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GEV, GE Vernova Inc.
GE Vernova is the power business carved out of General Electric. It makes the heavy equipment that generates electricity and moves it — gas turbines, steam and nuclear equipment, the grid and electrification hardware that carries power to where it is used, and wind turbines. The customers are utilities, governments, and power producers, and the sales are large, long-cycle projects. Much of the lasting profit comes not from the first sale of a turbine but from the multi-decade contracts to service and supply parts for the machines already installed.
We design, manufacture, deliver, and service technologies to create a more reliable, secure, and sustainable electric power system, enabling electrification and decarbonization, underpinning the progress and prosperity of the communities we serve.
We are a purpose-built company, positioned with a unique scope and scale of solutions to help accelerate the energy transition, while servicing and growing our installed base and strengthening our own profitability and stockholder returns.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Products (55%) and Services (45%).
- What moves the needle
- The test that governs GE Vernova is whether the franchise lives in the installed base rather than the order book. Selling the equipment is long-cycle, project-based, and competitive — costly machines whose buyers commit on multi-year timelines — but a turbine, once installed, runs for decades and needs parts and servicing from a maker that knows it, and that aftermarket is where durable pricing power and steadier earnings would show. So the lever to weigh is the service backlog on the installed fleet against the lumpier, more contested business of winning new orders. The bad case is plain: heavy capital sunk into long projects, demand that rides the power-investment cycle and policy on how electricity is made, and a wind business whose economics differ sharply from the turbine and grid franchises. Judge the margins and the return on capital across a full cycle, not a single strong year of orders — the figures are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 1 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 2 lines, the largest Products at 55%.
- Products55%$20.9B
- Services45%$17.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $29.7B | $33.2B | $34.9B | $38.1B | $39.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 12% | 14% | 17% | 20% | 20% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 18% | 15% | 13% | 13% | 13% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($2.9B) | ($923M) | $471M | $1.4B | $1.5B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −9.7% | −2.8% | 1.3% | 3.6% | 3.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($2.7B) | ($438M) | $1.6B | $4.9B | $9.4B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($114M) | $1.2B | $2.6B | $5.0B | $9.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $779M | $724M | $895M | $615M | $632M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $1.8B | $900M | $136M | ($512M) | ($993M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $513M | $744M | $883M | $1.3B | $1.5B | CapexCapex |
| 1.7% | 2.2% | 2.5% | 3.4% | 3.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($627M) | $442M | $1.7B | $3.7B | $7.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −2.1% | 1.3% | 4.9% | 9.7% | 19.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($627M) | $442M | $1.7B | $3.7B | $7.5B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −2.1% | 1.3% | 4.9% | 9.7% | 19.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $0 | $275M | $275M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | $0 | $43M | $3.3B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -24% | -12% | 5% | 60% | 23% | ROICROIC |
| -24% | -6% | 16% | 44% | 67% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −6% | 16% | 41% | 65% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $2.1B | $1.6B | $4.2B | $8.8B | $10.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | $8.2B | $9.8B | $9.6B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $8.3B | $8.6B | $10.4B | $11.9B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | $5.0B | $5.7B | $6.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $8.3B | $11.8B | $14.5B | $15.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $27.4B | $34.2B | $40.2B | $43.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $29.3B | $31.7B | $41.0B | $48.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.9× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $4.2B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.4B | $9.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $46.1B | $51.5B | $63.0B | $75.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $11.6B | $7.4B | $9.5B | $11.2B | $13.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 274M | 274M | 278M | 276M | 272M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $108.23 | $121.31 | $125.67 | $137.93 | $144.76 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-9.99 | $-1.60 | $5.58 | $17.70 | $34.47 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-2.29 | $1.61 | $6.12 | $13.44 | $27.67 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-2.29 | $1.61 | $6.12 | $13.44 | $27.67 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.00 | $1.01 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.87 | $2.72 | $3.18 | $4.63 | $5.47 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $42.36 | $27.07 | $34.34 | $40.50 | $51.18 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.4%/yr | +8.4%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +35.2%/yr | +35.2%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −1.5%/yr | −1.5%/yr (3-yr) |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Services+7.2%
“Services revenues increased at Power, driven by Gas Power higher parts volume and favorable price; at Electrification, primarily due to growth at Grid Solutions; and at Wind due to higher transactional services.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $4.9B of profit but $3.7B of owner earnings: $1.2B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $4.9B | $1.6B | ($438M) | ($2.7B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$615M | +$895M | +$724M | +$779M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$512M | +$136M | +$900M | +$1.8B |
| Cash from operations | $5.0B | $2.6B | $1.2B | ($114M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1.3B | −$883M | −$744M | −$513M |
| Owner earnings | $3.7B | $1.7B | $442M | ($627M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 10% | 5% | 1% | -2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $8.8B − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $8.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 94 + DIO 125 − DPO 68 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid, recently turned positivelatest $3.7B = operating cash $5.0B − maintenance capex $1.3B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median 1%)Industry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 4 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $5.0B ÷ net income $4.9B
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $3.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.7B
What this means
Of $3.7B Owner Earnings, $3.6B (97%) went back to shareholders, $275M dividends, $3.3B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.08×ExpandingCapex $1.3B ÷ depreciation $615M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 2 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $38.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.98×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.44/share (latest year $18.18), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $41.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −6% → 2% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words confirm the number: the filing says price increases held their volume, and the margin widened with them — Buffett’s strongest mark of pricing power.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to 2% lately, median −3% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2022 · −9.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.2%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$10.2B
- Receivables$9.6B
- Inventory$11.9B
- Other current assets$11.3B
- Accounts payable$6.3B
- Other current liabilities$41.8B
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $843M, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2022–2025
Over the record, the business generated $8.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$3.4B · 40%
- Dividends$275M · 3%
- Buybacks$3.4B · 39%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.6B · 18%
- Returned to owners$3.6B
70% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $275M as dividends and $3.4B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $8.1B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$404.39
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 8M shares were bought for $3.3B, about $404.39 each.
- Net change in share count−0.7%
The diluted count barely moved (274M to 272M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$1.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio282:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why GE Vernova Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Electrical Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INTCIntel Corporation | $52.9B | 56% | 23.4% | 11% | 15% |
| GEGE Aerospace | $45.9B | 36% | -2.2% | -2% | 6% |
| QCOMQUALCOMM Incorporated | $44.3B | 57% | 27.1% | 28% | 26% |
| GEVGE Vernova Inc. | $38.1B | 16% | -0.7% | -3% | 3% |
| MUMicron Technology Inc. | $37.4B | 39% | 24.4% | 15% | 20% |
| EMREmerson Electric Company | $18.0B | 43% | 15.3% | 17% | 14% |
| WHRWhirlpool | $15.5B | 17% | 5.4% | 12% | 3% |
| OTISOtis Worldwide Corporation Common Stock | $14.4B | — | 14.5% | 122% | 10% |
| Group median | — | 39% | 14.9% | 14% | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GE Vernova Inc. has delivered.
GE Vernova Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, GE Vernova Inc. earns about $1.2B on its 3.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $7.5B on 269M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net cash $7.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.5B) runs well above depreciation ($632M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $7.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← GETY its page in the Manual GEVO →
Industry order: ← FLNC the Electrical Equipment chapter GNRC →