← All companies ← STOK Manual STRC → ← PRDO Education Services TAL →

STRA, Strategic Education Inc.

Education services company that provides access to high-quality education through campus-based and online post-secondary education offerings, as well as through programs to develop job-ready skills for high-demand markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

STRA · Strategic Education Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.3B

+4.0% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $1.2B

Operating margin 13.8% 5-yr avg 9.6%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 14% 5-yr avg 10%

Free cash flow margin 14% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is U.S. Higher Education (68%), Australia / New Zealand (20%) and Education Technology Services (12%).
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.6% to 14% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

U.S. Higher Education is 68% of revenue, with Australia / New Zealand the other meaningful segment at 20%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

U.S. Higher Education68%$868M
Australia / New Zealand20%$252M
Education Technology Services12%$148M

By geographyUnited States80%International20%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$441M	$455M	$634M	$997M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	RevenueRevenue
11%	28%	31%	27%	29%	32%	36%	34%	34%	34%	34%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$57M	$52M	($23M)	$111M	$109M	$74M	$71M	$95M	$156M	$174M	$176M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
13.0%	11.5%	−3.6%	11.1%	10.6%	6.5%	6.6%	8.4%	12.8%	13.7%	13.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$35M	$21M	($16M)	$81M	$86M	$55M	$47M	$70M	$113M	$127M	$130M	Net incomeNet inc.
39%	—	—	34%	24%	28%	33%	31%	30%	29%	27%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$45M	$56M	$47M	$202M	$143M	$181M	$126M	$117M	$169M	$198M	$218M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$18M	$19M	$31M	$50M	$52M	$59M	$52M	$48M	$44M	$48M	$48M	DepreciationDeprec.
($19M)	$5M	$16M	$59M	($10M)	$48M	$6M	($21M)	($13M)	$230K	$17M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$13M	$18M	$28M	$39M	$47M	$49M	$43M	$37M	$41M	$44M	$44M	CapexCapex
3.0%	4.0%	4.3%	3.9%	4.6%	4.4%	4.1%	3.3%	3.3%	3.5%	3.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$31M	$38M	$19M	$163M	$96M	$131M	$83M	$80M	$129M	$154M	$174M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
7.1%	8.4%	3.0%	16.4%	9.4%	11.6%	7.8%	7.1%	10.6%	12.1%	13.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$31M	$38M	$19M	$163M	$96M	$131M	$83M	$80M	$129M	$154M	$174M	Free cash flowFCF
7.1%	8.4%	3.0%	16.4%	9.4%	11.6%	7.8%	7.1%	10.6%	12.1%	13.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$8M	$0	$0	$0	$629M	$0	$800K	$530K	$177K	$36K	$36K	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$11M	$28M	$47M	$56M	$59M	$59M	$59M	$59M	$58M	$56M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	$0	$0	$247K	$6M	$40M	$10M	$12M	$139M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
59%	49%	-2%	7%	5%	3%	3%	4%	7%	8%	8%	ROICROIC
18%	10%	-1%	6%	5%	3%	3%	4%	7%	8%	8%	Return on equityROE
—	4%	−3%	2%	2%	−0%	−1%	1%	3%	4%	4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$129M	$156M	$312M	$420M	$188M	$269M	$236M	$209M	$199M	$153M	$163M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$21M	$23M	$56M	$52M	$50M	$51M	$63M	$76M	$76M	$78M	$86M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$41M	$46M	$86M	$91M	$105M	$96M	$91M	$91M	$102M	$106M	$115M	Accounts payablePayables
($21M)	($23M)	($30M)	($39M)	($55M)	($44M)	($28M)	($15M)	($26M)	($28M)	($29M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$161M	$190M	$420M	$524M	$286M	$368M	$329M	$329M	$305M	$278M	$304M	Current assetsCur. assets
$60M	$69M	$125M	$157M	$200M	$196M	$210M	$210M	$216M	$218M	$263M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×	2.8×	3.4×	3.3×	1.4×	1.9×	1.6×	1.6×	1.4×	1.3×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$21M	$21M	$733M	$732M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	GoodwillGoodwill
$299M	$321M	$1.7B	$1.8B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.1B	Total assetsAssets
—	—	—	$0	$142M	$142M	$101M	$61M	$0	—	$25M	Total debtDebt
—	—	—	($420M)	($46M)	($127M)	($135M)	($147M)	($199M)	—	($138M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
89.5×	81.3×	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	273.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$188M	$209M	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.4%	2.6%	2.4%	1.2%	1.4%	1.6%	2.0%	1.7%	2.1%	1.8%	1.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
10.8M	11.2M	15.2M	22.1M	22.9M	24.1M	24.0M	24.0M	24.1M	23.4M	22.2M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$40.67	$40.62	$41.75	$45.13	$44.95	$46.92	$44.40	$47.29	$50.54	$54.19	$57.31	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.21	$1.84	$-1.03	$3.67	$3.77	$2.28	$1.94	$2.91	$4.67	$5.41	$5.85	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.89	$3.40	$1.27	$7.40	$4.20	$5.43	$3.45	$3.35	$5.33	$6.58	$7.84	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.89	$3.40	$1.27	$7.40	$4.20	$5.43	$3.45	$3.35	$5.33	$6.58	$7.84	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	$1.02	$1.83	$2.11	$2.45	$2.45	$2.47	$2.45	$2.44	$2.46	$2.54	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.21	$1.61	$1.81	$1.75	$2.05	$2.05	$1.80	$1.54	$1.68	$1.89	$1.98	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.37	$18.68	$93.83	$66.19	$76.48	$71.06	$68.16	$68.98	$68.87	$70.35	$73.72	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.45 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.2%/yr	+3.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+9.6%/yr	+9.4%/yr
EPS	+6.0%/yr	+7.5%/yr
Dividends / share	+11.6%/yr (8-yr)	+0.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	+5.1%/yr	−1.6%/yr
Book value / share	+16.8%/yr	−1.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

23Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

8%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$154Mowner earningsvs.$127Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $127M of profit into $154M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$127M

Owner earnings$154M · 12% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$127M	$113M	$70M	$47M	$55M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$48M	+$44M	+$48M	+$52M	+$59M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$23M	+$26M	+$20M	+$22M	+$18M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$230K	−$13M	−$21M	+$6M	+$48M
Cash from operations	$198M	$169M	$117M	$126M	$181M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$44M	−$41M	−$37M	−$43M	−$49M
Owner earnings	$154M	$129M	$80M	$83M	$131M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	12%	11%	7%	8%	12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer $131M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 271.4×

Comfortable

Operating income $174M ÷ interest expense $642K

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$128M

Net cash

Cash $141M + ST investments $7M − debt $20M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $128M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $5M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $133M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -2%–59%; 8% latest = NOPAT $124M ÷ invested capital $1.5B

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 3%–16%; latest $154M = operating cash $198M − maintenance capex $44M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves $131M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.57×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $198M ÷ net income $127M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 128%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $196M ÷ Owner Earnings $154M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $154M of Owner Earnings, $196M (128%) went back to shareholders, $58M dividends, $139M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $23M stock comp, the real buyback was about $116M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.91×

Maintaining

Capex $44M ÷ depreciation $48M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.27×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $20M vs $60M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Near

Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +678%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.56/share (latest year $5.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $72.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 7% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 12% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +17%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.
Worst year 2018 · −3.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$304M

Cash & short-term investments$158M
Receivables$86M
Other current assets$60M

Current liabilities$263M

Debt due within a year$6M
Accounts payable$115M
Other current liabilities$142M

Current ratio1.16×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.16×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.60×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$41Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$6M due · $158M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$128Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($140M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$115M$109M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$169Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$359M · 28%
Dividends$435M · 34%
Buybacks$207M · 16%
Retained (debt / cash)$283M · 22%

Returned to owners$642M
69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $435M as dividends and $207M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $207M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count104.4%
The diluted count rose from 11M to 22M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$2.46/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.5B73% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity75%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$806Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $359M of capital spent building

$14M written down across 1 year (2018): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Karl McDonnell	$6.2M	$1.3M	$131M
2022	Karl McDonnell	$5.5M	$10.0M	$83M
2023	Karl McDonnell	$5.4M	$8.2M	$80M
2024	Karl McDonnell	$5.5M	$6.1M	$129M
2025	Karl McDonnell	$5.7M	$4.0M	$154M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

CEO pay ratio69:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$23M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Strategic Education Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?104.4%
Diluted shares grew 104.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $207M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?5% → 7% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $21M to $86M while revenue grew 188%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (5% of revenue then, 7% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $29M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Education Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GHCGraham Holdings Company	$4.9B	—	4.6%	3%	5%
LRNStride Inc.	$2.4B	35%	5.8%	11%	11%
STRAStrategic Education Inc.	$1.3B	—	10.9%	6%	9%
LOPEGrand Canyon Education Inc.	$1.1B	—	28.1%	27%	24%
PRDOPerdoceo Education Corporation	$846M	—	19.7%	16%	17%
UTIUniversal Technical Institute Inc	$836M	—	1.5%	2%	4%
Group median	—	—	8.3%	8%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Strategic Education Inc. has delivered.

Strategic Education Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Strategic Education Inc. earns about $112M on its 8.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($112M) Net of stock comp (−$23M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+7%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+17%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $174M on 23M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-10; net cash $138M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh STRA against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Strategic Education Inc. (STRA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/STRA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← STOK its page in the Manual STRC →

Industry order: ← PRDO the Education Services chapter TAL →