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FCX, Freeport-McMoRan Inc.

Metals & Mining capital-intensive Cyclical

Freeport-McMoRan digs copper out of the ground and sells it, mostly as refined cathode and as concentrate that smelters cook into metal. The same ore yields gold and molybdenum alongside the copper. Its buyers are the smelters, refiners, and manufacturers who turn the metal into wire, pipe, and the wiring of nearly everything electrical.

Across our U.S. and South America operations, we are incorporating new applications, technologies and data analytics into our leaching processes.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

FCX · Freeport-McMoRan Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$25.2B

+0.1% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $25.9B 5-yr avg $23.8B

Operating margin 28.4% 5-yr avg 29.6%

ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 20%

Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 17%

Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Cathode (32%) and Concentrate (25%), with 5 more lines behind.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: The price of copper is set on world exchanges, not by Freeport, so the franchise-or-commodity test is settled before it starts: this is a price-taker, and the whole game is cost. What decides the outcome is whether the ore bodies are rich enough, and the mines low enough on the cost curve, to earn money when the metal is cheap — so watch cost per pound through the cycle, the grade and remaining life of the major deposits, and whether capital is spent with discipline rather than at the top. The bad case is plain: a long stretch of soft prices against a fixed, heavy cost base, mines that cannot be moved, and debt that must be served whatever copper does. The figures for margins, returns, and leverage are in the record below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Cathode at 32%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Cathode32%$8.1B
Concentrate25%$6.3B
Refined Copper Products18%$4.4B
Gold15%$3.9B
Molybdenum8%$2.0B
Other3%$749M
Purchased Copper2%$449M

By geographyUnited States36%Switzerland21%Japan11%Indonesia9%Singapore5%United Kingdom5%Other16%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$14.6B	$15.9B	$18.9B	$14.3B	$13.9B	$22.4B	$23.3B	$22.7B	$25.2B	$25.2B	$25.9B	RevenueRevenue
—	25%	29%	9%	—	37%	35%	31%	29%	26%	—	Gross marginGross mgn
4%	3%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	2%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($2.7B)	$3.7B	$4.8B	$1.1B	$2.4B	$8.4B	$7.0B	$6.2B	$6.9B	$6.5B	$7.4B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−18.7%	23.2%	25.1%	7.6%	17.5%	37.3%	30.2%	27.4%	27.3%	25.9%	28.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($4.2B)	$1.8B	$2.6B	($239M)	$599M	$4.3B	$3.5B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.7B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	33%	28%	—	—	35%	40%	55%	57%	50%	46%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$3.7B	$4.7B	$3.9B	$1.5B	$3.0B	$7.7B	$5.1B	$5.3B	$7.2B	$5.6B	$6.0B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2.6B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.3B	DepreciationDeprec.
$5.2B	$1.1B	($569M)	$246M	$791M	$1.3B	($443M)	$1.3B	$2.9B	$1.0B	$887M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2.8B	$1.4B	$2.0B	$2.7B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$3.5B	$4.8B	$4.8B	$4.5B	$4.3B	CapexCapex
19.3%	8.9%	10.4%	18.5%	14.1%	9.4%	14.9%	21.2%	19.1%	17.8%	16.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$924M	$3.3B	$1.9B	$70M	$1.5B	$5.6B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$4.9B	$3.4B	$3.8B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.3%	20.5%	10.0%	0.5%	10.7%	25.0%	13.4%	14.1%	19.5%	13.4%	14.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$924M	$3.3B	$1.9B	($1.2B)	$1.1B	$5.6B	$1.7B	$455M	$2.4B	$1.1B	$1.8B	Free cash flowFCF
6.3%	20.5%	10.0%	−8.2%	7.6%	25.0%	7.2%	2.0%	9.3%	4.4%	6.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M	$2M	$218M	$291M	$73M	$331M	$866M	$863M	$865M	$865M	$865M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	$0	$0	$488M	$1.3B	$0	$59M	$107M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-12%	15%	21%	3%	8%	36%	24%	15%	15%	13%	15%	ROICROIC
-69%	23%	27%	-3%	6%	31%	22%	11%	11%	12%	14%	Return on equityROE
−69%	23%	24%	−6%	5%	28%	17%	6%	6%	7%	10%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$4.3B	$4.6B	$4.3B	$2.1B	$3.7B	$8.1B	$8.1B	$4.8B	$3.9B	$3.8B	$3.8B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.1B	$1.3B	$829M	$741M	$892M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$578M	$977M	$681M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$2.0B	$2.7B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$4.1B	Accounts payablePayables
($414M)	($224M)	($832M)	($913M)	($581M)	($867M)	($1.4B)	($1.3B)	($2.2B)	($2.0B)	$1.6B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$10.4B	$10.6B	$10.5B	$7.9B	$9.3B	$14.8B	$15.6B	$14.1B	$13.3B	$13.8B	$14.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$4.3B	$4.9B	$3.3B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$5.9B	$6.3B	$5.8B	$5.5B	$6.0B	$5.9B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.4×	2.2×	3.1×	2.5×	2.7×	2.5×	2.5×	2.4×	2.4×	2.3×	2.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$37.3B	$37.3B	$42.2B	$40.8B	$42.1B	$48.0B	$51.1B	$52.5B	$54.8B	$58.2B	$58.8B	Total assetsAssets
$16.0B	$13.2B	$11.1B	$9.8B	$9.7B	$9.4B	$10.6B	$9.4B	$8.9B	$9.4B	$10.0B	Total debtDebt
$11.7B	$8.7B	$6.9B	$7.7B	$6.0B	$1.4B	$2.5B	$4.7B	$5.0B	$5.6B	$6.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$6.1B	$8.0B	$9.8B	$9.3B	$10.2B	$14.0B	$15.6B	$16.7B	$17.6B	$18.9B	$19.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.7%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
1.32B	1.45B	1.46B	1.45B	1.46B	1.48B	1.45B	1.44B	1.45B	1.44B	1.44B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$11.05	$10.93	$12.99	$9.89	$9.51	$15.13	$16.04	$15.73	$17.42	$17.45	$17.91	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.15	$1.25	$1.78	$-0.16	$0.41	$2.91	$2.39	$1.28	$1.31	$1.53	$1.89	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.70	$2.24	$1.30	$0.05	$1.02	$3.78	$2.15	$2.23	$3.40	$2.33	$2.60	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.70	$2.24	$1.30	$-0.81	$0.72	$3.78	$1.15	$0.32	$1.63	$0.77	$1.21	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00	$0.00	$0.15	$0.20	$0.05	$0.22	$0.60	$0.60	$0.60	$0.60	$0.60	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.13	$0.97	$1.35	$1.83	$1.34	$1.43	$2.39	$3.34	$3.33	$3.11	$2.97	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.59	$5.49	$6.72	$6.41	$6.96	$9.43	$10.72	$11.57	$12.17	$13.10	$13.51	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+5.2%/yr	+12.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+14.3%/yr	+18.0%/yr
EPS	—	+30.1%/yr
Dividends / share	+72.0%/yr	+64.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+4.3%/yr	+18.3%/yr
Book value / share	+12.4%/yr	+13.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

1.4Bpeak FY2021

ROIC

13%low FY2016

Gross margin

26%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.7×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.4Bowner earningsvs.$2.2Bnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $3.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.2B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.1B.

Reported net income$2.2B

Owner earnings$3.4B · 13% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2.2B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$3.5B	$4.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2.2B	+$2.2B	+$2.1B	+$2.0B	+$2.0B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$121M	+$109M	+$109M	+$95M	+$98M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1.0B	+$2.9B	+$1.3B	−$443M	+$1.3B
Cash from operations	$5.6B	$7.2B	$5.3B	$5.1B	$7.7B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$2.2B	−$2.2B	−$2.1B	−$2.0B	−$2.1B
Owner earnings	$3.4B	$4.9B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$5.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$2.3B	−$2.6B	−$2.8B	−$1.4B	—
Free cash flow	$1.1B	$2.4B	$455M	$1.7B	$5.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	13%	20%	14%	13%	25%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.2B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $121M), owner earnings is nearer $3.2B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 20.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $6.5B ÷ interest expense $312M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $7.3B · 1.1× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $3.8B − debt $11.1B

What this means
Netting $3.8B of cash and short-term investments against $11.1B of debt leaves $7.3B owed, about 1.1× a year's operating profit (1.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $70M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $7.2B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 55d

Tight

DSO 14 + DIO 98 − DPO 58 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 15%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -12%–36%; 12% latest = NOPAT $3.3B ÷ invested capital $26.2B

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 13%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 0%–25%; latest $3.4B = operating cash $5.6B − maintenance capex $2.2B

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $1.1B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $121M of SBC) leaves $3.2B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.55×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $5.6B ÷ net income $2.2B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 29%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $972M ÷ Owner Earnings $3.4B

What this means
Of $3.4B Owner Earnings, $972M (29%) went back to shareholders, $865M dividends, $107M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($121M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.00×

Expanding

Capex $4.5B ÷ depreciation $2.2B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $25.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.29×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $11.1B vs $7.8B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +2142%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.38/share (latest year $1.53), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.15/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → 27% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 10% early to 27% lately, median 25% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 35%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +8%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · −18.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Many of our business and operational processes utilize traditional and emerging technology systems, including AI, to conduct day-to-day operations, improve safety and efficiency, and lower costs.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$14.1B

Cash & short-term investments$3.7B
Receivables$681M
Inventory$5.0B
Other current assets$4.7B

Current liabilities$5.9B

Debt due within a year$500M
Accounts payable$4.1B
Other current liabilities$1.3B

Current ratio2.39×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.54×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.63×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$8.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$500M due · $3.7B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 2.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$19.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($13.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$10.5B$1.1B of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$35Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$24M

'27$1.3B

'28$925M

'29$477M

'30$1.0B

later$4.9B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$24Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$1.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$1.3Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$8.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$3.7B

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.4B

Together, against $24M due next year296.0×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $7.1B against the $24M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 296 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $47.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$30.5B · 64%
Dividends$4.4B · 9%
Buybacks$2.0B · 4%
Retained (debt / cash)$10.8B · 23%

Returned to owners$6.4B
23% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4.4B as dividends and $2.0B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$38.34
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 48M shares were bought for $1.8B, about $38.34 each.
Net change in share count9.6%
The diluted count rose from 1318M to 1444M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.60/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 72% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained23%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($8.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $1.8B, so each retained $1 added about 0.23 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Richard C. Adkerson	$19.1M	$75.7M	$5.6B
2022	Richard C. Adkerson	$20.5M	$7.2M	$3.1B
2023	Richard C. Adkerson	$24.0M	$25.3M	$3.2B
2024	Kathleen L. Quirk	$13.3M	$10.9M	$4.9B
2024	Richard C. Adkerson	$23.7M	$16.5M	$4.9B
2025	Kathleen L. Quirk	$14.8M	$24.4M	$3.4B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio128:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$121M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Freeport-McMoRan Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?9.6%
Diluted shares grew 9.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $2.0B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Metals & Mining

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FCXFreeport-McMoRan Inc.	$25.2B	29%	25.5%	15%	13%
NEMNewmont Corporation	$22.7B	—	12.0%	4%	19%
CLFCleveland-Cliffs	$18.6B	14%	8.4%	16%	9%
SCCOSouthern Copper Corporation	$13.4B	52%	41.5%	18%	24%
CDECoeur Mining Inc.	$2.1B	79%	4.3%	2%	2%
MPMP Materials	$224M	—	-10.4%	-4%	-3%
MUXMcEwen Inc.	$198M	77%	-43.0%	-9%	-7%
IAUXi-80 Gold Corp.	$95M	—	-177.0%	-15%	-157%
Group median	—	52%	6.4%	3%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Freeport-McMoRan Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Freeport-McMoRan Inc. earns about $3.4B on its 13.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($3.4B) Net of stock comp (−$135M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($3.8B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−1%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−2%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.8B on 1438M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $6.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4.3B) runs well above depreciation ($2.3B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $3.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh FCX against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (FCX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FCX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FCPT its page in the Manual FDMT →

Industry order: ← ERO the Metals & Mining chapter GAU →