Buybacks$125M · 18%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$460M · 67%
  • Returned to owners$125M

    21% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $125M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $677M and cash and short-term investments rose $274M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$14.00

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $8M, about $14.00 each.

  • Net change in share count17.7%

    The diluted count rose from 50M to 59M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained36%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($303M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $108M, so each retained $1 added about 0.36 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.4B59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity75%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$883Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $98M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Tarang Amin$5.2M$5.2M$15M
2023Tarang Amin$5.6M$42.1M$100M
2024Tarang Amin$8.4M$74.2M$62M
2025Tarang Amin$8.8M−$44.2M$115M
2026Tarang Amin$8.8M$7.5M$190M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio71:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$87M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 118% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why e.l.f. Beauty is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2026.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?17.7%

    Diluted shares grew 17.7% over 2016–2026, even as the company spent $125M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Personal Care Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
COTYCoty Inc.$5.9B60%-1.0%-1%4%
SCLStepan$2.3B17%7.3%12%4%
EPCEdgewell Personal Care$2.2B45%9.0%6%6%
PTCTPTC Therapeutics Inc.$1.7B97%-55.4%-45%-28%
ELFe.l.f. Beauty$1.6B65%10.3%7%8%
LNTHLantheus Holdings$1.5B51%17.2%24%17%
IPARInter Parfums$1.5B63%15.8%19%10%
OLPXOlaplex Holdings Inc.$423M69%27.1%7%35%
Group median62%9.7%7%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what e.l.f. Beauty has delivered.

e.l.f. Beauty’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, e.l.f. Beauty earns about $131M on its 8.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+28%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2017+50%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $190M on 59M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-14; net debt $552M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "e.l.f. Beauty (ELF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ELF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ELAN its page in the Manual ELMD →

Industry order: ← EL the Personal Care Products chapter EPC →