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CLF, Cleveland-Cliffs
We are a leading North America-based steel producer with focus on value-added sheet products, particularly for the automotive industry.
We are vertically integrated from the mining of iron ore, production of pellets and direct reduced iron, and processing of ferrous scrap through primary steelmaking and downstream finishing, stamping, tooling and tubing.
Compared to other steel end markets, automotive steel is generally higher quality, more operationally and technologically intensive to produce, and requires significantly more devotion to customer service than other steel end markets.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 11% and operating margin about 8.4% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −8.5% and 29% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $5.4B | $20.4B | $23.0B | $22.0B | $19.2B | $18.6B | $18.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 18% | 25% | 35% | 29% | 5% | 22% | 11% | 6% | 0% | −5% | −3% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 7% | 6% | 5% | 6% | 5% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $131M | $390M | $673M | $429M | ($142M) | $4.0B | $1.9B | $659M | ($763M) | ($1.6B) | ($1.2B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.4% | 20.9% | 28.9% | 21.6% | −2.7% | 19.6% | 8.4% | 3.0% | −4.0% | −8.5% | −6.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $174M | $367M | $1.1B | $293M | ($122M) | $3.0B | $1.3B | $385M | ($760M) | ($1.5B) | ($1.2B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| -8% | — | — | 6% | — | 21% | 24% | 27% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $303M | $338M | $479M | $568M | ($258M) | $2.8B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $105M | ($462M) | ($436M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $115M | $88M | $89M | $85M | $308M | $897M | $1.0B | $973M | $951M | $1.2B | $1.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $14M | ($117M) | ($738M) | $190M | ($444M) | ($1.1B) | $54M | $909M | ($86M) | ($219M) | ($448M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $7M | $135M | $296M | $656M | $525M | $705M | $943M | $646M | $695M | $561M | $561M | CapexCapex |
| 0.5% | 7.2% | 12.7% | 33.0% | 9.8% | 3.4% | 4.1% | 2.9% | 3.6% | 3.0% | 3.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $296M | $250M | $390M | $483M | ($566M) | $2.1B | $1.5B | $1.6B | ($590M) | ($1.0B) | ($997M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 19.0% | 13.4% | 16.7% | 24.3% | −10.6% | 10.2% | 6.4% | 7.4% | −3.1% | −5.5% | −5.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $296M | $203M | $183M | ($88M) | ($783M) | $2.1B | $1.5B | $1.6B | ($590M) | ($1.0B) | ($997M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 19.0% | 10.9% | 7.8% | −4.4% | −14.6% | 10.2% | 6.4% | 7.4% | −3.1% | −5.5% | −5.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $0 | $72M | $41M | — | — | — | — | — | $41M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | $0 | $48M | $253M | $0 | $0 | $240M | $152M | $733M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 31% | 44% | 78% | 19% | -2% | 30% | 12% | 4% | -4% | -9% | -7% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | — | 82% | -6% | 54% | 17% | 5% | -11% | -24% | -21% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | 62% | −8% | — | — | — | — | — | −22% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $313M | $978M | $823M | $353M | $112M | $48M | $26M | $198M | $54M | $57M | $131M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $129M | $107M | $227M | $94M | $1.2B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $178M | $138M | $181M | $317M | $3.8B | $5.2B | $5.1B | $4.5B | $5.1B | $4.8B | $4.6B | InventoryInvent. |
| $108M | $100M | $187M | $193M | $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $2.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $200M | $146M | $221M | $218M | $3.4B | $5.3B | $4.9B | $4.2B | $4.7B | $4.3B | $4.5B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $825M | $1.5B | $1.5B | $898M | $5.3B | $7.7B | $7.4B | $6.6B | $6.9B | $6.4B | $6.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $391M | $452M | $468M | $409M | $2.9B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.3B | $3.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 3.4× | 3.2× | 2.2× | 1.8× | 2.1× | 2.1× | 1.9× | 2.1× | 1.9× | 2.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | $2M | $1.4B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.9B | $3.0B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $16.8B | $19.0B | $18.8B | $17.5B | $20.9B | $20.0B | $20.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $5.4B | $5.2B | $4.2B | $3.1B | $7.1B | $7.3B | $7.8B | Total debtDebt |
| $1.9B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.8B | $5.3B | $5.2B | $4.2B | $2.9B | $7.0B | $7.2B | $7.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($1.5B) | ($444M) | ($410M) | $358M | $2.0B | $5.5B | $7.8B | $7.9B | $6.6B | $6.1B | $5.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 200M | 293M | 304M | 284M | 379M | 558M | 524M | 511M | 480M | 508M | 570M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $7.77 | $6.37 | $7.67 | $7.01 | $14.13 | $36.64 | $43.87 | $43.05 | $39.97 | $36.63 | $33.16 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.87 | $1.25 | $3.71 | $1.03 | $-0.32 | $5.35 | $2.55 | $0.75 | $-1.58 | $-2.91 | $-2.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.48 | $0.85 | $1.28 | $1.70 | $-1.49 | $3.73 | $2.82 | $3.17 | $-1.23 | $-2.01 | $-1.75 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.48 | $0.69 | $0.60 | $-0.31 | $-2.07 | $3.73 | $2.82 | $3.17 | $-1.23 | $-2.01 | $-1.75 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.25 | $0.11 | — | — | — | — | — | $0.07 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.04 | $0.46 | $0.97 | $2.31 | $1.39 | $1.26 | $1.80 | $1.26 | $1.45 | $1.10 | $0.98 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-7.32 | $-1.52 | $-1.35 | $1.26 | $5.32 | $9.84 | $14.87 | $15.43 | $13.82 | $12.04 | $10.21 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +18.8%/yr | +21.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +45.8%/yr | −4.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | +17.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $1.5B loss into ($1.0B) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($1.5B) | ($760M) | $385M | $1.3B | $3.0B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.2B | +$951M | +$973M | +$1.0B | +$897M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$219M | −$86M | +$909M | +$54M | −$1.1B |
| Cash from operations | ($462M) | $105M | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.8B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$561M | −$695M | −$646M | −$943M | −$705M |
| Owner earnings | ($1.0B) | ($590M) | $1.6B | $1.5B | $2.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -5% | -3% | 7% | 6% | 10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -7.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($1.6B) ÷ interest expense $217M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $57M − debt $7.3B
What this means
Netting $57M of cash and short-term investments against $7.3B of debt leaves $7.2B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $86M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $7.1B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 28 + DIO 89 − DPO 35 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -9%–78%; -9% latest = NOPAT ($1.2B) ÷ invested capital $13.3BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -11%–24%; latest ($1.0B) = operating cash ($462M) − maintenance capex $561MIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -5% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves ($1.0B).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($462M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($1.5B) · cash from operations ($462M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.45×HarvestingCapex $561M ÷ depreciation $1.2B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $18.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.95×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $7.3B vs $3.1B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −211%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.08/share (latest year $-2.59), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.72/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 19% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 19% early to −3% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −7%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2025 · −8.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“The shortage will continue to be exacerbated by the anticipated widespread adoption of AI in virtually all sectors of the economy, which will exponentially increase the consumption of electricity in the U.S. and worldwide.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$45M
- Receivables$1.9B
- Inventory$4.6B
- Other current assets$192M
- Debt due within a year$26M
- Accounts payable$2.0B
- Other current liabilities$1.3B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $8.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$5.2B · 60%
- Dividends$113M · 1%
- Buybacks$1.4B · 17%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.8B · 22%
- Returned to owners$1.5B
35% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $113M as dividends and $1.4B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $5.6B and cash and short-term investments fell $268M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$10.10
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 30M shares were bought for $301M, about $10.10 each.
- Net change in share count184.9%
The diluted count rose from 200M to 570M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.11/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−11%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $309M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.11 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Lourenco Goncalves | $24.5M | $39.0M | $2.1B |
| 2022 | Lourenco Goncalves | $18.5M | $5.1M | $1.5B |
| 2023 | Lourenco Goncalves | $26.1M | $24.3M | $1.6B |
| 2024 | Lourenco Goncalves | $15.2M | −$5.7M | ($590M) |
| 2025 | Lourenco Goncalves | $19.0M | $20.5M | ($1.0B) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- CEO pay ratio156:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$17M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Cleveland-Cliffs is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
5 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.4% vs 16.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 16.4% early in the record and −0.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?184.9%
Diluted shares grew 184.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.2B → $7.8B
Debt rose from $2.2B to $7.8B while owner earnings went from about $312M to $3M — about 7.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2921 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?20% → 34% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $307M to $6.5B while revenue grew 1116%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (20% of revenue then, 34% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $274M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Steel
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FCXFreeport-McMoRan Inc. | $25.2B | 29% | 25.5% | 15% | 13% |
| NEMNewmont Corporation | $22.7B | — | 12.0% | 4% | 19% |
| CLFCleveland-Cliffs | $18.6B | 14% | 8.4% | 16% | 9% |
| SCCOSouthern Copper Corporation | $13.4B | 52% | 41.5% | 18% | 24% |
| CDECoeur Mining Inc. | $2.1B | 79% | 4.3% | 2% | 2% |
| MPMP Materials | $224M | — | -10.4% | -4% | -3% |
| MUXMcEwen Inc. | $198M | 77% | -43.0% | -9% | -7% |
| IAUXi-80 Gold Corp. | $95M | — | -177.0% | -15% | -157% |
| Group median | — | 52% | 6.4% | 3% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cleveland-Cliffs has delivered.
Cleveland-Cliffs’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Cleveland-Cliffs earns about $1.6B on its 8.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −5.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($997M) on 570M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-21; net debt $7.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CLDX its page in the Manual CLFD →
Industry order: ← ATI the Steel chapter CMC →