Owner Scorecard


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IPAR, Inter Parfums

Personal Care Products consumer brand

We operate in the fragrance business, and manufacture, market and distribute a wide array of prestige fragrances, and fragrance related products.

Distribution of prestige brands in the United States Republic of Singapore Interparfums Asia Pacific Pte., Ltd.

Sales and marketing office South Korea Interparfums Korea Co., Ltd.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
IPAR · Inter Parfums
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.5B
+2.5% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.5B 5-yr avg $1.2B
Gross margin 64% 5-yr avg 64%
Operating margin 18.0% 5-yr avg 18.2%
ROIC 20% 5-yr avg 20%
Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 63% and operating margin about 15% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Inventory runs near 24% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 19%, above 15% in 7 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

64% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States36%$532M
  • Western Europe26%$383M
  • Asia Pacific13%$189M
  • Eastern Europe8%$121M
  • Central and South America8%$121M
  • Middle East and Africa8%$118M
  • France5%$73M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$521M$591M$676M$714M$539M$880M$1.1B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5BRevenueRevenue
63%64%63%62%61%63%64%64%64%64%64%Gross marginGross mgn
50%50%49%48%48%46%45%45%45%45%46%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$67M$79M$95M$105M$70M$148M$194M$251M$275M$270M$269MOperating incomeOp. inc.
12.8%13.3%14.0%14.7%13.0%16.8%17.9%19.1%18.9%18.2%18.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$33M$42M$54M$60M$38M$87M$121M$153M$164M$168M$169MNet incomeNet inc.
42%35%33%33%34%32%26%29%28%27%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$55M$36M$63M$76M$65M$120M$73M$106M$188M$215M$222MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$4M$4M$4M$4M$9M$13M$23M$17M$28M$25M$25MDepreciationDeprec.
$16M($12M)$3M$9M$15M$17M($74M)($67M)($7M)$20M$26MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$5M$3M$4M$5M$11M$141M$34M$6M$5M$24M$24MCapexCapex
0.9%0.5%0.6%0.8%2.0%16.1%3.1%0.5%0.3%1.6%1.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$51M$33M$59M$73M$54M$107M$50M$99M$183M$190M$198MOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.8%5.6%8.7%10.2%10.0%12.2%4.6%7.5%12.6%12.8%13.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$50M$33M$59M$71M$54M($22M)$39M$99M$183M$190M$198MFree cash flowFCF
9.6%5.6%8.7%10.0%10.0%−2.5%3.6%7.5%12.6%12.8%13.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$18M$21M$26M$35M$21M$32M$64M$80M$96M$103M$103MDividends paidDiv. paid
14%18%21%20%12%18%21%22%19%20%ROICROIC
9%10%12%13%7%15%20%22%22%19%19%Return on equityROE
4%5%6%5%3%10%9%10%9%7%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$256M$278M$261M$253M$296M$159.8B$151M$94M$109M$137M$237MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$105M$121M$133M$133M$124M$159M$198M$247M$275M$321M$333MReceivablesReceiv.
$97M$137M$162M$168M$159M$199M$290M$372M$372M$351M$370MInventoryInvent.
$50M$53M$58M$54M$36M$82M$88M$97M$91M$77M$85MAccounts payablePayables
$152M$205M$237M$247M$247M$276M$399M$522M$556M$595M$617MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$472M$549M$572M$573M$601M$710M$788M$839M$926M$1.0B$998MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$142M$167M$189M$184M$156M$245M$345M$325M$332M$344M$306MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.3×3.3×3.0×3.1×3.8×2.9×2.3×2.6×2.8×3.0×3.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$682M$778M$798M$829M$890M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5BTotal assetsAssets
$75M$61M$46M$23M$25M$149M$180M$157M$157M$176M$157MTotal debtDebt
($181M)($218M)($215M)($230M)($272M)($159.6B)$29M$63M$48M$39M($80M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
28.5×39.5×36.7×48.8×35.6×52.4×54.0×22.3×35.1×37.3×37.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$370M$433M$448M$468M$536M$572M$617M$699M$745M$881M$882MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.4%0.3%0.5%0.6%0.3%0.3%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
31.2M31.3M31.5M31.7M31.7M31.8M32.0M32.1M32.1M32.1M32.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$16.71$18.89$21.43$22.52$17.03$27.63$33.97$41.00$45.21$46.32$46.66Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.07$1.33$1.71$1.90$1.21$2.75$3.78$4.75$5.12$5.24$5.28EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.63$1.05$1.87$2.30$1.71$3.36$1.58$3.09$5.69$5.93$6.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.60$1.05$1.87$2.24$1.71$-0.68$1.23$3.09$5.69$5.93$6.18Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.58$0.68$0.83$1.09$0.66$1.00$1.99$2.49$2.99$3.20$3.21Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.15$0.10$0.13$0.17$0.35$4.44$1.06$0.20$0.15$0.76$0.76Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.88$13.84$14.20$14.77$16.93$17.96$19.28$21.76$23.19$27.40$27.53Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.0%/yr+22.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+15.4%/yr+28.3%/yr
EPS+19.3%/yr+34.1%/yr
Dividends / share+20.9%/yr+37.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+19.5%/yr+16.9%/yr
Book value / share+9.7%/yr+10.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Asia Pacific-4.1%
    “Asia Pacific sales declined 4% driven by distribution challenges in South Korea and India which were partially offset by growth in Australia, China and Japan.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Eastern Europe+2.5%
    “Eastern Europe grew 2% reflecting more normalized sales levels despite the ongoing conflict in the region, and Central and South America achieved top line growth of 11% in 2025 compared to 2024 fueled by the strength of Lacoste, Coach and GUESS fragrances.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
32Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
19%low FY2020
Gross margin
64%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$190Mowner earningsvs.$168Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $168M of profit into $190M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$168M
Owner earnings$190M · 13% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$168M$164M$153M$121M$87M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$25M+$28M+$17M+$23M+$13M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$2M+$2M+$3M+$3M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$20M−$7M−$67M−$74M+$17M
Cash from operations$215M$188M$106M$73M$120M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$24M−$5M−$6M−$23M−$13M
Owner earnings$190M$183M$99M$50M$107M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$11M−$129M
Free cash flow$190M$183M$99M$39M($22M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%13%8%5%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer $189M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $270M ÷ interest expense $7M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $159.6B + ST investments $137M − debt $176M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $159.6B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 79 + DIO 237 − DPO 52 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($158.6B) = debt $176M + equity $881M − cash
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 5%–13%; latest $190M = operating cash $215M − maintenance capex $24M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves $189M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $215M ÷ net income $168M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $103M ÷ Owner Earnings $190M
    What this means

    Of $190M Owner Earnings, $103M (54%) went back to shareholders, $103M dividends, $77K buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($2M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.96×
    Maintaining
    Capex $24M ÷ depreciation $25M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.99×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $176M vs $683M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +277%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.05/share (latest year $5.26), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $27.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 13% early to 19% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 22%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +18%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 18% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 12.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.3%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Our use of artificial intelligence ("AI") has enabled us to develop new products and marketing more rapidly.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$998M
  • Cash & short-term investments$237M
  • Receivables$333M
  • Inventory$370M
  • Other current assets$58M
Current liabilities$306M
  • Debt due within a year$50M
  • Accounts payable$85M
  • Other current liabilities$170M
Current ratio3.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.05×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.77×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$692Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$50M due · $237M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 3.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$564Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$178M$21M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $996M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$239M · 24%
  • Dividends$495M · 50%
  • Buybacks$77K · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$262M · 26%
  • Returned to owners$495M

    55% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $495M as dividends and $77K as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $77K over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count2.7%

    The diluted count rose from 31M to 32M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$3.20/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 21% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained26%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($426M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $110M, so each retained $1 added about 0.26 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$326M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $239M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Jean Madar$1.4M$1.2M$54M
2021Jean Madar$1.2M$3.2M$107M
2022Jean Madar$1.4M$945k$50M
2023Jean Madar$2.0M$2.8M$99M
2024Jean Madar$2.0M$1.9M$183M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$2M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Inter Parfums is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Personal Care Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
COTYCoty Inc.$5.9B60%-1.0%-1%4%
SCLStepan$2.3B17%7.3%12%4%
EPCEdgewell Personal Care$2.2B45%9.0%6%6%
ELFe.l.f. Beauty$1.6B65%10.3%7%8%
LNTHLantheus Holdings$1.5B51%17.2%24%17%
IPARInter Parfums$1.5B63%15.8%19%10%
ALKSAlkermes$1.5B84%-4.8%-7%3%
OLPXOlaplex Holdings Inc.$423M69%27.1%7%35%
Group median62%9.7%7%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Inter Parfums has delivered.

Inter Parfums’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Inter Parfums earns about $147M on its 9.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+24%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $198M on 32M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net cash $80M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Inter Parfums (IPAR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IPAR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IP its page in the Manual IPG →

Industry order: ← HLN the Personal Care Products chapter KVUE →