Owner Scorecard


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LNTH, Lantheus Holdings

Biotechnology consumer brand Cyclical

Our diagnostic products provide information that enables HCPs to better detect and characterize, or rule out, disease, with the potential to achieve better patient outcomes, reduce patient risk, and limit overall costs.

We classify our products into three product categories: Radiopharmaceutical Oncology, Precision Diagnostics, and Strategic Partnerships and Other Revenue.

Our Radiopharmaceutical Oncology product helps healthcare professionals ("HCPs") Find, Fight and Follow cancer.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LNTH · Lantheus Holdings
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.5B
+0.5% YoY · 35% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.5B 5-yr avg $1.1B
Gross margin 60% 5-yr avg 57%
Operating margin 18.8% 5-yr avg 13.5%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 21%
Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 23%
Free cash flow margin 24% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 50% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −14% and 30% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 24%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$302M$331M$343M$347M$339M$425M$935M$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5BRevenueRevenue
46%49%51%50%41%44%62%55%64%61%60%Gross marginGross mgn
13%15%15%18%20%35%14%10%13%18%18%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%5%5%6%10%11%33%6%11%12%12%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$57M$52M$64M$52M($4M)($61M)$36M$365M$457M$311M$290MOperating incomeOp. inc.
18.7%15.6%18.8%14.9%−1.2%−14.3%3.9%28.1%29.8%20.2%18.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$27M$123M$41M$32M($13M)($71M)$28M$327M$312M$234M$279MNet incomeNet inc.
5%18%-5%21%28%26%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$50M$55M$61M$80M$16M$54M$282M$305M$545M$390M$408MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$18M$19M$14M$13M$25M$42M$48M$60M$65M$70M$79MDepreciationDeprec.
$2M($94M)($2M)$23M($9M)$67M$177M($132M)$91M$921K($31M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$7M$18M$20M$22M$0$0$260M$45M$52M$36M$31MCapexCapex
2.5%5.3%5.9%6.4%0.0%0.0%27.8%3.5%3.4%2.3%2.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$42M$37M$47M$67M$16M$54M$234M$260M$493M$354M$377MOwner earningsOwner earn.
14.0%11.2%13.8%19.3%4.8%12.7%25.0%20.0%32.1%23.0%24.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$42M$37M$41M$58M$16M$54M$22M$260M$493M$354M$377MFree cash flowFCF
14.0%11.2%12.0%16.8%4.8%12.7%2.3%20.0%32.1%23.0%24.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$75M$0$100M$300MBuybacksBuybacks
44%24%24%24%-1%-9%6%44%45%18%17%ROICROIC
530%57%28%-3%-15%6%40%29%21%23%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$51M$76M$113M$93M$80M$99M$416M$714M$913M$359M$499MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$37M$40M$44M$44M$54M$89M$213M$284M$321M$359M$356MReceivablesReceiv.
$18M$26M$33M$29M$36M$35M$35M$64M$68M$65M$61MInventoryInvent.
$19M$17M$18M$19M$16M$21M$21M$41M$35M$43M$46MAccounts payablePayables
$36M$49M$59M$54M$73M$104M$228M$307M$355M$380M$371MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$111M$148M$195M$173M$184M$236M$678M$1.1B$1.3B$900M$942MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$44M$47M$53M$66M$81M$90M$248M$187M$241M$333M$333MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×3.2×3.7×2.6×2.3×2.6×2.7×5.8×5.5×2.7×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$16M$16M$16M$16M$59M$61M$61M$61M$61M$240M$239MGoodwillGoodwill
$256M$384M$440M$406M$870M$864M$1.3B$1.7B$2.0B$2.2B$2.3BTotal assetsAssets
$278M$268M$266M$194M$218M$175M$558M$562M$566M$569M$570MTotal debtDebt
$227M$192M$153M$101M$139M$76M$142M($151M)($347M)$210M$72MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.1×2.8×3.7×3.8×-0.4×-7.8×5.0×18.2×23.2×15.7×14.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($107M)$23M$71M$115M$514M$464M$447M$816M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%1.8%2.5%3.6%4.1%3.7%3.1%3.9%5.0%5.6%5.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
32.7M38.9M39.5M40.1M54.1M67.5M70.7M70.2M71.7M68.4M65.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.24$8.52$8.69$8.66$6.27$6.30$13.23$18.46$21.41$22.52$23.51Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.82$3.17$1.03$0.79$-0.25$-1.06$0.40$4.65$4.36$3.41$4.24EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.29$0.96$1.20$1.67$0.30$0.80$3.31$3.70$6.88$5.17$5.73Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.29$0.96$1.04$1.45$0.30$0.80$0.31$3.70$6.88$5.17$5.73Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.23$0.45$0.51$0.55$0.00$0.00$3.68$0.65$0.72$0.53$0.47Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-3.26$0.60$1.80$2.86$9.50$6.88$6.33$11.62$15.18$15.92$18.43Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.4%/yr+29.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+16.6%/yr+76.4%/yr
EPS+17.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.8%/yr
Book value / share+10.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
68Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
18%low FY2021
Gross margin
61%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.6×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$354Mowner earningsvs.$234Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $234M of profit into $354M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$234M
Owner earnings$354M · 23% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$234M$312M$327M$28M($71M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$70M+$65M+$60M+$48M+$42M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$86M+$76M+$51M+$29M+$16M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$921K+$91M−$132M+$177M+$67M
Cash from operations$390M$545M$305M$282M$54M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$36M−$52M−$45M−$48M
Owner earnings$354M$493M$260M$234M$54M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$212M
Free cash flow$354M$493M$260M$22M$54M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue23%32%20%25%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $86M), owner earnings is nearer $268M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $311M ÷ interest expense $20M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $210M · 0.7× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $359M − debt $569M
    What this means

    Netting $359M of cash and short-term investments against $569M of debt leaves $210M owed, about 0.7× a year's operating profit (1.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 85 + DIO 39 − DPO 26 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -9%–45%; 18% latest = NOPAT $231M ÷ invested capital $1.3B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 5%–32%; latest $354M = operating cash $390M − maintenance capex $36M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $86M of SBC) leaves $268M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $390M ÷ net income $234M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $300M ÷ Owner Earnings $354M
    What this means

    Of $354M Owner Earnings, $300M (85%) went back to shareholders, $123K dividends, $300M buybacks. Net of $86M stock comp, the real buyback was about $214M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.51×
    Harvesting
    Capex $36M ÷ depreciation $70M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.70×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $569M vs $567M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +358%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.47/share (latest year $3.59), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.74/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 18% early to 26% lately, median 16% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 32%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +30%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 30% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −14.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“We offer our Digital Solutions to HCPs for clinical use and to pharmaceutical companies for development purposes, and in some cases, we also obtain clinical imaging data that we may use to further develop artificial intelligence solutions .”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$942M
  • Cash & short-term investments$499M
  • Receivables$356M
  • Inventory$61M
  • Other current assets$27M
Current liabilities$333M
  • Debt due within a year$803K
  • Accounts payable$46M
  • Other current liabilities$286M
Current ratio2.83×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.64×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.50×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$609Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$803K due · $499M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.7× → 2.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$267Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($192M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$618M$59M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$460M · 25%
  • Buybacks$475M · 26%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$903M · 49%
  • Returned to owners$475M

    30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $475M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $292M and cash and short-term investments rose $447M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$72.92

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $175M, about $72.92 each.

  • Net change in share count101.4%

    The diluted count rose from 33M to 66M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained58%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($563M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $327M, so each retained $1 added about 0.58 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$962M43% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity22%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $460M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mary Anne Heino$6.2M$14.9M$54M
2022Mary Anne Heino$9.5M$21.0M$234M
2023Mary Anne Heino$12.6M$19.7M$260M
2024Brian A. Markison$788k$9.6M$493M
2024Mary Anne Heino$13.4M$18.8M$493M
2025Brian A. Markison$13.9M$3.5M$354M
2025Mary Anne Heino$2.2M$135k$354M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio79:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$86M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 28% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Lantheus Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?101.4%

    Diluted shares grew 101.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $475M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?18% → 27% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $54M to $417M while revenue grew 412%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (18% of revenue then, 27% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Biotechnology

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
QDELQuidelOrtho$2.7B4.6%24%2%
PTCTPTC Therapeutics Inc.$1.7B97%-55.4%-45%-28%
LNTHLantheus Holdings$1.5B51%17.2%24%17%
ALKSAlkermes$1.5B84%-4.8%-7%3%
HALOHalozyme$1.4B83%37.1%17%39%
PAHCPhibro Animal Health Corporation$1.3B32%8.8%16%3%
NEOGNeogen$895M47%16.0%9%10%
MYGNMyriad Genetics Inc.$825M70%-17.7%-14%9%
Group median70%6.7%13%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lantheus Holdings has delivered.

Lantheus Holdings’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Lantheus Holdings earns about $257M on its 16.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+31%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+30%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $377M on 65M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $72M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lantheus Holdings (LNTH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LNTH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LNT its page in the Manual LOAR →

Industry order: ← KYMR the Biotechnology chapter LXEO →