Share count
15Mpeak FY2020
← All companies ← ESE Manual ESI → ← EIG Insurance — Property & Casualty ESNT →
ESGR, Enstar Group
A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
$1.2B
−16.4% YoY · −11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $204M −19.4% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $59M yr-ago $128M
Net margin 28.9% yr-ago 50.6%
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 46% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from −21% to 80% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2015–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2015’15 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMMar 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $904M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $619M | $2.2B | $2.7B | $789M | ($1.1B) | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 43% | 37% | 40% | 56% | 19% | 19% | 47% | −31% | 26% | 32% | 34% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $252M | $320M | $333M | ($128M) | $1.0B | $1.8B | $634M | ($793M) | $958M | $727M | $654M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 27.9% | 28.2% | 30.3% | −20.7% | 45.8% | 69.2% | 80.4% | 75.2% | 66.5% | 60.3% | 56.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $220M | $265M | $311M | ($150M) | $938M | $1.8B | $538M | ($870M) | $1.1B | $576M | $507M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 5% | 12% | -2% | — | 1% | 1% | 5% | — | — | 10% | 10% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($265M) | ($203M) | ($343M) | ($160M) | $1.8B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $257M | $523M | $483M | $794M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $41M | $35M | $36M | $32M | $35M | $59M | $74M | $47M | $7M | $11M | $8M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($526M) | ($502M) | ($691M) | ($42M) | $791M | $968M | $3.2B | $1.1B | ($602M) | ($82M) | $295M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $18M | $4M | $245M | $0 | $0 | $206M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $26M | $942M | $163M | $531M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 10% | 11% | 12% | -2% | 18% | 25% | 9% | -10% | 14% | 10% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| 9% | 9% | 10% | -4% | 19% | 26% | 9% | -17% | 20% | 9% | 8% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 9% | 10% | −4% | 19% | 26% | 9% | −17% | 20% | 9% | 8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $795M | $955M | $955M | $536M | $624M | $901M | $1.6B | $822M | $564M | $1.1B | $1.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $73M | $73M | $73M | $110M | $110M | $63M | $63M | — | — | — | $63M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $11.8B | $12.9B | $13.6B | $16.6B | $19.8B | $21.6B | $24.7B | $22.2B | $20.9B | $20.4B | $20.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $600M | $674M | $647M | $862M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.9B | Total debtDebt |
| ($195M) | ($281M) | ($308M) | $326M | $567M | $472M | $45M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $735M | $778M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 13.0× | 15.5× | 11.9× | -5.0× | 18.9× | 31.2× | 9.2× | -8.9× | 10.6× | 8.2× | 7.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $2.5B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.9B | $4.8B | $6.7B | $6.3B | $5.0B | $5.5B | $6.1B | $6.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | — | — | $8M | — | — | — | $63M | $63M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 19.4M | 19.4M | 19.5M | 20.9M | 21.8M | 21.8M | 20.1M | 17.3M | 15.8M | 15.0M | 15.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $46.60 | $58.43 | $56.38 | $29.62 | $100.57 | $121.92 | $39.20 | $-60.84 | $91.19 | $80.11 | $76.81 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $11.35 | $13.62 | $15.95 | $-7.19 | $43.08 | $80.62 | $26.73 | $-50.22 | $70.75 | $38.30 | $33.69 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $129.68 | $144.10 | $160.63 | $186.66 | $222.37 | $305.89 | $314.15 | $287.13 | $350.26 | $404.96 | $412.40 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.2%/yr | −4.4%/yr |
| EPS | +14.5%/yr | −2.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +13.5%/yr | +12.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2015–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
10%low FY2022
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2019FY2024
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $727M ÷ interest expense $89M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $735M · 1.0× operating profitModest net debtCash $1.1B − debt $1.8B
What this means
Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $1.8B of debt leaves $735M owed, about 1.0× a year's operating profit (2.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -10%–25%; 10% latest = NOPAT $656M ÷ invested capital $6.8BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $483M ÷ net income $576M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +3%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $18.42/share (latest year $38.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $408.51/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2015–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 29% → 67% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 29% early to 67% lately, median 46% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2018 · −20.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −2.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Dominic Silvester | $23.5M | $27.7M | $1.8B |
| 2021 | Dominic Silvester | $5.2M | $14.7M | $538M |
| 2022 | Dominic Silvester | $20.9M | $7.3M | ($870M) |
| 2023 | Dominic Silvester | $7.5M | $25.2M | $1.1B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Enstar Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PGNYProgyny | $1.3B | 21% | 4.2% | 13% | 10% |
| STRAStrategic Education Inc. | $1.3B | — | 10.9% | 6% | 9% |
| PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd. | $1.3B | 41% | -1.3% | 4% | 3% |
| BBSIBarrett Business Services Inc. | $1.2B | 21% | 4.8% | 34% | 5% |
| ESGREnstar Group | $1.2B | — | 53.1% | 11% | — |
| PRAAPRA Group Inc. | $1.2B | — | 570.9% | 6% | 124% |
| PAYPaymentus Holdings Inc. | $1.2B | 30% | 5.1% | 13% | 7% |
| RSIRush Street Interactive Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | -19.3% | — | -1% |
| Group median | — | — | 5.0% | 11% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnstar Group is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered−17%/yr’19→’24
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Enstar Group (ESGR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ESGR, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← ESE its page in the Manual ESI →
Industry order: ← EIG the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter ESNT →