← All companies ← FSLR Manual FSS → ← FRSH Software GCL →

FSLY, Fastly Inc.

Software asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Fastly is the essential platform to deliver resilient, highly performant, always-on software and services at global scale.

The edge cloud is a category of Infrastructure as a Service ("IaaS") that enables software engineers to build, secure, and deliver digital experiences at the edge of the Internet.

The edge cloud complements data center, central cloud, and hybrid solutions, and is critical for responsive, safe, and secure AI-centric experiences.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

FSLY · Fastly Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$624M

+14.8% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $653M 5-yr avg $492M

Gross margin 59% 5-yr avg 53%

Operating margin −16.0% 5-yr avg −41.6%

ROIC −7% 5-yr avg −11%

Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg −6%

Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg −6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Network Services (77%), Security (20%) and Other (3%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −31% through the cycle on a 54% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 20% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −13%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Network Services is 77% of revenue, with Security the other meaningful line at 20%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Network Services77%$478M
Security20%$125M
Other3%$21M

By geographyUnited States75%International25%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$105M	$145M	$200M	$291M	$354M	$433M	$506M	$544M	$624M	$653M	RevenueRevenue
54%	55%	56%	59%	53%	48%	53%	54%	57%	59%	Gross marginGross mgn
17%	16%	21%	35%	36%	28%	23%	21%	18%	18%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
28%	24%	23%	26%	36%	36%	30%	25%	26%	26%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($31M)	($29M)	($47M)	($107M)	($219M)	($246M)	($198M)	($168M)	($119M)	($105M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−29.6%	−20.2%	−23.2%	−36.9%	−61.8%	−56.9%	−39.1%	−30.9%	−19.1%	−16.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($32M)	($31M)	($52M)	($96M)	($223M)	($191M)	($133M)	($158M)	($122M)	($103M)	Net incomeNet inc.
										Cash flow & returns
($26M)	($17M)	($31M)	($20M)	($38M)	($70M)	$362K	$16M	$94M	$106M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$10M	$13M	$17M	$20M	$29M	$43M	$52M	$54M	$61M	$58M	DepreciationDeprec.
($6M)	($4M)	($8M)	($8M)	$15M	($67M)	($54M)	$13M	$38M	$25M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$12M	$17M	$15M	$30M	$35M	$20M	$11M	$10M	$29M	$47M	CapexCapex
11.5%	11.6%	7.3%	10.2%	9.8%	4.6%	2.2%	1.9%	4.6%	7.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($36M)	($34M)	($46M)	($40M)	($73M)	($90M)	($11M)	$6M	$66M	$59M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−33.8%	−23.3%	−22.9%	−13.7%	−20.7%	−20.7%	−2.1%	1.1%	10.5%	9.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($38M)	($34M)	($46M)	($49M)	($73M)	($90M)	($11M)	$6M	$66M	$59M	Free cash flowFCF
−36.2%	−23.3%	−22.9%	−17.0%	−20.7%	−20.7%	−2.1%	1.1%	10.5%	9.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$0	$0	$201M	$1M	$26M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	-14%	-8%	-10%	-13%	-13%	-13%	-8%	-7%	ROICROIC
—	—	-20%	-9%	-22%	-20%	-14%	-16%	-13%	-11%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−20%	−9%	−22%	−20%	−14%	−16%	−13%	−11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$31M	$37M	$16M	$63M	$166M	$683M	$329M	$296M	$362M	$330M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$25M	$37M	$50M	$65M	$90M	$120M	$116M	$118M	$130M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$2M	$5M	$9M	$9M	$5M	$6M	$6M	$18M	$39M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$22M	$33M	$41M	$55M	$85M	$115M	$110M	$100M	$91M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$117M	$249M	$261M	$625M	$636M	$464M	$440M	$507M	$490M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$32M	$37M	$94M	$132M	$152M	$148M	$104M	$194M	$163M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	3.7×	6.7×	2.8×	4.7×	4.2×	3.1×	4.2×	2.6×	3.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$382K	$360K	$372K	$635M	$637M	$670M	$670M	$670M	$670M	$670M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$163M	$321M	$1.2B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Total assetsAssets
—	$39M	$25M	$0	$933M	$705M	$344M	$338M	$362M	$324M	Total debtDebt
—	$2M	$9M	($63M)	$767M	$22M	$15M	$42M	$80K	($7M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-27.8×	-16.1×	-8.9×	-69.2×	-41.8×	-41.8×	-48.9×	-61.1×	-9.4×	-8.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($107M)	($132M)	$258M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$955M	$979M	$965M	$930M	$977M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.7%	2.8%	6.1%	22.2%	39.6%	33.7%	26.9%	19.9%	18.8%	19.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
23.4M	24.4M	68.3M	104M	116M	122M	129M	138M	147M	154M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.48	$5.93	$2.93	$2.81	$3.05	$3.55	$3.93	$3.94	$4.25	$4.25	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.39	$-1.27	$-0.75	$-0.93	$-1.92	$-1.57	$-1.03	$-1.14	$-0.83	$-0.67	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.52	$-1.38	$-0.67	$-0.39	$-0.63	$-0.74	$-0.08	$0.04	$0.45	$0.38	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.62	$-1.38	$-0.67	$-0.48	$-0.63	$-0.74	$-0.08	$0.04	$0.45	$0.38	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.52	$0.69	$0.21	$0.29	$0.30	$0.16	$0.09	$0.07	$0.20	$0.31	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-4.57	$-5.41	$3.77	$10.25	$8.74	$7.85	$7.61	$6.99	$6.33	$6.36	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.8 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.52 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.7%/yr	+8.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	−11.5%/yr	−7.3%/yr
Book value / share	—	−9.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Network Services+11.7%
“Network Services revenue was $477.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, compared to $427.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, an increase of $50.1 million, or 12%. The increase in Network Services revenue was primarily driven by growth in usage from existing customers.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Security+21.4%
“Security revenue was $125.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, compared to $103.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, an increase of $22.0 million, or 21%. The increase in Security revenue was primarily driven by an increase in Next-Gen WAF revenue, partially offset by a decrease in Fastly legacy WAF revenue.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

147Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−8%low FY2019

Gross margin

57%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$66Mowner earningsvs.($122M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2023FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $122M loss into $66M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($122M)	($158M)	($133M)	($191M)	($223M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$61M	+$54M	+$52M	+$43M	+$29M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$117M	+$108M	+$136M	+$146M	+$140M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$38M	+$13M	−$54M	−$67M	+$15M
Cash from operations	$94M	$16M	$362K	($70M)	($38M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$29M	−$10M	−$11M	−$20M	−$35M
Owner earnings	$66M	$6M	($11M)	($90M)	($73M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	11%	1%	-2%	-21%	-21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $117M), owner earnings is nearer ($52M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -9.4×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($119M) ÷ interest expense $13M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $80K

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $181M + ST investments $181M − debt $362M

What this means
Netting $362M of cash and short-term investments against $362M of debt leaves $80K owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 45d

Tight

DSO 69 + DIO 0 − DPO 24 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -13%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range -14%–-8%; -8% latest = NOPAT ($94M) ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median -6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Positive this year, negative across the cycle

latest $66M = operating cash $94M − maintenance capex $29M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median -21%)

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a -21% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $117M of SBC) leaves ($52M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $94M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($122M) · cash from operations $94M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.47×

Harvesting

Capex $29M ÷ depreciation $61M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $624M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.61×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $362M vs $313M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.88/share (latest year $-0.78), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −24% → −30% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
The recent-years average (−30%) sits below the early years (−24%), but the latest year (−19%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −31% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2021 · −61.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We may not be successful in our AI initiatives or our competitors may incorporate AI into their products or market their AI solutions more successfully than us, which could adversely affect our business (such as by impairing our ability to compete effectively against our competitors), reputation, or financial results.…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$490M

Cash & short-term investments$330M
Receivables$130M
Other current assets$30M

Current liabilities$163M

Accounts payable$39M
Other current liabilities$124M

Current ratio3.00×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio3.00×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio2.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$327Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+19.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.1× → 3.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$283Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($46M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$398M$74M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$43Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$696M46% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity72%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$228Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $178M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$10.2M	−$12.8M	($73M)
2022	$9.2M	−$3.9M	($90M)
2022	$21.9M	$20.2M	($90M)
2023	$10.2M	$36.9M	($11M)
2024	$7.5M	−$24.7M	$6M
2025	$6.4M	−$23.1M	$66M
2025	$6.8M	$10.5M	$66M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership4.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$117M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 19% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$209M · 32% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our 10 largest customers generated an aggregate of 32% and 33% of our revenue in the trailing 12 months ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
NTSKNetskope Inc.	$709M	65%	-76.9%	-107%	-27%
BLBlackLine	$700M	76%	-9.4%	-3%	11%
QLYSQualys	$669M	78%	24.5%	25%	40%
MQMarqeta Inc.	$625M	45%	-28.0%	-57%	10%
FSLYFastly Inc.	$624M	54%	-30.9%	-13%	-21%
VRNSVaronis	$624M	85%	-23.5%	-22%	5%
NCNOnCino	$595M	59%	-20.4%	-6%	2%
EVCMEverCommerce	$589M	—	-4.9%	-1%	16%
Group median	—	65%	-21.9%	-9%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Fastly Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($20M) Net of stock comp (−$127M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($77M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+982%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $59M on 157M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $7M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($47M) runs well above depreciation ($58M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $77M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh FSLY against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Fastly Inc. (FSLY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FSLY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FSLR its page in the Manual FSS →

Industry order: ← FRSH the Software chapter GCL →