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GFS, GlobalFoundries Inc.
A semiconductor business, riding a brutal capacity cycle on the edge of Moore's Law.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 15% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.9%) on a 24% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −10 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 3 regions, the largest United States at 50%.
- United States50%$3.4B
- Europe, the Middle East and Africa25%$1.7B
- Other25%$1.7B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $5.8B | $4.9B | $6.6B | $8.1B | $7.4B | $6.8B | $6.8B | $6.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| −9% | −15% | 15% | 28% | 28% | 24% | 25% | 25% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($1.6B) | ($1.7B) | ($60M) | $1.2B | $1.1B | ($214M) | $797M | $797M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −28.0% | −34.1% | −0.9% | 14.4% | 15.3% | −3.2% | 11.7% | 11.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($1.4B) | ($1.4B) | ($250M) | $1.4B | $1.0B | ($265M) | $885M | $885M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 6% | 6% | — | 3% | 3% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $497M | $1.0B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2.4B | $2.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($514M) | $167M | $1.7B | ($292M) | ($216M) | $563M | ($322M) | ($322M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $588M | $592M | $1.8B | $3.1B | $1.8B | $625M | $722M | $722M | CapexCapex |
| 10.1% | 12.2% | 26.8% | 37.7% | 24.4% | 9.3% | 10.6% | 10.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($91M) | $412M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $804M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.0B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −1.6% | 8.5% | 16.3% | 14.3% | 10.9% | 16.3% | 14.9% | 14.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($91M) | $412M | $1.1B | ($435M) | $321M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $1.0B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −1.6% | 8.5% | 16.3% | −5.4% | 4.3% | 16.3% | 14.9% | 14.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $200M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | -16% | -1% | 11% | 10% | -2% | 7% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| -15% | -19% | -3% | 15% | 9% | -2% | 7% | 7% | Return on equityROE |
| −15% | −19% | −3% | 15% | 9% | −2% | 7% | 7% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $997M | $959M | $3.0B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $1.9B | $1.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $767M | $872M | $824M | $1.0B | $906M | $1.0B | $1.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $920M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $1.3B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.2B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $344M | ($593M) | ($686M) | $140M | $421M | $464M | $464M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $3.0B | $5.3B | $5.8B | $6.3B | $6.4B | $6.2B | $6.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $1.9B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $3.0B | $2.4B | $2.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.6× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 2.0× | 2.1× | 2.6× | 2.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $12.3B | $15.0B | $17.8B | $18.0B | $16.8B | $17.1B | $17.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $2.0B | $1.7B | $2.3B | $1.8B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $998M | ($1.2B) | ($143M) | ($638M) | ($1.2B) | ($797M) | ($797M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -7.1× | -10.8× | -0.5× | 10.5× | 8.2× | -1.5× | 8.6× | 8.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $9.0B | $7.2B | $8.0B | $9.9B | $11.1B | $10.8B | $11.9B | $11.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 504M | 500M | 506M | 539M | 552M | 553M | 555M | 556M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $11.53 | $9.70 | $13.01 | $15.04 | $13.39 | $12.21 | $12.24 | $12.22 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.72 | $-2.70 | $-0.49 | $2.69 | $1.85 | $-0.48 | $1.59 | $1.59 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.18 | $0.82 | $2.12 | $2.14 | $1.46 | $1.98 | $1.82 | $1.82 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.18 | $0.82 | $2.12 | $-0.81 | $0.58 | $1.98 | $1.82 | $1.82 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.17 | $1.18 | $3.49 | $5.68 | $3.27 | $1.13 | $1.30 | $1.30 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $17.90 | $14.35 | $15.76 | $18.39 | $20.12 | $19.49 | $21.49 | $21.46 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.0%/yr | +4.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +17.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +1.8%/yr | +1.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +3.1%/yr | +8.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $885M of profit into $1.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $885M | ($265M) | $1.0B | $1.4B | ($250M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.2B | +$1.4B | +$1.3B | +$1.5B | +$1.4B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$322M | +$563M | −$216M | −$292M | +$1.7B |
| Cash from operations | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $2.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$722M | −$625M | −$1.3B | −$1.5B | −$1.8B |
| Owner earnings | $1.0B | $1.1B | $804M | $1.2B | $1.1B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$483M | −$1.6B | — |
| Free cash flow | $1.0B | $1.1B | $321M | ($435M) | $1.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 15% | 16% | 11% | 14% | 16% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $797M ÷ interest expense $93M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $1.8B + ST investments $53M − debt $1.1B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $797M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 56 + DIO 113 − DPO 154 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -16%–11%; 7% latest = NOPAT $777M ÷ invested capital $11.2BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -2%–16%; latest $1.0B = operating cash $1.7B − maintenance capex $722MIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 7 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.7B ÷ net income $885M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $1.0B
What this means
Of $1.0B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.62×HarvestingCapex $722M ÷ depreciation $1.2B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $6.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.62×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $3.8B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.98/share (latest year $1.59), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $21.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −21% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −21% early to 8% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +37%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 37% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −34.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +1.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$1.9B
- Receivables$1.0B
- Inventory$1.6B
- Other current assets$1.7B
- Accounts payable$2.2B
- Other current liabilities$214M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $12.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$9.2B · 73%
- Buybacks$200M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)$3.2B · 25%
- Returned to owners$200M
4% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $200M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $200M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count10.3%
The diluted count rose from 504M to 556M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why GlobalFoundries Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?10.3%
Diluted shares grew 10.3% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $200M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NXPINXP Semiconductors N.V. | $12.3B | 55% | 24.8% | 17% | 21% |
| ADIAnalog Devices Inc. | $11.0B | 63% | 27.0% | 8% | 35% |
| MRVLMarvell Technology Inc. | $8.2B | 50% | -8.7% | -2% | 19% |
| GFSGlobalFoundries Inc. | $6.8B | 24% | -0.9% | 3% | 14% |
| ONON Semiconductor Corporation | $6.0B | 37% | 13.4% | 14% | 15% |
| QQnity Electronics Inc. | $4.8B | 46% | 20.1% | 7% | 20% |
| MCHPMicrochip Technology Incorporated | $4.7B | 61% | 15.9% | 7% | 31% |
| SWKSSkyworks Solutions Inc. | $4.1B | 47% | 27.8% | 23% | 28% |
| Group median | — | 49% | 18.0% | 7% | 20% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. GlobalFoundries Inc.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GlobalFoundries Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, GlobalFoundries Inc. earns about $968M on its 14.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $1.0B on 556M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $797M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← GFR its page in the Manual GGAL →
Industry order: ← FSLR the Semiconductors chapter HIMX →