Owner Scorecard


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FTDR, Frontdoor Inc.

Frontdoor is the leading provider of home warranties and new home builder warranties in the United States, as measured by revenue, and operates primarily under the American Home Shield, HSA, OneGuard, Landmark and 2-10 HBW brands.

Our customizable home warranties help customers protect and maintain their homes, typically their most valuable asset, from costly and unplanned breakdowns of essential home systems and appliances.

Non-warranty services are marketed to our existing warranty customer base, enabling incremental revenue opportunities beyond traditional warranty coverage.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FTDR · Frontdoor Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.1B
+13.6% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $1.8B
Gross margin 55% 5-yr avg 50%
Operating margin 19.9% 5-yr avg 14.9%
ROIC 40% 5-yr avg 37%
Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 18% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Renewals (76%) and Non-Warranty and Other (9%), with 2 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 49% and operating margin about 15% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −28 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 42%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Renewals is 76% of revenue, with Non-Warranty and Other the other meaningful line at 9%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Renewals76%$1.6B
  • Non-Warranty and Other9%$193M
  • Direct-To-Consumer8%$172M
  • Real Estate7%$141M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.0B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8B$2.1B$2.1BRevenueRevenue
48%49%45%50%49%49%43%50%54%55%55%Gross marginGross mgn
28%27%27%29%32%32%31%33%33%32%32%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$195M$221M$190M$266M$206M$206M$124M$268M$349M$418M$421MOperating incomeOp. inc.
19.1%19.1%15.1%19.5%14.0%12.9%7.5%15.1%18.9%20.0%19.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$124M$160M$125M$153M$112M$128M$71M$171M$235M$255M$259MNet incomeNet inc.
36%27%25%25%25%23%24%25%24%25%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$155M$194M$189M$200M$207M$185M$142M$202M$270M$416M$411MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$8M$17M$21M$24M$34M$35M$34M$37M$39M$89M$86MDepreciationDeprec.
$19M$13M$39M$14M$44M($3M)$15M($32M)($30M)$38M$30MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$11M$15M$27M$22M$32M$31M$40M$32M$39M$26M$25MCapexCapex
1.1%1.3%2.1%1.6%2.2%1.9%2.4%1.8%2.1%1.2%1.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$147M$179M$168M$178M$175M$154M$102M$170M$231M$390M$386MOwner earningsOwner earn.
14.4%15.5%13.4%13.0%11.9%9.6%6.1%9.6%12.5%18.6%18.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$144M$179M$162M$178M$175M$154M$102M$170M$231M$390M$386MFree cash flowFCF
14.1%15.5%12.9%13.0%11.9%9.6%6.1%9.6%12.5%18.6%18.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$87M$38M$5M$0$0$583M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$87M$63M$137M$63MDividends paidDiv. paid
$103M$59M$121M$161M$283MBuybacksBuybacks
32%42%42%55%50%45%25%50%26%37%40%ROICROIC
22%24%6400%116%126%98%105%113%Return on equityROE
7%15%85%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$168M$309M$305M$435M$597M$262M$292M$325M$474M$566M$603MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$406M$12M$11M$5M$7M$5M$6M$10M$10M$10MReceivablesReceiv.
$33M$41M$48M$55M$66M$80M$76M$71M$89M$87MAccounts payablePayables
$373M($29M)($37M)($50M)($59M)($75M)($70M)($61M)($79M)($77M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$741M$330M$461M$626M$295M$330M$363M$488M$624M$661MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$705M$345M$364M$403M$378M$364M$331M$369M$402M$451MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.0×1.3×1.6×0.8×0.9×1.1×1.3×1.6×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$471M$476M$476M$501M$512M$512M$503M$503M$967M$959M$959MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B$1.0B$1.3B$1.4B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$2.1B$2.1B$2.2BTotal assetsAssets
$977M$973M$968M$608M$609M$593M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BTotal debtDebt
$672M$538M$371M$346M$317M$268M$725M$607M$564MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
221.0×8.3×4.3×3.6×5.3×4.0×6.7×8.7×5.3×5.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$560M$661M($344M)($179M)($61M)$2M$61M$136M$239M$242M$230MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.3%0.3%0.7%1.2%1.6%1.3%1.5%1.4%1.6%1.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
84.5M84.5M84.7M84.9M85.5M85.5M82.0M80.9M78.0M74.5M72.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$12.07$13.69$14.85$16.08$17.24$18.74$20.27$22.00$23.63$28.09$29.34Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.47$1.89$1.48$1.80$1.31$1.50$0.87$2.11$3.01$3.42$3.59EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.74$2.12$1.98$2.10$2.05$1.80$1.24$2.10$2.96$5.23$5.35Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.70$2.12$1.91$2.10$2.05$1.80$1.24$2.10$2.96$5.23$5.35Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.03$0.75$1.62$0.87Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.13$0.18$0.32$0.26$0.37$0.36$0.49$0.40$0.50$0.35$0.35Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.63$7.82$-4.06$-2.11$-0.71$0.02$0.74$1.68$3.06$3.25$3.19Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.8%/yr+10.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+13.0%/yr+20.7%/yr
EPS+9.9%/yr+21.2%/yr
Dividends / share+25.3%/yr (2-yr)+25.3%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share+11.6%/yr−1.4%/yr
Book value / share−7.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+13.6%
    “Revenue increased 14 percent for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase in renewal revenue reflects the impact of the 2-10 HBW Acquisition and improved price realization resulting from our prior pricing actions, offset, in part, by a decline in the number of renewed home warranties.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
75Mpeak FY2020
ROIC
37%low FY2022
Gross margin
55%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.6×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$390Mowner earningsvs.$255Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $255M of profit into $390M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$255M
Owner earnings$390M · 19% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$255M$235M$171M$71M$128M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$89M+$39M+$37M+$34M+$35M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$34M+$26M+$26M+$22M+$25M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$38M−$30M−$32M+$15M−$3M
Cash from operations$416M$270M$202M$142M$185M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$26M−$39M−$32M−$40M−$31M
Owner earnings$390M$231M$170M$102M$154M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue19%13%10%6%10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $34M), owner earnings is nearer $356M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $418M ÷ interest expense $79M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $607M · 1.5× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $566M − debt $1.2B
    What this means

    Netting $566M of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $607M owed, about 1.5× a year's operating profit (2.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 2 + DIO 0 − DPO 35 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 25%–55%; 37% latest = NOPAT $314M ÷ invested capital $849M
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 37% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 6%–19%; latest $390M = operating cash $416M − maintenance capex $26M
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $34M of SBC) leaves $356M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $416M ÷ net income $255M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $420M ÷ Owner Earnings $390M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $390M of Owner Earnings, $420M (108%) went back to shareholders, $137M dividends, $283M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $34M stock comp, the real buyback was about $249M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.29×
    Harvesting
    Capex $26M ÷ depreciation $89M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $222M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +62%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.14/share (latest year $3.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 18% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 18% early, 18% lately, median 15%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 28%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · 7.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Technological developments in artificial intelligence could disrupt our industry and subject us to increased competition, legal and regulatory risks and compliance costs.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$661M
  • Cash & short-term investments$603M
  • Receivables$10M
  • Other current assets$48M
Current liabilities$451M
  • Accounts payable$87M
  • Other current liabilities$364M
Current ratio1.47×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.47×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.34×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$210Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($724M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$20M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$191Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$275M · 13%
  • Dividends$287M · 13%
  • Buybacks$727M · 34%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$871M · 40%
  • Returned to owners$1.0B

    54% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $287M as dividends and $727M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $435M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$41.62

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 17M shares were bought for $727M, about $41.62 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $30.77 (2022) to $52.39 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($283M).

  • Net change in share count−14.6%

    The diluted count fell from 85M to 72M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.62/sh

    Paid in 3 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 25% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained19%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($520M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $99M, so each retained $1 added about 0.19 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.4B63% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$716Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $275M of capital spent building

$14M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$6.2M$1.9M$154M
2022$5.4M−$5.9M$102M
2022$5.2M$3.1M$102M
2023$7.9M$13.2M$170M
2024$8.4M$15.3M$231M
2025$9.2M$14.7M$390M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio99:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$34M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Frontdoor Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ROLRollins$3.8B51%17.9%30%16%
TYLTyler Technologies$2.3B47%14.9%10%21%
RDDTReddit Inc.$2.2B88%-21.6%22%3%
FTDRFrontdoor Inc.$2.1B49%17.0%42%13%
EXLSExlService$2.1B86%12.5%14%12%
DTDynatrace$2.0B81%8.7%8%27%
FICOFair Isaac$2.0B73%30.6%35%29%
TBLATaboola.com Ltd.$1.9B30%0.3%-2%6%
Group median62%13.7%18%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Frontdoor Inc. has delivered.

Frontdoor Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Frontdoor Inc. earns about $268M on its 12.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+25%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $386M on 70M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $564M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Frontdoor Inc. (FTDR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FTDR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FTAIM its page in the Manual FTI →

Industry order: ← FOUR the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter FVRR →