Owner Scorecard


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ESOA, Energy Services of America Corporation

Construction & Engineering capital-intensive

Energy Services of America Corporation, formed in 2006, is a contractor and service company that operates primarily in the mid-Atlantic and central regions of the United States and provides services to customers in the natural gas, petroleum, water distribution, automotive, chemical, and power industries.

Energy Services is involved in the construction of both interstate and intrastate pipelines, with an emphasis on the latter.

For the oil industry, the Company provides a variety of services relating to pipeline, storage facilities and plant work.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ESOA · Energy Services of America Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$411M
+16.8% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $441M 5-yr avg $277M
Gross margin 12% 5-yr avg 12%
Operating margin 3.8% 5-yr avg 2.7%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 1%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Electrical, Mechanical, and General (48%), Gas and Water Distribution (36%) and Gas and Petroleum Transmission (16%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 11% and operating margin about 2.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −0.9% to 5.6% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Electrical, Mechanical, and General at 48%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Electrical, Mechanical, and General48%$197M
  • Gas and Water Distribution36%$150M
  • Gas and Petroleum Transmission16%$65M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$140M$135M$175M$119M$122M$198M$304M$352M$411M$441MRevenueRevenue
6%9%7%11%11%11%12%14%9%12%Gross marginGross mgn
5%6%5%8%11%8%8%9%8%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$382K$4M$4M$4M($1M)$6M$13M$20M$4M$17MOperating incomeOp. inc.
0.3%2.9%2.2%3.1%−0.9%3.3%4.3%5.6%1.0%3.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($388K)$3M$2M$2M($1M)$4M$4MNet incomeNet inc.
27%37%35%38%49%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1M$9M$4M$15M$799K$8M$21M$19M$4M$17MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3M$4M$4M$4M$5M$6M$7M$9M$12M$13MDepreciationDeprec.
($2M)$2M($2M)$8M($3M)($1M)($300K)Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M$2M$3M$4M$6M$5M$11M$9M$6M$7MCapexCapex
2.0%1.4%1.9%3.0%4.9%2.7%3.6%2.5%1.5%1.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($2M)$7M$962K$11M($4M)$3M$14M$10M($2M)$10MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−1.1%5.3%0.6%9.6%−3.2%1.5%4.5%2.8%−0.5%2.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($2M)$7M$962K$11M($5M)$3M$10M$10M($2M)$10MFree cash flowFCF
−1.1%5.3%0.6%9.6%−4.3%1.5%3.4%2.8%−0.5%2.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$696K$696K$0$0$833K$994K$2M$2MDividends paidDiv. paid
$50K$301K$268K$0$0$220K$41K$844KBuybacksBuybacks
9%7%8%-3%11%24%35%3%ROICROIC
-2%11%7%8%-5%13%5%Return on equityROE
−5%6%−5%13%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$2M$1M$5M$11M$8M$7M$16M$13M$12M$10MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$23M$22M$22M$18M$21M$38M$51M$56M$76M$60MReceivablesReceiv.
$6M$6M$3M$5M$7M$20M$22M$24M$31M$21MAccounts payablePayables
$18M$16M$19M$13M$14M$18M$29M$32M$45M$39MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$38M$38M$39M$42M$43M$70M$95M$110M$145M$123MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$26M$24M$18M$19M$34M$65M$80M$74M$98M$88MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.6×2.1×2.2×1.2×1.1×1.2×1.5×1.5×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M$4M$4M$4M$10M$10MGoodwillGoodwill
$57M$55M$56M$58M$70M$113M$143M$158M$215M$194MTotal assetsAssets
$14M$10M$15M$15M$12M$18M$25M$24M$62M$25MTotal debtDebt
$13M$9M$11M$4M$4M$10M$9M$11M$50M$15MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.5×4.3×3.6×7.5×-1.6×6.6×5.4×9.1×1.3×4.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$21M$23M$25M$26M$25M$28M$35M$35M$54M$82MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
14.2M17.7M17.5M17.2M17.0M16.3M16.7M16.6M16.7M17.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.87$7.67$9.97$6.91$7.21$12.10$18.24$21.19$24.63$25.71Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.03$0.14$0.10$0.12$-0.07$0.23$0.22EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.11$0.41$0.05$0.66$-0.23$0.18$0.82$0.60$-0.13$0.56Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.11$0.41$0.05$0.66$-0.31$0.18$0.61$0.60$-0.13$0.56Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05$0.04$0.00$0.00$0.05$0.06$0.09$0.09Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.20$0.11$0.19$0.21$0.36$0.33$0.65$0.53$0.38$0.41Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.48$1.32$1.41$1.50$1.45$1.73$2.07$2.08$3.22$4.75Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.1%/yr+28.9%/yr
Dividends / share+7.9%/yr+17.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.7%/yr+13.2%/yr
Book value / share+10.2%/yr+16.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
17Mpeak FY2018
ROIC
3%low FY2021
Gross margin
9%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.1×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3Mowner earningsvs.$4Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2022 the business reported $4M of profit but $3M of owner earnings: $774K less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$4M
Owner earnings$3M · 2% of revenue
FY2022FY2021FY2020FY2019FY2018
Reported net income$4M($1M)$2M$2M$3M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$6M+$5M+$4M+$4M+$4M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$1M−$3M+$8M−$2M+$2M
Cash from operations$8M$799K$15M$4M$9M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$5M−$5M−$4M−$3M−$2M
Owner earnings$3M($4M)$11M$962K$7M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$1M
Free cash flow$3M($5M)$11M$962K$7M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%-3%10%1%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Restated past financials
“As a result of this uncertainty, the Company restated the previously issued audited financial statements of the Company for fiscal 2022 and 2021.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $4M ÷ interest expense $3M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $50M · 11.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $12M − debt $62M
    What this means

    Netting $12M of cash and short-term investments against $62M of debt leaves $50M owed, about 11.8× a year's operating profit (14.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -3%–35%; 4% latest = NOPAT $4M ÷ invested capital $103M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -3%–10%; latest ($2M) = operating cash $4M − maintenance capex $6M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $32K of SBC) leaves ($2M).

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $4M ÷ net income $4M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.53×
    Harvesting
    Capex $6M ÷ depreciation $12M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $411M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.48×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $62M vs $47M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +24%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.08/share (latest year $0.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.88/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 4% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 26%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −0.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +2.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$123M
  • Cash & short-term investments$10M
  • Receivables$60M
  • Other current assets$53M
Current liabilities$88M
  • Debt due within a year$9M
  • Accounts payable$21M
  • Other current liabilities$57M
Current ratio1.40×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratioinventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio0.12×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$35Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$9M due · $10M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+21.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$67Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$11MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$27M$2M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$29Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $83M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$49M · 59%
  • Dividends$5M · 6%
  • Buybacks$2M · 2%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$27M · 33%
  • Returned to owners$6M

    17% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $5M as dividends and $2M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$5.18

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $1M, about $5.18 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $2.20 (2023) to $7.94 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($844K).

  • Net change in share count20.4%

    The diluted count rose from 14M to 17M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.09/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained241%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $5M, so each retained $1 added about 2.41 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Douglas V. Reynolds$190k$246k$14M
2024Douglas V. Reynolds$269k$472k$10M
2025Douglas V. Reynolds$209k$226k($2M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership25.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$32K

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Energy Services of America Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?20.4%

    Diluted shares grew 20.4% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $2M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Construction & Engineering

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PRIMPrimoris Services$7.6B11%4.5%12%2%
DYDycom Industries$5.5B6.4%10%3%
MYRGMYR Group$3.7B11%3.5%12%3%
STRLSterling Infrastructure$2.5B15%7.6%16%8%
ORNOrion Group Holdings Inc. Common$852M9%0.3%-4%1%
PLPCPreformed Line Products Company$669M32%8.4%10%5%
CDNLCardinal Infrastructure Group Inc.$456M11.4%14%7%
ESOAEnergy Services of America Corporation$411M11%2.9%9%2%
Group median11%5.4%11%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Energy Services of America Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Energy Services of America Corporation earns about $6M on its 1.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’20–’22)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $10M on 19M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-08; net debt $15M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Energy Services of America Corporation (ESOA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ESOA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ESNT its page in the Manual ESPR →

Industry order: ← ENGS the Construction & Engineering chapter FER →