Owner Scorecard


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EPC, Edgewell Personal Care

Personal Care Products consumer brand Cyclical

Edgewell Personal Care Company, is one of the world's largest manufacturers and marketers of personal care products in the Wet Shave, Sun and Skin Care, and Feminine Care segments.

With operations in approximately 20 countries, our products are widely available in more than 50 countries.

During the years that followed, we implemented a strategy of acquiring several personal care brands, which created the foundation for the company we are today.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
EPC · Edgewell Personal Care
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.2B
−1.3% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.2B 5-yr avg $2.2B
Gross margin 40% 5-yr avg 42%
Operating margin 1.7% 5-yr avg 8.6%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg −2%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Wet Shave (55%), Sun and Skin Care (33%) and Feminine Care (12%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 45% and operating margin about 9.0% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.7% to 11% — on a steadier 45% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Wet Shave at 55%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Wet Shave55%$1.2B
  • Sun and Skin Care33%$743M
  • Feminine Care12%$262M
By geographyUnited States54%International46%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.3B$2.2B$2.1B$1.9B$2.1B$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.2B$2.2BRevenueRevenue
49%46%45%45%46%41%42%42%42%40%Gross marginGross mgn
18%19%19%20%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%3%2%3%3%3%3%3%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$16M$232M$244M$176M$240M$182M$227M$199M$97M$38MOperating incomeOp. inc.
0.7%10.4%11.4%9.0%11.5%8.4%10.1%8.8%4.3%1.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$6M$103M($372M)$68M$118M$100M$115M$99M$25M($78M)Net incomeNet inc.
37%23%20%20%22%18%-8%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$314M$259M$191M$233M$229M$102M($216M)($231M)$118M$117MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$94M$98M$94M$89M$87M$90M$91M$88M$89M$86MDepreciationDeprec.
$191M$42M$451M$57M($3M)($111M)($450M)($444M)($20M)$88MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$69M$62M$58M$48M$57M$56M$50M$57M$77M$69MCapexCapex
3.0%2.8%2.7%2.4%2.7%2.6%2.2%2.5%3.5%3.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$245M$197M$133M$185M$172M$46M($266M)($288M)$41M$49MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.6%8.8%6.2%9.5%8.2%2.1%−11.8%−12.8%1.9%2.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$245M$197M$133M$185M$172M$46M($266M)($288M)$41M$49MFree cash flowFCF
10.6%8.8%6.2%9.5%8.2%2.1%−11.8%−12.8%1.9%2.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$34M$90M$0$234M$300K$309M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$0$26M$33M$32M$31M$29M$29MDividends paidDiv. paid
$165M$124M$0$0$9M$125M$75M$59M$90MBuybacksBuybacks
5%6%8%5%7%6%4%ROICROIC
0%6%-29%5%7%7%7%6%2%-5%Return on equityROE
0%−29%5%6%5%5%4%−0%−7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$503M$266M$342M$365M$479M$189M$216M$209M$226M$300MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$224M$227M$206M$159M$151M$137M$106M$109M$138M$185MReceivablesReceiv.
$334M$330M$357M$314M$346M$449M$492M$477M$485M$450MInventoryInvent.
$224M$238M$223M$182M$210M$229M$194M$219M$220M$231MAccounts payablePayables
$334M$318M$340M$291M$287M$357M$404M$367M$403M$404MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B$951M$1.0B$984M$1.1B$942M$962M$936M$996M$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$524M$717M$660M$511M$537M$540M$523M$564M$566M$614MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.3×1.3×1.6×1.9×2.1×1.7×1.8×1.7×1.8×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.4B$1.5B$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$4.2B$4.0B$3.4B$3.5B$3.7B$3.7B$3.7B$3.7B$3.8B$3.5BTotal assetsAssets
$1.5B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.4B$1.7BTotal debtDebt
$1.0B$1.0B$873M$873M$755M$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.2×3.4×3.9×2.9×3.5×2.6×2.9×2.6×1.3×0.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.7B$1.7B$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%0.8%0.8%1.0%1.3%1.1%1.2%1.2%1.1%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$319M$24M$408M$51M$89MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
57.5M54.5M54.1M54.6M55.2M53.6M51.8M50.1M47.6M46.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$39.97$41.00$39.57$35.71$37.81$40.52$43.47$44.98$46.71$48.05Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.10$1.90$-6.88$1.24$2.13$1.86$2.21$1.97$0.53$-1.67EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.25$3.62$2.45$3.39$3.12$0.85$-5.13$-5.74$0.87$1.05Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.25$3.62$2.45$3.39$3.12$0.85$-5.13$-5.74$0.87$1.05Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.46$0.61$0.61$0.61$0.62$0.62Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.20$1.14$1.07$0.87$1.03$1.05$0.96$1.13$1.62$1.48Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$30.29$32.01$24.09$26.35$28.82$27.37$29.74$31.62$32.63$31.14Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.0%/yr+5.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share−18.0%/yr−23.8%/yr
EPS+23.4%/yr−15.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.8%/yr+13.1%/yr
Book value / share+0.9%/yr+4.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
48Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
4%low FY2025
Gross margin
42%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
28.0×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$41Mowner earningsvs.$25Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $25M of profit into $41M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$25M
Owner earnings$41M · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$25M$99M$115M$100M$118M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$89M+$88M+$91M+$90M+$87M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$25M+$27M+$28M+$24M+$27M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$20M−$444M−$450M−$111M−$3M
Cash from operations$118M($231M)($216M)$102M$229M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$77M−$57M−$50M−$56M−$57M
Owner earnings$41M($288M)($266M)$46M$172M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%-13%-12%2%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $25M), owner earnings is nearer $17M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $97M ÷ interest expense $73M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.5B · 15.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $226M − debt $1.7B
    What this means

    Netting $226M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 15.5× a year's operating profit (17.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 23 + DIO 136 − DPO 62 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    7-yr median, range 4%–8%; 3% latest = NOPAT $97M ÷ invested capital $3.0B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -13%–11%; latest $41M = operating cash $118M − maintenance capex $77M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25M of SBC) leaves $17M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $118M ÷ net income $25M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $120M ÷ Owner Earnings $41M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $41M of Owner Earnings, $120M (289%) went back to shareholders, $29M dividends, $90M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $25M stock comp, the real buyback was about $66M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.87×
    Maintaining
    Capex $77M ÷ depreciation $89M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.76×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs $430M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.73/share (latest year $0.55), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $33.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 7% early, 8% lately, median 9%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2017 · 0.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$300M
  • Receivables$185M
  • Inventory$450M
  • Other current assets$174M
Current liabilities$614M
  • Accounts payable$231M
  • Other current liabilities$383M
Current ratio1.81×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.07×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.49×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$496Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 1.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($500M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($976M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.3B$73M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $999M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$533M · 53%
  • Dividends$150M · 15%
  • Buybacks$648M · 65%
  • Returned to owners$798M

    171% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $150M as dividends and $648M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$332M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $332M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.5B to $1.7B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $203M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$45.65

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $648M, about $45.65 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $30.67 (2021) to $75.18 (2017), and 2017, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($165M).

  • Net change in share count−19.1%

    The diluted count fell from 58M to 47M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.62/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.2B59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity83%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$668Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $533M of capital spent building

$803M written down across 4 years (2017, 2018, 2019, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Rod R. Little$8.1M$12.0M$172M
2022Rod R. Little$9.3M$10.6M$46M
2023Rod R. Little$10.5M$9.1M($266M)
2024Rod R. Little$10.1M$6.8M($288M)
2025Rod R. Little$9.8M−$1.6M$41M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio198:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$25M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 25% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Edgewell Personal Care is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−7.6% vs 8.6%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.6% early in the record and −7.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$389M · 17% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
    “The Company's largest customer, Walmart Inc. and its affiliates (collectively, "Walmart"), accounted for approximately 17.4 % of consolidated net sales in fiscal 2025.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Personal Care Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
COTYCoty Inc.$5.9B60%-1.0%-1%4%
SCLStepan$2.3B17%7.3%12%4%
EXELExelixis Inc.$2.3B96%23.9%18%34%
EPCEdgewell Personal Care$2.2B45%9.0%6%6%
MRNAModerna Inc.$1.9B55%-126.4%-35%-77%
SRPTSarepta$1.9B-93.0%-25%-63%
ELFe.l.f. Beauty$1.6B65%10.3%7%8%
IPARInter Parfums$1.5B63%15.8%19%10%
Group median60%8.1%6%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Edgewell Personal Care has delivered.

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Through the cycle, Edgewell Personal Care earns about $138M on its 6.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $49M on 46M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Edgewell Personal Care (EPC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EPC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EPAM its page in the Manual EPD →

Industry order: ← ELF the Personal Care Products chapter HLF →