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FSLR, First Solar

Semiconductors capital-intensive Cyclical

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Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

FSLR · First Solar

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$5.2B

+24.1% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $5.4B 5-yr avg $3.7B

Gross margin 42% 5-yr avg 30%

Operating margin 31.8% 5-yr avg 21.7%

ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 13%

Owner-earnings margin 35% 5-yr avg 16%

Free cash flow margin 31% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 22% and operating margin about 6.0% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −20% and 33% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 18% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.2B	$3.1B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$2.6B	$3.3B	$4.2B	$5.2B	$5.4B	RevenueRevenue
22%	19%	17%	18%	25%	25%	3%	39%	44%	41%	42%	Gross marginGross mgn
9%	7%	8%	7%	8%	6%	6%	6%	4%	4%	4%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%	3%	4%	3%	3%	3%	4%	5%	5%	4%	5%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($568M)	$178M	$40M	($162M)	$317M	$587M	($27M)	$857M	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.7B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−19.6%	6.0%	1.8%	−5.3%	11.7%	20.1%	−1.0%	25.8%	33.2%	30.6%	31.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($416M)	($166M)	$144M	($115M)	$398M	$469M	($44M)	$831M	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.7B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	2%	—	—	18%	—	7%	8%	3%	3%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$207M	$1.3B	($327M)	$174M	$37M	$238M	$873M	$602M	$1.2B	$2.1B	$2.5B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$204M	$92M	$131M	$205M	$233M	$260M	$270M	$308M	$423M	$529M	$552M	DepreciationDeprec.
$390M	$1.4B	($636M)	$46M	($623M)	($512M)	$619M	($571M)	($526M)	($20M)	$210M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$229M	$514M	$740M	$669M	$417M	$540M	$904M	$1.4B	$1.5B	$870M	$782M	CapexCapex
7.9%	17.5%	33.0%	21.8%	15.4%	18.5%	34.5%	41.8%	36.3%	16.7%	14.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($23M)	$1.2B	($458M)	($31M)	($196M)	($22M)	$604M	$294M	$795M	$1.5B	$1.9B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−0.8%	42.5%	−20.4%	−1.0%	−7.2%	−0.8%	23.0%	8.9%	18.9%	29.3%	35.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($23M)	$826M	($1.1B)	($495M)	($380M)	($303M)	($30M)	($785M)	($308M)	$1.2B	$1.7B	Free cash flowFCF
−0.8%	28.1%	−47.5%	−16.1%	−14.0%	−10.4%	−1.2%	−23.6%	−7.3%	22.7%	30.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$10M	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$36M	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
-11%	3%	1%	-3%	7%	10%	-0%	15%	18%	21%	21%	ROICROIC
-8%	-3%	3%	-2%	7%	8%	-1%	12%	16%	16%	17%	Return on equityROE
−8%	−3%	3%	−2%	7%	8%	−1%	12%	16%	16%	17%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2.0B	$3.0B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$1.6B	$2.8B	$3.4B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$267M	$212M	$128M	$475M	$266M	$429M	$324M	$661M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$363M	$172M	$388M	$444M	$568M	$666M	$621M	$820M	$1.1B	$737M	$894M	InventoryInvent.
$149M	$120M	$233M	$218M	$183M	$193M	$341M	$207M	$482M	$406M	$307M	Accounts payablePayables
$481M	$264M	$283M	$700M	$650M	$902M	$604M	$1.3B	$1.9B	$1.6B	$2.0B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.8B	$3.8B	$3.9B	$3.6B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$3.8B	$4.6B	$5.1B	$6.0B	$5.6B	Current assetsCur. assets
$908M	$650M	$845M	$1.3B	$847M	$727M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.2×	5.9×	4.6×	2.7×	3.6×	4.4×	3.7×	3.5×	2.4×	2.7×	2.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$14M	$14M	$14M	$14M	$14M	$14M	$14M	$30M	$28M	$31M	$31M	GoodwillGoodwill
$6.8B	$6.9B	$7.1B	$7.5B	$7.1B	$7.4B	$8.3B	$10.4B	$12.1B	$13.3B	$13.4B	Total assetsAssets
$197M	$406M	$479M	$472M	$279M	$240M	$184M	$560M	$610M	$499M	$426M	Total debtDebt
($1.8B)	($2.6B)	($924M)	($881M)	($948M)	($1.2B)	($1.3B)	($1.4B)	($1.0B)	($2.3B)	($3.0B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-27.7×	6.9×	1.5×	-6.0×	13.2×	44.8×	-2.2×	66.1×	35.9×	36.2×	40.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.2B	$5.1B	$5.2B	$5.1B	$5.5B	$6.0B	$5.8B	$6.7B	$8.0B	$9.5B	$9.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%	1.2%	1.5%	1.2%	1.1%	0.7%	1.1%	1.0%	0.7%	0.4%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
103M	104M	106M	105M	107M	107M	107M	107M	108M	108M	108M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$28.24	$28.19	$21.15	$29.09	$25.41	$27.34	$24.58	$30.91	$39.12	$48.54	$50.35	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-4.05	$-1.59	$1.36	$-1.09	$3.73	$4.38	$-0.41	$7.74	$12.02	$14.21	$15.47	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.22	$11.97	$-4.31	$-0.30	$-1.84	$-0.21	$5.67	$2.74	$7.39	$14.21	$17.64	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.22	$7.92	$-10.05	$-4.70	$-3.56	$-2.83	$-0.28	$-7.31	$-2.87	$11.04	$15.50	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.23	$4.93	$6.97	$6.35	$3.91	$5.05	$8.48	$12.92	$14.19	$8.09	$7.27	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$50.73	$48.87	$49.12	$48.40	$51.75	$55.74	$54.77	$62.28	$74.19	$88.69	$91.79	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.2%/yr	+13.8%/yr
EPS	—	+30.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+15.4%/yr	+15.7%/yr
Book value / share	+6.4%/yr	+11.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

108Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

21%low FY2016

Gross margin

41%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.5Bowner earningsvs.$1.5Bnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $529M it takes just to hold its position. It put $341M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.2B.

Reported net income$1.5B

Owner earnings$1.5B · 29% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$1.5B	$1.3B	$831M	($44M)	$469M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$529M	+$423M	+$308M	+$270M	+$260M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$19M	+$28M	+$34M	+$29M	+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$20M	−$526M	−$571M	+$619M	−$512M
Cash from operations	$2.1B	$1.2B	$602M	$873M	$238M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$529M	−$423M	−$308M	−$270M	−$260M
Owner earnings	$1.5B	$795M	$294M	$604M	($22M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$341M	−$1.1B	−$1.1B	−$634M	−$280M
Free cash flow	$1.2B	($308M)	($785M)	($30M)	($303M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	29%	19%	9%	23%	-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $529M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $341M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer $1.5B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 36.2×

Comfortable

Operating income $1.6B ÷ interest expense $44M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$3.0B

Net cash

Cash $2.8B + ST investments $720M − debt $499M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $3.0B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 129d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 90 + DIO 87 − DPO 48 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -11%–21%; 21% latest = NOPAT $1.5B ÷ invested capital $7.2B

Industry peers: median 19%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 21% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 29%

High, recently turned positive

latest $1.5B = operating cash $2.1B − maintenance capex $529M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -1%)

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 29% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 10 years. It chose to put $341M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $1.2B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves $1.5B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.35×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $2.1B ÷ net income $1.5B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 1.64×

Expanding

Capex $870M ÷ depreciation $529M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.67×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $499M vs $3.8B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $11.33/share (latest year $14.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $88.76/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −4% → 30% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −4% early to 30% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 50%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +7%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · −19.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.5%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, any latency, disruption, or failure in our AI systems or infrastructure could result in delays or errors in our offerings.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.6B

Cash & short-term investments$3.4B
Receivables$1.4B
Inventory$894M

Current liabilities$2.2B

Debt due within a year$189M
Accounts payable$307M
Other current liabilities$1.7B

Current ratio2.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.15×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.53×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$3.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$189M due · $3.4B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+23.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.2× → 2.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$9.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$2.2BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$544M$119M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$1.8Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$7.8B · 121%

Source of funding−$1.4B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $197M to $426M.
Net change in share count4.6%
The diluted count rose from 103M to 108M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained16%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($3.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $616M, so each retained $1 added about 0.16 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Widmar	$6.5M	$3.1M	($22M)
2022	Mr. Widmar	$7.2M	$32.5M	$604M
2023	Mr. Widmar	$7.7M	$19.9M	$294M
2024	Mr. Widmar	$6.4M	$6.5M	$795M
2025	Mr. Widmar	$8.1M	$10.4M	$1.5B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$19M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why First Solar is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.6%
Diluted shares grew 4.6% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?22% → 42% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $630M to $2.3B while revenue grew 87%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (22% of revenue then, 42% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $1.1B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TXNTexas Instruments Incorporated	$17.7B	64%	40.7%	35%	35%
AMKRAmkor Technology	$6.7B	17%	7.5%	10%	6%
SNSharkNinja Inc.	$6.4B	48%	11.7%	21%	6%
FSLRFirst Solar	$5.2B	23%	8.9%	5%	4%
CIENCiena Corporation	$4.8B	43%	7.5%	9%	9%
AYIAcuity	$4.3B	42%	12.7%	19%	11%
GNRCGenerac	$4.2B	36%	14.5%	14%	11%
AOSA.O. Smith Corporation	$3.8B	39%	19.1%	29%	13%
Group median	—	41%	12.2%	16%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what First Solar has delivered.

First Solar’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, First Solar earns about $211M on its 4.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 29.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($211M) Net of stock comp (−$23M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($1.9B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+41%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.7B on 107M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $3.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($782M) runs well above depreciation ($552M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh FSLR against another business →

The owners of FSLR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "First Solar (FSLR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FSLR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FSI its page in the Manual FSLY →

Industry order: ← FORM the Semiconductors chapter GFS →